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In the Supreme Court oral argument in Reno v. ACLU-the case that
struck down a federal statute regulating Internet indecency 2 -Justice Scalia
asked:
This is an area where change is enormously rapid. Is it possible that
this statute is unconstitutional today, or was unconstitutional 2 years
ago when it was examined on the basis of a record done about 2
years ago, but will be constitutional next week?... Or next year or
in two years?3
Scalia's suggestion of rapid change in cyberspace is widely accepted;
indeed, it has become a clich6 to assert that the computer and telecommuni-
cations industries-and particularly the Internet-are changing rapidly and
continually.4 The last few years have witnessed enormous changes and
1. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
2. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The Communica-
tions Decency Act prohibited the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any
recipient under 18 years of age, and the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages
in a manner available to a person under 18. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (Supp. 1111997).
3. Transcript of Oral Argument, Reno (No. 96-511), available in 1997 WL 136253, at *49 (Mar.
19, 1997).
4. One somewhat amusing example of the expectation of continued future change is the fact that
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's business school recently buried an Internet time capsule,
with the usual expectation that upon its opening people will marvel at how differently things were done
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explosive growth in these areas, and it is not clear when or where these
changes will end.5 Legal commentators and jurists have noted the pace of
change in cyberspace and have suggested that courts and legislatures move
slowly in light of the rapid changes.6 Commentators have largely ignored,
however, the questions raised by Justice Scalia in the quotation above:
How should a court respond if, in the case before it, the factual findings
from a previous opinion are no longer valid?7
What if, for example, factual findings regarding the Internet on which
the Supreme Court relied in Reno v. ACLU are now outdated, such that the
Communications Decency Act' (CDA)-not a similar statute, but the CDA
itself-merits new consideration as a possibly constitutional statute? Even
more provocatively, what if some of those findings were outdated by the
time the Supreme Court decided the case, and the changes in the months
after the district court issued its findings weakened the case for unconstitu-
tionality? This Article will discuss the issues raised by both possibilities,
focusing on changes during the appellate process.9
in that era (in this case, of course, the earlier era will be the year 1999). What is striking is that the
date for opening the capsule is only five years hence (the year 2004). See Amy Harmon, It's @786.
Do You Know Where Your Computer Is?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, § 4, at 2, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File; see also Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, No. 99 CIV. 10035, 1999 WL 980165,
at *17 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 27, 1999) (refusing to enforce a one-year noncompete agreement based in part
on the fact that "[w]hen measured against the [information technology] industry in the Internet
environment, a one-year hiatus from the workforce is several generations, if not an eternity").
5. For example, the Internet may replace television broadcasters-and, if so, those broadcasters
may later regain preeminence-or the Internet may never replace broadcasters in the first place. It may
be that houses end up with one telecommunications provider, see Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 776 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that cable and
telephone companies are competing "for control over the single wire that will carry both their
services"), or there may be several; and, once again, it may be that one pattern is dominant for a while
and then is replaced by another (and so on). Simply stated, every aspect of telecommunications is
uncertain, and no one can have confidence about even the most basic conclusions about the size, the
shape, or indeed the existence of the relevant markets and technologies.
6. The law professor most closely associated with this view is Lawrence Lessig. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745 (1995) ("[I]f we had to decide
today ... just what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace, . . . we would get it
fundamentally wrong."). The most prominent jurist espousing this position is Justice Souter, whose
concurrence in Denver Area quoted this assertion by Professor Lessig and also stated that:
Because we cannot be confident that for purposes of judging speech restrictions it will
continue to make sense to distinguish cable from other technologies, and because we know
that changes in these regulated technologies will enormously alter the structure of
regulation itself, we should be shy about saying the final word today about what will be
accepted as reasonable tomorrow.
518 U.S. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring).
7. The lone exception is a recent article that raises the issue but discusses it only briefly. See
Charles Nesson & David Marglin, The Day the Internet Met the First Amendment: Time and the
Communications Decency Act, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 113, 125-30 (1996) (suggesting that the reviva-
bility doctrine might apply to the Communications Decency Act of 1996 in light of changing facts).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
9. This Article focuses on the federal appellate system and the rules and procedures relevant to
it. My analysis applies to state courts only insofar as state rules mirror the federal ones.
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Consideration of these issues raises important and difficult questions
about the functioning of the appellate process, the role of appellate courts,
and the nature of precedent. These issues arise in the evaluation of the
various choices available to appellate courts faced with potentially outdated
factual findings from a trial court. The choices boil down to three basic
options: the appellate court can remand the case, issue its opinion based on
the facts as found below, or update the facts on its own. Remand seems
the obvious option, but it is problematic where the facts are subject to
continual change; the facts may change again between the. new fact-finding
and the issuance of the final appellate opinion, raising the prospect of
indefinitely delaying appellate adjudication. Deciding the case immediately
avoids this problem but creates another one: the appellate court's opinion
granting (or denying) forward-looking relief may be based on facts that no
longer exist. Appellate updating of facts emerges as the most attractive
option. It does require a greater expenditure of appellate resources, but the
other options consume similar amounts of other judges' time and energy;
it does force appellate courts to find facts, but appellate courts are more
willing and more able to do so than we might have thought.
No matter what option is chosen, however, a central consideration
remains: Rapidly changing facts weaken the force of stare decisis by under-
mining the stability of precedents. Appellate opinions are only as robust
as the facts on which they are based. When those facts evaporate, the
opinion on which they rest is weakened as well. Courts could attempt to
ignore this problem by refusing to reconsider decisions even if their factual
underpinnings have been undermined, but that position is difficult to
defend; if an opinion no longer has any factual basis, it is hard to see why
it should continue to have legal force. Rapidly changing facts thus can
undermine factual findings and in turn the opinions that rely on them; the
result is a reduction in the period of time during which judicial opinions
dealing with rapidly changing areas remain applicable, and perhaps a con-
comitant reduction in the degree to which people rely on such opinions for
guidance.
Like the appellate cases on which it focuses, this Article will begin
with the facts (here, the role that facts play in appellate cases) and then
discuss the significance of those facts (here, for the appellate process).
Part I of the Article briefly discusses the centrality of facts in judicial tests.
Part II considers what should happen if facts change after the appellate
process is complete, and the relevance in that context of forward-looking
judicial determinations. Part III identifies situations where facts found by
the trial court changed before an appellate court ruled. Part IV addresses
various ways that appellate courts could respond to this possibility of
factual change during the appellate process. Part V evaluates these
approaches, concluding that appellate updating is the most attractive
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approach. Part VI discusses the larger implications of rapidly changing
facts for the appellate process and for the nature of precedent.
I. The Centrality of Facts in Judicial Tests
Judicial opinions are filled with assertions about the state of the
world-not only recitations of the specific course of dealings between the
parties, but also more general facts and predictions about the impact that
a particular ruling will likely have on events in the future. In the Fourth
Amendment context, for instance, federal courts eschew per se rules in
favor of fact-specific determinations, such as whether or not a reasonable
person questioned by a police officer "would feel free 'to disregard the
police and go about his business."' 10 Examples also arise in First
Amendment jurisprudence. The judicial test for restrictions on speech, for
instance, depends very heavily on the availability of alternatives that would
restrict less speech-and a judgment about the existence of such alternatives
involves factual conclusions about the feasibility of various other forms of
regulation.II Among the tests that call for factual predictions, meanwhile,
is the determination whether a particular interpretation of the First
Amendment will have a chilling effect on future speakers.'"
Although these tests may seem needlessly fact specific, significant
reliance on facts is almost inevitable in many situations. At the outset, the
Supreme Court's long insistence that Article III requires that a federal court
be presented with real parties who have a concrete dispute focuses federal
courts on the actual situation of the parties and the real injury to the
plaintiff. 3 This is one way that legal rulings depend on underlying facts;
but it is not the only way. Even if federal courts were willing to ignore
10. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434 (1991) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
628 (1991)).
11. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (stating that statute's restriction on adult
speech "is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve"); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126, 131 (1989) (striking down a speech regulation because it was not the least restrictive
means of accomplishing Congress's compelling interest); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 146-67 (commenting on
the Court's examination of less restrictive alternatives to the CDA).
12. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 871-72 (stating that the vagueness of a content-based regulation
of speech "raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free
speech").
13. Scholars have discussed at length the constitutional pedigree and wisdom of this limitation.
See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Moomess, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 603, 636-43 (1992) (discussing interpretations of the Article III "Cases" or "Controversies"
requirement); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article II's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions
of Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994) (asserting that the terms "Cases" and
"Controversies" are not interchangeable and that the distinction should be used to analyze the
justiciability doctrines, including standing, ripeness, and mootness).
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the specific history and circumstances of the parties (and one could argue
that some facial challenges do just that), they would still find themselves
depending on facts on the ground-the state of the world as it is.'4
To return to the example of free speech jurisprudence, courts could
devise tests that did not rely so explicitly on the state of the world. But
only the most absolutist tests would, in actual application, avoid a reliance
on the facts on the ground. That is, one could say that any law regulating
speech in any way was per se unconstitutional, and thereby perhaps avoid
having to look at how the law operated. Furthermore, in order to keep
facts out of the picture, the category of "speech" would need to be
delimited as a pure question of legal theory. But any test that defined
speech at least in part by the way it affects people would pollute the fact-
free environment. Similarly, any test that looked at whether or not the law
truly interfered with speech-much less examined the degree of such
interference-would necessarily examine the actual operation of the law in
the world as it exists.' 5 Even Hugo Black's "absolutist" position on the
First Amendment 6 required him to examine the statute's real-world
impact in order to determine whether the challenged law abridged the right
to free speech. Once he found such abridgement, he was inclined not to
engage in any balancing of interests; but, in order to find the abridgement,
he had to understand how the law operated and how people were likely to
respond to it.17
The state of the world is indispensable to most judicial inquiries that
one can imagine. A legal determination about what constitutes a "speedy
S.. trial"'" ultimately rests in part on how trials actually work and thus
14. I use "on the ground" as a term of art that excludes highly specific facts pertaining to the
interactions between the parties (e.g., who did what to whom); these historical facts will not change,
and thus they are of limited relevance to this Article. More general facts about the world are subject
to change, however, and are central to my argument.
15. The same is true of the question whether the regulated activity has the expressive elements of
speech. Such a question is necessary unless courts create a definition of speech that does not depend
on what people actually do.
16. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I believe
that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free
speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was
to be done .... ").
17. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295, 297 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the Constitution grants the press "an absolute immunity for criticism of the
way public officials do their public duty," but also noting that the speech in question was "the kind of
speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the area of free discussion," and
that "[tlo punish the exercise of this right ... is to abridge or shut off discussion of the very kind most
needed"); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (accepting time, place, and manner
restrictions because the First Amendment does not mean that "people who want to propagandize
protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they
please").
18. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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how speedy a trial can be. In the Second Amendment context, one could
try to avoid reliance on facts by interpreting the amendment to create a
legally absolute protection of the right to bear arms and defining the
protected items in terms of legal categories of "arms," but one still would
have to determine whether a host of newer weapons that emit projectiles
(bazookas, flame throwers, etc.) constitute arms. There may be excep-
tions, of course. A constitutional formalist, for example, might define
"executive power" based purely on legal theory, and might further con-
clude that any statute whose terms conferred any degree of such power
outside the executive branch would violate the separation of powers. 19
But such examples are relatively unusual. In the main, as Kenneth Davis
put it more than half a century ago, application of legal tests "must depend
on fact-finding. "I
II. What If Facts Change After the Appellate Process Has Run Its
Course?
Facts found by a trial court can do one of three things: they can
remain the same (or change in legally irrelevant ways); they can change
before the final appellate court issues its ruling; or they can change after
such a final ruling.2 Before I address the tricky question of changes that
occur before a final ruling, it is useful to focus on the significance of
19. This was Justice Scalia's position as the sole dissenter in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
705-09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the challenged statute should have been
invalidated based on the simple juxtaposition of the requirements of the statute and the constitutional
separation of powers, eliminating the need for examination of the actual effects of the statute or the
facts of its application).
20. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942); see also Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a Book Out... ":An Analysis
of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1987) (contending that facts or
theories about the state of the world commonly form the bases of judicial application of the law).
There are, of course, varying degrees of fact specificity: some opinions rely heavily on particular
facts, while others are less tethered to specific facts and are written more as broad pronouncements.
Particularly interesting in this regard is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The
opinion, as written, seemed to place great emphasis on empirical findings about the effects of
segregated education. See id. at 494 & n. 11; Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual
Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1554-63 (1998). When a district court decided to reconsider
Brown's factual findings, however, the Fifth Circuit promptly reversed, treating Brown as pronouncing
a broad rule that did not rely on specific facts. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ.,
220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933
(1964); see also infra note 190. That understanding of Brown is widely shared today, even though the
opinion as written seems to be more fact specific. See, e.g., Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality:
The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 723 n.307
(1988) (citing Stell for the proposition that "[n]o inferior federal court may refrain from acting as
required by [Brown] even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to the
facts or to the law"); see also infra note 300.
21. The same, of course, is true for the statutes and constitutional provisions on which an opinion
rests.
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changes afterward, as the question is interesting in its own right and
illuminates a number of important considerations regarding the appellate
process. What should a court do if relevant facts change subsequent to its
ruling such that, had the new facts existed at the time of the original
adjudication,' the court would have reached a different result? It turns
out that the answer to this question depends on the nature of the facts upon
which the appellate court relied.
A. The Importance of Prospectivity
Many judicial tests are backward looking: they focus on a set of his-
torical events and ask whether, at the time they occurred, the parties took
reasonable actions.' Other tests draw factual conclusions about the world
as it exists today or the world we can expect under a particular legal
regime. Not surprisingly, this latter type of test is associated with cases
involving declaratory and injunctive relief, rather than damages. For
instance, the First Amendment test for restrictions on speech depends very
heavily on the availability of alternatives that would restrict less speech,
which entails factual conclusions about the feasibility of other forms of
regulation and their effect on communication. 4 Another relevant consid-
eration in First Amendment cases is whether the speech regulation leaves
open other channels of communication, which obviously focuses on the
available means of communication.' Such inquiries thus rely in part on
the state of the art in communications-and the state of the art changes as
the underlying technology changes.
This distinction between historical and current (or predictive) facts will
often track the distinction between retrospective and prospective relief. If
the court in the original adjudication issued retrospective relief only, it
presumably relied on historical facts, and thus any new facts should not
have any bearing on the case. The situation I am positing is one in which
the facts were correctly found by the original court, but those facts later
changed.' Where the original facts were significant for the light they
shed on a past interaction that was the basis of some damages claim, it is
hard to see how a future change could be relevant; the historical facts
22. I am referring to "adjudication" as a single process because I am postponing, until the next
section, a discussion of the significance of a change in facts during the appellate process.
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1995) (emphasizing
alternative channels for lawyers' communications to clients in upholding restrictions on direct
solicitations); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977) (striking
down a speech restriction in part because it left open no satisfactory alternatives).
26. This should be distinguished from the situation where the facts were found incorrectly by the
original court. The situation I am focusing on here is one in which there is no basis for impugning the
facts as found at the time, but those facts have subsequently changed.
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would have served as the basis for the relief, and those historical facts
would not (indeed could not) have changed. 7
Injunctive relief, in contrast, by definition involves future behavior.
If such behavior no longer poses the same threat, the court should recon-
sider its prior conclusion and quite possibly reach a different conclusion.
After all, an injunction is a continuing judicial order preventing (or
compelling) certain actions that are prohibited (or required) by law. If an
injunction is no longer legally justified because the basis for the legal
reasoning no longer exists, then the issuing court is obliged to reject or
modify it, as appropriate, once the parties bring the new facts to the court's
attention. This is obviously the case when the law that forms the basis of
the injunction is modified in a relevant way, and there is no reason why a
change in relevant facts should be different.
The one remaining category is declaratory relief; such relief is a bit
more complicated, and those complications are relevant to larger issues in
this Article. It may seem that, when a court declares a statute to be
unconstitutional, or a practice to be inconsistent with a statute, it is simply
issuing a ruling as of that date and telling the parties nothing about the
future. In contradistinction to the continuing effect of an injunction, or the
retrospective effect of a determination of liability for past acts, declaratory
relief seems to focus not on future or past acts but instead on the present.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, after all, is couched in the present, pro-
viding that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration."2I
For better or worse, though, the force of declaratory relief-or,
perhaps more accurately, the force as understood by all the relevant players
(judges, litigants, affected third parties)-is not confined solely to the
present. Congress created the Declaratory Judgment Act in order to elimi-
nate uncertainty surrounding acts that might take place in the future.29
Indeed, unless the declaration does alter the status of the parties' past
actions (which is relatively uncommon), a limitation of declaratory relief
to the present would render it meaningless; it would stand as a memento.
Simply stated, in most cases the reason one would pursue declaratory relief
is because of the ongoing force that such relief will have.3"
27. This is not to suggest that historical facts can never have a prospective effect, but rather that
such facts cannot change and thus cannot constitute the basis for a relevant transformation. See infra
note 43 and accompanying text.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
29. See Mark Peter Henriques, Note, Desuetude and Declaratory Judgment: A New Challenge to
Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1061-62 (1990).
30. This point is buttressed by a consideration of the converse proposition, namely, that the
prospect of someone later rejecting the continuing validity of the declaratory relief would not be
troubling, because there would be no "continuing validity" in the first place. On this theory, even the
losing party could later deny the validity of the ruling, because the ruling purported to tell the parties
1999]
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The significance of prospectivity is heightened by the role of prece-
dent. Not only does a judicial opinion resolve the litigants' dispute (and,
if prospective relief is involved, bind their future actions), but also it gives
guidance to the rest of us on related issues, and, importantly, that guidance
operates on different levels of generality. An illustrative example of these
different levels is Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,3 a decision criti-
cized as relying on an outdated notion that broadcast spectrum is uniquely
scarce.32 In Red Lion, a radio station broadcast a program disparaging
the author of a book critical of Barry Goldwater (who was then running for
president). The book's author demanded that the station give him free air
time to reply to this attack, and the station challenged the FCC rules that
mandated their compliance with this request.33 The Supreme Court
upheld the FCC's regulation, relying heavily on the scarcity of spectrum
available for broadcasters in "the present state of commercially acceptable
technology" (in contrast to the availability of newsprint). 4 We do not,
of course, understand Red Lion to instruct us only as to the constitutional
status of an AM radio broadcast regarding Barry Goldwater. The case is
understood to stand for broader principles that have become benchmarks
in the regulation of broadcast: that a right-of-reply statute is permissible;
and, more generally, that regulation of broadcasters is subject to fairly
lenient judicial scrutiny.35 Then there are subsidiary conclusions, such as
that regulations of print media merit more rigorous judicial scrutiny
because print is not subject to the sort of scarcity that characterizes
spectrum.36 Crucially (for purposes of this Article), all of these propo-
sitions rely on spectrum scarcity. Without that pillar, it is not at all clear
what the Court would have done then or would do now regarding broadcast
regulation.37  Red Lion remains as a precedent-supporting all the
only where they stood at a given point in time. That is not how we understand declaratory relief: we
would likely see a post-ruling rejection as a lawless act. Why? Because the relevant legal actors do
not see declaratory relief as simply telling the world where the law is that moment, and nothing more;
they see it as relieving litigants and potential litigants from insecurity by telling them what will be
permissible from now on-or at least until the court decides to reconsider that ruling. The whole point
of a declaratory judgment is that it gives the parties guidance about the legal significance of acts they
may take in the future. The legal players, in other words, do see it as having continuing force.
31. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
32. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
33. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371-73.
34. See id. at 388, 396-97.
35. See, e.g., Matthew L. Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1985) (citing Red Lion to support the proposition that "right-of-reply statutes are
unconstitutional as applied to newspapers but that the same rules applied to broadcasters are completely
acceptable").
36. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994) (citing Red Lion
as supporting the position that spectrum scarcity justifies less rigorous First Amendment scrutiny of
broadcast regulation than of the regulation of other media).
37. This is not to suggest that Red Lion is necessarily indefensible without the scarcity rationale.
Most notably, Cass Sunstein and Owen Fiss have defended the result in Red Lion without embracing
278 [Vol. 78:269
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propositions laid out above-despite the belief among many commentators
and lower court judges that it rests on the outdated, and now incorrect,
factual assertion that spectrum is unusually scarce.3"
It bears emphasizing, though, that elimination of the role of precedent
would not eliminate the potential problems posed by changing facts; even
absent any effect on nonparties, there would still be a concern about any
continuing effect on the parties themselves. This point may perhaps be
illustrated by the most prominent distinction between facts-namely, the
one that Kenneth Davis drew between adjudicative facts ("[f]acts pertaining
to the parties and their businesses and activities"39) and legislative facts
(which "do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general
facts that help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and
discretion"'). In light of the potentially wide-ranging ramifications (via
precedent) of a factual finding that is not limited to the parties, changes in
legislative facts may be particularly troubling. But even if the relevant fact
the notion that spectrum is uniquely scarce. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH 48-51, 110 (1993) (suggesting that it is the economics of the market system, not the
scarcity of the broadcast spectrum, that justifies regulation of broadcasters); Owen M. Fiss, Why the
State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1987) (enumerating the market restraints on the presentation
of matters of public interest). My point is simply that Red Lion did rely on this rationale and thus
jettisoning it would seem to call the ruling into question. The Supreme Court might ultimately reach
the same result, but presumably it would have to find different grounds for such a holding. See infra
text accompanying notes 48-50.
38. Some commentators believed that Red Lion was wrong when decided, on the theory that there
is nothing special about spectrum that makes it any more scarce than any other resource. See R.H.
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959). Others accept the
proposition that spectrum was scarce when Red Lion was decided, but argue that subsequent
developments (e.g., the ability to use smaller bits of the spectrum for broadcasting, the rise of new
broadcasters, and the availability of communications via satellite and cable) have rendered Red Lion's
conclusion no longer valid. See Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the
New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 903-04 (1998) (emphasizing the staleness of the notion of resource
scarcity "despite the fact that its chief source of constitutional authority, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, is only thirty years old"); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501,
508 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Broadcast frequencies are much less scarce now than when the scarcity
rationale first arose[,] ... and it appears that currently 'the number of broadcast stations ... rivals
and perhaps surpasses the number of newspapers and magazines in which political messages may
effectively be carried.'" (second ellipses in the original) (citations omitted)).
39. 2 KENNErH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979).
40. Id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee note ("Adjudicative facts are simply the
facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to
legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling
by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body."). As the citation above indicates, the
1975 amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted the legislative fact-adjudicative fact
distinction for purposes of judicial notice. The notes to Rule 201 credit Kenneth Davis for this
distinction. Id. (On judicial notice, see infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.) Although facts
posited by legislatures in hearings or in statutes are treated as a subset of legislative facts, the category
of legislative fact focuses on the nature of the assertion and not its source. Moreover, as this Article
will demonstrate, such legislative facts are often put forward by parties or amici in briefs or by an
appellate court itself, see infra notes 270-298 and accompanying text.
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pertains only to the course of dealing between the parties, and even if the
fact has no precedential value,4" its alteration raises serious concerns
where the case has a prospective effect. Under such circumstances, the
outdated fact will live on, not via precedent but instead via the continuing
direct legal force of the court's decision. To pick a notable example: the
questions whether Microsoft's Windows operating system is separate from
its Internet browser, or how seriously Microsoft's integration of its browser
into its operating system harms Netscape, are probably best understood as
adjudicative facts, and they do not have any obvious broad precedential
effect (in contrast to the finding of spectrum scarcity). But if findings on
those questions become the basis for an injunction, and those findings
become outdated, then the concerns identified in this Article would be
implicated.42
The foregoing thus suggests two basic requirements for factual
changes to be relevant to this Article: the finding has to be subject to
change, and the finding must have a prospective effect. -The former
requirement effectively eliminates historical facts; though it is possible for
them to have a prospective effect,43 such historical facts, by definition,
are not subject to change. The requirement of prospectivity, meanwhile,
is satisfied whenever a ruling has a prospective effect; the role of precedent
does not create the problem but merely enhances it.'
B. The Significance of Factual Change
This discussion of the relevance of prospectivity and the categories of
factual change lays the groundwork for us to answer the question of what
should happen if facts change after the final appellate court has taken its
final action. Where an opinion with a prospective effect focuses on facts
41. It should be noted that some findings may pertain only to the parties but nonetheless have a
precedential effect. See infra note 43.
42. See discussion infra subpart III(B).
43. One example would be a finding that a particular school district had in the past discriminated
against a plaintiff class based on race. This is a historical fact (and is probably best understood as an
adjudicative fact, on the theory that it concerned the course of dealing in the past between a specific
institution and a set of people defined by their race). Such a finding might nonetheless have a
significant effect on subsequent cases involving different plaintiffs (perhaps of a different race): a later
court might well conclude that the earlier finding of discrimination justified (and perhaps required)
certain remedial actions that would not be justified absent that history. Thus the status of this finding
as a historical and adjudicative fact would not deprive it of continuing significance.
44. In theory, the power of precedent could create prospectiviry in a case that otherwise would be
retrospective. There are two hurdles for such a phenomenon, however. First, the purely retrospective
case must have a precedential effect; second, the retrospective case also would have to rely on current
or predictive facts (because historical facts do not change). I confess that I can think of no purely
retrospective cases that both have a precedential effect and rely on facts that might change in relevant
ways. If, though, such cases exist, then they would present an additional avenue for the changes
addressed in this Article.
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that exist today-facts about the world as it is-those facts can change; and
changes in those facts merit a reconsideration of the resulting legal
conclusion. The same thing is true of predictions that form the basis of
appellate rulings.'
Any other conclusion would be difficult to defend. As Part I empha-
sized, underlying facts form the crucial foundations for the statements of
law that we call the "holding." Where the holding has continuing force-
that is, it informs parties about the legal status of actions they may take in
the future-that holding relies on the continuing validity of the underlying
facts. If the facts on which the opinion relied no longer describe the
world, then the opinion purports to lay down the current status of the law
but in fact misdescribes the world, and thus creates an intolerable tension.
A decision nonetheless to treat a given opinion as if it had solid grounding
would ignore the role that facts play in the judicial process. Judicial
opinions are not proclamations of general principles from an ethereal body;
they are situated in a particular factual context, and a transformation of that
context necessarily affects the opinion that builds upon it.' Thus, if
relevant facts change after a case has worked its way through the system,
a litigant should be allowed to bring a new case through that same system
to reconsider the original ruling. 7
45. Perhaps the most famous recent example was the Supreme Court's assertion in Clinton v.
Jones that the Paula Corbin Jones litigation against President Clinton was "highly unlikely to occupy
any substantial amount of [the President's] time." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997). In a
recent private lawsuit brought by a different woman who claims to have had a sexual relationship with
the President (Dolly Browning), the President argued that based on his experience in the Jones litigation
subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling, the Supreme Court drastically underestimated the burden that
civil litigation places on the President's time. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Temporary Stay on Grounds of Presidential Immunity, Browning v. Clinton, No. 98-
1991 (D.D.C.).
Some commentators have suggested that this prediction, though perhaps reasonable at the time,
has been demonstrated by subsequent events to be flatly wrong and even laughable. See, e.g., Robert
Trout, Commentary, All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 4, 1999) (stating
that this prediction by the Court stands as "what may be the most misguided prediction of the
century"); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 4, 75 (1998) (suggesting reconsideration of Clinton v. Jones and
Morrison v. Olson on the grounds that subsequent experience has called into question the Court's
factual assertions in those cases). Whether or not one is persuaded by these arguments, it would be
extremely troubling for the Supreme Court's assertion about the effect of the case on the President's
time to be treated as unassailable, or even entitled to deference as a settled fact. It is just a fact (here,
a prediction), and its arguable invalidation calls into question the holding that relies on it.
46. This is not to suggest that the newly invalid facts deprive the original opinion of all
significance. The original opinion might function as a hypothetical that provides useful information:
if the facts that no longer obtain were to reappear, then the legal rule would be X. But injunctions and
declaratory judgments do not purport merely to inform the litigants about hypothetical worlds; they
purport to apply to the one that actually exists. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text
(discussing the problems attendant to a court's issuing an opinion that did not apply to the parties'
dispute as it currently existed).
47. This can be contrasted with a situation in which a party believes not that the facts have
changed, but that they were wrongly decided by the original court. In such circumstances, the ordinary
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Reconsideration need not produce an overruling even if the facts have
changed. The relevant court might find other bases to support the original
position (or simply find that the remaining bases articulated in the original
opinion are sufficient to support it).48 And if the court concluded the
original holding was no longer supportable, it might declare that the
original opinion is limited to its facts (and/or no longer relevant to the
world) without overruling it; there would be no real difference between
such a ruling and an outright overruling, so the difference would be largely
a matter of atmospherics. To return to the example of Red Lion,4 9 a court
faced with persuasive evidence that the broadcast spectrum was no longer
scarce in a manner that distinguished it from other media might reach the
same result for different reasons (e.g., because broadcast spectrum has
been given free of charge"0); limit the case to its facts (which,
rule is that the aggrieved party must make her case to the fact-finding court or, failing that, shortly after
judgment is entered, see FED. R. Civ. P. 59, 60 (or, failing that, on appeal). The rule not only forces
the parties to make their best case in one proceeding, but also, by giving the litigants several
opportunities during the litigation to point out errors, largely obviates the need for a separate, later
proceeding to challenge the factual findings. After all, if the litigant was not able to convince the first
set of judges to whom she made her case, why would she be able to convince the second set? (The few
exceptions arguably prove the rule: most notably, in Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406
(N.D. Cal. 1984), the district court found that the government's deliberate lies to the courts in the
original 1942 proceeding, combined with the pervasive sentiments of the day, effectively denied Fred
Korematsu a fair bite at the apple. On this basis, the court granted a writ of coram nobis vacating his
conviction.)
Neither of these considerations applies where the facts were found correctly in the original
proceeding but became invalid over time: there would be no reason to believe that the parties did not
make their best case in the original proceeding, and the factual changes would likely change the
outcome when presented to a new set (or the same old set) of judges.
48. This discussion intentionally elides the question whether, in light of the hierarchy of federal
courts, it would be appropriate for a lower court to do the reconsidering, or whether only the court that
issued the relevant holding (or one above it in the hierarchy) can properly engage in such
reconsideration. Though such a question is interesting, nothing turns on it for purposes of my Article;
this section is merely attempting to establish that reconsideration should occur, holding aside the
question of which court should conduct it.
It should be emphasized, however, that, as a practical matter, many lower courts will likely
refrain from reconsidering either the conclusion or the factual bases of cases decided by courts above
them in the hierarchy, even if the facts are outdated. This, in fact, has been the experience thus far
with Red Lion: a number of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have lambasted
the Supreme Court's spectrum scarcity rationale but also have indicated that it is up to the Supreme
Court to reject it. See, e.g., Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723,724 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J., dissenting) (denying
rehearing en banc); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); accord Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1443 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring). The significance of lower courts' refusal to reconsider RedLion is that, when facts change
during the appellate process, a higher court's refusal to consider those facts before issuing its opinion
may have the effect of persuading at least some lower courts that they cannot revisit the appellate
opinion and the (stale) findings on which it relied. See infra text accompanying notes 181-90.
49. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
50. See Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the
Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1732 (1997) (suggesting that the
government's grant of spectrum free of explicit monetary charge justifies broadcast regulation).
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presumably, would never recur if one of the relevant facts was a now-
discarded notion of spectrum scarcity); or simply overrule it entirely.
The Supreme Court has expressed agreement with the proposition that
changes in underlying facts alter the status of the legal conclusions that rely
on those facts. For instance, in Maine v. Taylor,5' the Court found that
a Maine prohibition on the importation of live baitfish did not discriminate
against interstate commerce (and thus violate the negative aspect of the
Commerce Clause) because no acceptable testing procedures were available
as an alternative to the ban. 2 The Court then noted that, "if and when
such procedures are developed, Maine no longer may be able to justify its
import ban."53 This is not a new sentiment. In the 1931 case of Abie
State Bank v. Bryan,5' the Court stated that "[a] police regulation,
although valid when made, may become, by reason of later events, arbi-
trary and confiscatory in operation."'55
These quotations suggest that changes in relevant facts should prompt
a reconsideration of the cases that rely on them. The Supreme Court, in
fact, has so indicated: the standard litany of bases upon which the Court
will reject one of its precedents includes changes in underlying facts.56
The Court's actual practice, however, has not been so clear.
Commentators have identified three cases in which, they contend, the
Supreme Court overruled one of its precedents because of changes in fact
that undermined the precedent.' These scholars may be correct that the
decisions are best explained on this basis, but in none of the decisions did
the Supreme Court actually state that it was squarely relying on the changes
in fact.5 And, despite both the Supreme Court's statement that "the
51. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
52. Id. at 146, 146-51 (noting that the district court found that alternative testing did not exist, and
stating that "the record probably could not support a contrary finding").
53. Id. at 147.
54. 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
55. Id. at 772.
56. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that overruling can be appropriate when "facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification").
57. The cases are: The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455-56 (1851)
(overruling The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825)); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (rejecting the reasoning of Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236
U.S. 230 (1915)); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (overruling Wolfv. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949)). See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT.
REV. 211, 219-23; Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 109 n. 178 (1991); Note, Constitutional StareDecisis, 103 HARv.
L. REV. 1344, 1346 n.19 (1990) (all identifying these cases as overrulings based on new facts). But
see Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and the
Transformation ofthe Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1119, 1138-40 (1995)
(arguing that The Genesee Chief overruled The Thomas Jefferson because of a different interpretation
of the Constitution).
58. Justice Taney's opinion for the Court in The Genesee Chief did note that the earlier case had
been decided "when the commerce on the rivers of the west and on the lakes was in its infancy ...
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broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions
adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable
today may well be outmoded 10 years hence,"5 9 and the many cases in
which advocates have questioned the spectrum scarcity rationale from Red
Lion,' the Court has consistently ducked the question, employing an
interesting avoidance technique in doing so: it has recognized the criticism
of Red Lion's assertion of spectrum scarcity but stated that "[w]e are not
prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding approach without some
signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have
advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation
may be required." 6'
Thus the Court has spoken fairly clearly about the possibility of
factual change meriting reconsideration of a precedent, but its actions have
and but little regarded compared with that of the present day," but it also clearly stated that The
Thomas Jefferson had been wrong when decided, and that its error was in its interpretation of the
Constitution. Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 456, 459. The court was overruling The Thomas
Jefferson, according to Justice Taney, because the earlier court had misinterpreted the law. Id. at 459
(noting that The Thomas Jefferson "was founded in error"). The reason for the error, Taney suggested,
was that the Court had not focused on the possibility of a broader rule, in part because no broader rule
seemed necessary; but the mistake was fundamentally a legal one. Id. at 458-59.
Burstyn rejected a precedent from 1915 that had held motion pictures to be outside the protection
of the First Amendment, and the Court may well have been motivated by a change in the facts
surrounding the role of motion pictures in society. But the Court did not so state; the opinion was quite
brief in its discussion of the earlier case, and abruptly announced that "lilt cannot be doubted that
motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas." Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
Finally, Mapp did cite as one basis for reconsidering Wolfthat statutes supporting Wofhad been
replaced by laws that undercut it, but Mapp also indicated that Wolfwas wrong when it was decided.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651-55.
It also bears mentioning that the controlling opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
characterized Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (rejecting Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896)) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)) as cases in which the Court responded to changes
in facts. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-64. But West Coast Hotel and Brown did not so state (and
Brown, of course, did not even squarely overrule Plessy). See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Morton J.
Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 30, 74, 82-92 (1993). And Casey's
characterizations were made in distinguishing Brown and West Coast Hotel from the situation in Casey
(which, of course, chose not to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). See Casey, 505 U.S.
at 846.
59. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
60. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the National Association of Broadcasters at 12, Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511).
61. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984). On the basis of its
decision to await action by another branch of government before it reconsiders this factual conclusion,
the Court has not yet seen fit to reexamine Red Lion's reliance on the scarcity rationale. The Court's
position is difficult to defend. Courts made the original findings on spectrum scarcity, and it seems
incumbent upon courts to reconsider them if they appear to be incorrect. Even if neither the legislative
nor the executive branch says the magic words, the fact that litigants have brought forth powerful
challenges to the factual assertion of scarcity should be sufficient to prod the judicial branch to
reconsider its own factual (and ultimately, legal) determinations.
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not been as straightforward: it has never acknowledged that a set of facts
was no longer valid and nonetheless refused to reconsider the case that
relied on them, but it has also never relied on such factual changes as the
dispositive factor commanding a reconsideration. Federal courts of appeals
have done so on occasion,6' but we still await such action from the
biggest fish in the sea. The absence of clearer action by the Supreme
Court is unfortunate, because the principle is important. Courts rely on
factual assertions in their opinions, and courts should revisit those opinions
if the facts on which they rely are no longer valid.
One loose end deserves brief mention: in cases involving determina-
tions of consistency with the Constitution, rather than a statute, there arises
the question of how the legal system takes account of a perceived shift in
facts. If the original decision declared the challenged law constitutional,
then the matter is fairly straightforward; enforcement can continue, so a
future victim of the regulation can simply challenge its constitutionality in
the context of defending against the enforcement action. The difficulty is
created by what we might call "springing constitutionality"-where the law
was originally declared unconstitutional and later the facts supporting the
invalidation evaporated. The ordinary answer-simply raise the issue in an
enforcement proceeding-will not be available, because the law has been
struck down and presumably no enforcement actions will be taking place.
Congress could attempt to repass the statute, but it appears that such
an action would have no legal effect.63 At the same time, it would be
62. For instance, in Chandler v. City ofDallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993), and Daugherty v.
City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit had held that drivers with
insulin-dependent diabetes posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others as a matter of law
(and thus that they could not bring employment discrimination claims arising from differential treatment
based on their diabetes). In Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 176 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 1999), the plaintiff
brought an employment discrimination claim that was squarely covered by Chandler and Daugherty,
and the district court accordingly rejected the claim. Id. at 840, 842. On appeal, however, the Fifth
Circuit explicitly declined to follow these cases. The court, emphasizing "scientific advancements"
such as "technological improvements which have significantly increased the ability of diabetics to
monitor blood sugar levels and thereby prevent hypoglycemic reactions," stated that the factual
underpinnings of its earlier decisions may have become invalid. Kapche, 176 F.3d at 846, 847. It then
held:
Consequently, we conclude, the time has come for a reevaluation of the facts that
supported our prior per se holdings in Chandler and Daugherty. To this end, we vacate
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and remand for a
determination whether today there exists new or improved technology-not available at
the time these cases were decided-that could now permit insulin-dependent diabetic
drivers in general, and Kapche in particular, to operate a vehicle safely.
Id. at 847.
63. The proposal for congressional repassage presupposes that the original, invalidated statute is
no longer a duly enacted statute and thus must be repassed in order to be enforced. This implicates
the question of what happens to a statute when it is invalidated by a court. Interestingly, there is near
unanimity among courts and commentators that an invalidated statute simply becomes dormant, ready
to be enforced as soon as a court finds that it is no longer invalid. Cf. William Michael Treanor &
Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM.
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problematic for a court, with no enforcement or other proceeding before
it, simply to announce that one of its precedents was invalid. Such an
action would seem to run afoul of the constitutional requirement that a
federal court decide only "Cases" or "Controversies."' A court cannot
declare what the law is if the parties requesting the declaration are not part
of an actual controversy, much less declare what the law is when there are
no parties before it at all. That knocks out two branches of government,
leaving the executive as the remaining candidate to instigate a reexamina-
tion of an invalidated law that may, through changes in facts, have become
constitutional. This possibility has its own complications,6' but they are
probably resolvable.66 It bears note, though, that even a relatively small
L. REV. 1902, 1915, 1908-17 (1993) (arguing for "non-revival" of statutes in a narrow class of cases,
but acknowledging that their position runs counter to the position of the U.S. Supreme Court, state
courts, and almost every other commentator); see also State v. O'Neil, 126 N.W. 454, 454 (Iowa 1910)
("It is, of course, well settled that a statute which has been held unconstitutional either in toto or as
applied to a particular class of cases is valid and enforceable without re-enactment when the supposed
constitutional objection has been removed, or has been found not to exist."). In the Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553-54 (1870), for instance, the Court upheld, in full, the
constitutionality of a statute that it had found unconstitutional as to preexisting obligations less than two
years earlier in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1869). The Court in the Legal
Tender Cases never suggested that the statute had to be repassed by Congress, and its holding that the
statute now applied fully to all obligations precluded such a conclusion. See Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. at 553. A more famous example-which included an explicit articulation of this position, rather
than the silent resurrection of a statute as in the Legal Tender Cases-arose when West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a statute establishing a minimum wage for women)
overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 559 (1923) (striking down a District of
Columbia statute establishing a minimum wage for children and women). With Adkins overruled, the
United States Attorney General concluded that the previously invalidated statute could be enforced,
because its judicial invalidation had not abolished or repealed it. See 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 22, 22-23
(1937) ("[The courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and ... notwithstanding a decision
holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books."). The Municipal Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia (the highest District of Columbia court) reached the same
conclusion:
[A] law once declared unconstitutional and later held to be constitutional does not require
re-enactment by the legislature in order to restore its operative force .... [A] statute
declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but
not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished ....
Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C. 1952). There seems, then, to be little point in a legislature
reenacting a statute that has been struck down.
64. See U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also RICHARD H. FALLON Er AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 13-18 (4th ed. 1996).
65. If an executive (whether state or federal) brought a prosecution against a defendant who
violated a statute the substance of which had been declared unconstitutional, the defendant would have
a powerful argument that a new prosecution would be prohibited under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Even
if a court were inclined to find the statute constitutional, the absence of notice to the defendant would
be fatal to the actual prosecution at issue, as the defendant would have had no way of knowing that his
actions were illegal. Meanwhile, in noncriminal cases, there would be a possibility of preclusion.
Once the relevant executive branch loses a case because the statute is declared unconstitutional, any
attempt at reopening the case, even based on allegedly new facts, would likely be met by the immediate
response that the issue had been conclusively resolved and thus could not be reopened.
66. For criminal cases, the answer would seem to be for the executive to announce that, at some
future date far enough away to allow everyone to conform their actions to the invalidated law, it would
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probability that we would lack a mechanism to reconsider an opinion based
on outdated facts raises the disturbing specter of a ruling having continuing
force but no factual basis.
Insofar as courts do, in fact, reconsider cases whose factual founda-
tions no longer exist, a concomitant possibility arises: because relevant
facts (particularly technological facts) may quickly become outdated,
overrulings-even of facial challenges like that in Reno v. ACLU 67-may
occur only a few years (perhaps even months) after the original opinion
was decided. Such events will undercut the seeming permanence of appel-
late decisions. But that is the necessary result of a reliance on facts
combined with the possibility of changing circumstances. And, though the
prospect may be disturbing, it is less problematic than the alternative of an
opinion remaining in force long after its factual basis has ceased to exist.
III. Examples of Facts Changing Between Trial and Appellate Rulings
The previous section suggests that rapidly changing facts can weaken
precedents and require their reconsideration. When those factual changes
occur after the appellate process has run its course, there is no challenge
to the appellate process itself. By contrast, when facts change so rapidly
that some of the facts as found by the trial court may be outdated before
the appellate court issues its opinion, and when the process of change
shows no sign of abating in the near future, the challenge to the appellate
process is profound. When an appellate court rules in a case, we are
accustomed to thinking of that ruling as applying to the conditions that
obtain at the time of the ruling. We do not ordinarily assume that a
decision applies only to the facts at the time they were found by the trial
court (or finder of fact, if not the trial court). But, when the facts change
in material ways between the time that the facts are found and the appellate
court rules, then there is a very real danger that the ruling, at the time it
is issued, does not actually apply to the world as it exists.
On a number of occasions some potentially relevant facts have
changed' in between the time that a lower federal court ruled and a
initiate prosecutions under that law. Then there would be no issue of notice, and the question of the
continued vitality of the dormant law would get before a court. For civil cases, the executive would
presumably invoke Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a court to relieve
a party from a final judgment if, inter alia, "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application." FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(5); see also infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text
(discussing Rule 60(b)).
67. 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
68. Of course, changes in law, as opposed to fact, also have occurred between the time that a
lower court rules and an appellate court reviews that ruling. Such supervening legal decisions have
spawned a considerable jurisprudence of their own. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
155-56 (1944); Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941); State Tax Comm'n v.
Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939); Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503 (1912); see
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higher court issued its opinion. A declaration of war or peace, for
example, can dramatically change the relations between parties in an
international dispute.69 One such instance was Wtts, Wtts & Co. v.
Unione Austriaca di Navigazione,7 in which a British corporation had
sued an Austro-Hungarian corporation over nonpayment for coal. The
Supreme Court dryly noted the impact of the United States's declaration of
war against Austria-Hungary, stating,
Since the certiorari was granted, the relation of the parties to the
court has changed radically. Then, as earlier, the proceeding was
one between alien belligerents in a court of a neutral nation. Now,
it is a suit by one belligerent in a court of a co-belligerent against a
common enemy.7
In light of the difficulties created by the declaration (i.e., no counsel could
represent Austria-Hungary, as intercourse between citizens of the two
nations was both illegal and physically impossible7), the Court remanded
the case for further proceedings to take place when, "by reason of the
restoration of peace between the United States and Austria-Hungary, or
otherwise, it may become possible for the respondent to present its defense
Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939); Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503 (1912); see
also United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (identifying a "supervening
decision doctrine," which allows appellate courts to consider issues not raised at trial if there has been
a supervening decision); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 521 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting a relevant
intervening Supreme Court decision); Baird v. Benton County Bd. of Educ., 421 F.2d 700, 701 (5th
Cir. 1970) (noting relevant intervening decisions by the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit); In re
Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (involving an intervening D.C. Circuit Court opinion);
Zank v. Landon, 205 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir. 1953) (involving an intervening Supreme Court
decision). The challenge to the appellate process presented by these cases is fairly minor compared to
the challenge presented by continually changing facts, for two main reasons. First, and more
important, appellate courts are accustomed to deciphering the significance of laws, new and old; though
an appellate court might prefer that a lower court consider the legal question, there is no reason why
a court would deem itself incapable of addressing a new legal question. New facts, on the other hand,
place appellate courts in the position of making findings on their own-a circumstance to which they
are largely unaccustomed (or at least one that they do not acknowledge). Second, it is unusual for one
to have a reasonable belief that an area of law will be subject to continual change; usually, the
expectation is that the change will not be reversed or modified significantly in the near future. As a
result, considerations regarding the future, on which this Article focuses, are generally absent in cases
involving changes in law. As this Article will discuss, however, a number of areas of endeavor raise
the serious possibility of factual change for the foreseeable future.
69. See, e.g., Welch v. Shultz, 482 F.2d 780, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (remanding a suit challenging
a ban on contributions to North Vietnam in light of a peace agreement signed after the district court
ruled); United States v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 165 F.2d 354, 356-57 (8th Cir. 1948)
(remanding for new fact-finding where the relevant contract was to continue in effect until six months
after the end of World War II, and, after the district court ruled, the President proclaimed the cessation
of hostilities); The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 246 F. 786, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1917) (taking judicial notice of
changed facts, in particular the declaration of war and the United States's seizure of the relevant ship).
70. 248 U.S. 9 (1918).
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id. at 22.
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adequately." 73  Other, more prosaic events also can alter crucial facts.
The successful conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement, for
instance, has led appellate courts to remand to lower courts related labor
disputes that the lower courts had adjudicated prior to the parties'
agreement.74 Or the change in fact may be as simple a matter as the
withdrawal of a lawyer whose inappropriate behavior had provoked the
district court to dismiss his case.75
In most of these cases, the appellate court (whether the Supreme Court
or a court of appeals) has simply remanded the case for further proceedings
in a lower court.76 That approach may be appropriate in cases in which
there is little likelihood that relevant facts in the case will change again in
the future in some relevant way. Once the parties have concluded a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, for example, the chances of the agreement being
torn asunder and the same dispute arising seem remote. But what about
situations where relevant facts not only have changed in the time since the
lower court made its findings, but probably will do so again in the near
future? In such situations a remand seems problematic, because there is
every reason to suspect that the next time the case comes up through the
appellate process the same concern about outdated facts will arise, thus
raising the specter of an infinite judicial process.'
As this Article has suggested, such a scenario is not far-fetched. It
arguably occurs in the context of wars. During a war, the facts on the
ground frequently are in a state of flux, and the duration of the war-and,
therefore, of these continuing and unpredictable changes-is not estimable.
73. Id. at 22-23.
74. See McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 385 U.S. 533, 535 (1967) (determining that, after the two
sides in the labor dispute reached a collective bargaining agreement subsequent to the circuit court
disposition, the "District Court should determine in the first instance the effect of this supervening
event upon the appropriateness of injunctive relief"); see also Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co.
v. Potter, 400 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating that because the strike had been settled, "the trial
court should reconsider the necessity and appropriateness of injunctive relief in the light of these
changed conditions"); General Elec. Co. v. Local Union 191, 443 F.2d 608, 610 (5th Cir. 1971)
(remanding and instructing the district court to dismiss the case based on a prior collective bargaining
agreement no longer in force).
75. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972). In Korn, the appellate court
observed,
The second ... component in deciding to end Rule 23 status was the conduct of
the plaintiff's attorney who the court thought had acted improperly ....
The former attorney, whose actions were severely criticized by the District Court,
has withdrawn from all connection with or participation in the litigation .... Since our
decision has to be forward-looking... we must take account of this new situation....
Id. at 1208.
76. The main exception to this phenomenon is cases where parties have presented evidence of
moomess; frequently, appellate courts respond by simply declaring the case moot, rather than
remanding for consideration of mootness. See discussion infra subsection V(C)(1)(a).
77. This possibility is discussed more fully infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
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But the most prominent examples have arisen in other contexts, involving
high technology industries like computers and also more mundane areas
like metal manufacturing.
A. Reno v. ACLU
As was noted at the outset of this Article, the Internet has experienced
enormous growth and change in the last few years; so it is perhaps fitting
that the development of the Internet was central to the most notable recent
example of change during the appellate process-Reno v. ACLU,7  which
involved a First Amendment challenge to the Communications Decency Act
(which regulated indecency on the Internet). Two provisions of the CDA
were challenged: the "indecent transmission" provision, which prohibited
the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications device, of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under eighteen years of
age;79 and the "patently offensive display" provision, which prohibited the
knowing sending or displaying, by means of an interactive computer ser-
vice, of patently offensive messages in a manner available to a person
under eighteen.'
Interestingly, the time that elapsed between the fact-finding by the trial
court and the resolution in the Supreme Court was unusually brief in Reno
v. ACLU (primarily because the legislation containing the CDA provided
for expedited review by a three-judge district court, with an expedited
appeal directly to the Supreme Court)."' The evidentiary hearings in the
district court were in March and April of 1996; the district court's opinion
was issued in June of that year. The Supreme Court heard oral argument
in the case in March of 1997 and issued its opinion on June 26, 1997. So
it was not much more than a year between the decision by the district court
(containing its findings, many of which in turn were based on the parties'
stipulations) and the Supreme Court decision-about as short a time
between trial court findings and Supreme Court ruling as one is likely to
find. And yet there is good reason to believe that, by June 26, 1997, some
of the findings made by the district court were stale-becoming less and
78. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
79. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. III 1997).
80. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. III 1997).
81. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. 1111997) (providing for expedited review). In addition,
it so happened that the timing of the district court decision and the petition for certiorari enabled the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari and hear the case in the same term without any delay. By contrast,
appeals court decisions frequently come down at a time when the petition for certiorari is not acted
upon for months (e.g., if the petition arrives after the end of June, it is not considered until October),
or, even worse for the parties, when there is too little time left in the current term to permit argument
(e.g., beginning in January the Court grants cases for the following term, meaning that argument will
not occur until October).
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less tenable by the day, and arguably incorrect by the time the Supreme
Court ruled-and subject to change in the future, as well.
One example arises out of the fact that the CDA created a statutory
defense to prosecution for anyone who restricted access via an age
verification system. The ACLU had persuaded the district court that
although the World Wide Web allowed for age verification systems, the
Internet outside the Web did not allow for such verification; that this world
outside the Web encompassed important services, such as USENET news-
groups, listservs, and chat rooms; that such fora allowed for distinctive
forms of communication unavailable on the Web; and thus that even with
the statutory defense, the CDA prevented people from engaging in certain
kinds of speech.' These statements were correct when the district court
made its findings (at a time when chat rooms and newsgroups did not exist
on the Web). In the months between the district court hearing and the
briefing in the Supreme Court, however, one of the ways the Internet
changed was that newsgroups, listserv logs, and chat rooms began to
mushroom on the Web. The distinctive speech offered by newsgroups,
listservs and chat rooms was now available on the Web, where age verifi-
cation was possible.
The government seized on this development in its briefs to the
Supreme Court, arguing that this development changed the constitutional
calculus.8 3 The problem for the government was that, because it occurred
in the months since the district court hearing, this development was of
course not contained in the district court's findings. The ACLU empha-
sized this point, stating that,
[Contrary to the district court's findings, [the government] simply
asserts that effective screening of minors is possible for speakers
using all modes of communication on the Internet. Thus, it asks this
Court to take it on faith that it is technologically feasible to set up
adults-only listservs, chat rooms, and newsgroups. But in the district
court, the "Government offered no evidence that there is a reliable
way to ensure that recipients and participants in such fora can be
screened for age. . . ."4
82. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845, 854 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aft'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
83. See Reply Brief for Appellants at 10, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511)
("[A]ppellees' concerns about the inability to engage in 'distinctive' forms of communication have
largely become moot since the time of the [preliminary injunction] hearing. As we explain in our
opening brief, since the time of that hearing, chat rooms and newsgroups have begun to proliferate on
the Web."); id. at 37-38 ("[S]ince the record was compiled at the preliminary injunction stage of the
case, it has become clear that chat rooms, newsgroups, and mailing lists can be established on a Web
site, where those who wish to post patently offensive material can avail themselves of the very same
screening technologies that apply to the Web.").
84. Brief of Appellees at 24, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (quoting ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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The government of course did not deny that it had offered no evidence at
the trial level, but it wanted the Supreme Court to take cognizance of these
developments. That desire was for naught: The Court ignored the govern-
ment's contentions of new developments and relied entirely on the district
court's factual findings, even pointedly noting that the government had
failed to present evidence to the district court indicating that the screening
was possible in newsgroups, listservs, and chat groups.'
Notably, the government could have pressed the age verification point
further. As to the Web itself, the district court found that age verification
would be "economically and practically unavailable" for noncommercial
Web pages because "verification agencies would decline to process a card
unless it accompanied a commercial transaction."86 Once again, this
finding probably accurately reflected the state of knowledge at the time that
the district court made its findings. The source for the finding that
verification agencies would require payment was the government's own
expert, and the district court pointedly stated that "[t]here was no evidence
to the contrary. "I In the months between those findings and the Supreme
Court's ruling, however, the market changed. Age verification services
proliferated, and many of them followed an interesting economic model;
they paid the referring sites, rather than the other way around. As Jeffrey
Rosen noted in an article written in March of 1997 (shortly before Reno v.
ACLU was argued in the Supreme Court), "since last June [of 1996, when
the district court issued its opinion], the technology has changed in
response to the market .... [The age verification] system is no longer
'economically .prohibitive' for the Internet sites that use it." 8 Once
again, however, the Supreme Court's opinion makes no mention of these
changes (much less their significance). On the contrary, the Court simply
relied on the district court's findings that age verification was economically
prohibitive and thus effectively unavailable.89 Significantly, the Court's
opinion placed great weight on the economic unavailability of age verifi-
cation for noncommercial web sites. This unavailability, in combination
with the point noted above that newsgroups, chat rooms, and listservs were
85. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 855-56.
86. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 846.
87. Id.
88. Jeffrey Rosen, Zoned Out, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 31, 1997, at 15 (quoting ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 854).
89. Reno, 521 U.S. at 856-57. Interestingly, the Court explicitly qualified its statement by saying,
"at the time of the trial, credit card verification was 'effectively unavailable to a substantial number of
Internet content providers.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846
(E.D. Pa. 1996)). This statement, and others like it, may suggest that the Court was relying on old
facts despite any concerns that they might be outdated. This response to rapidly changing facts is
discussed infra subpart V(A).
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outside the realm of the Web, were critical to the Court's reasoning that
the CDA's age verification defense was inadequate.'
What makes these rapidly changing facts especially tricky is that we
cannot predict them with confidence; they may have moved in one direc-
tion in the recent past (rendering findings made a year or two earlier out
of date) but, contrary to expectations, move in another direction in the near
future. A nice example arises out of Reno v. ACLU. One of the govern-
ment's main arguments was that the CDA was constitutional in light of
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.9 In that case, the Supreme Court had held
that indecency regulation of broadcasts was subject to lenient First
Amendment scrutiny, based in significant part on the invasive nature of
broadcasting.' The United States seized on this comparison, arguing that
the Internet was similarly invasive.93 The district court squarely rejected
this comparison, finding as a fact that "[c]ommunications over the Internet
do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen
unbidden."' The Supreme Court embraced this finding, quoting it
verbatim.95 In between the district court findings and the Supreme Court
ruling, however, the market changed: "push" technology came on line.
Such technology delivers content directly to the user without the user
requesting it. The material is "pushed" by the provider onto computers,
rather than having specific content chosen (or "pulled") by users. In other
words, for a large number of users, communications did appear on their
screens in the same sort of "unbidden" way that broadcasts appear, leading
some commentators to suggest that this finding, too, had become outdated
by the time the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Reno v. ACLU.'
90. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 880. The findings from Reno v. ACLU discussed in the text are not
the only ones that may have become outdated in the months between the district court fact-finding and
the Supreme Court ruling. One that has been frequently singled out is the crucial finding that no
effective blocking software existed. That was probably true at the time the district court so found, but
it is not at all clear that it was still true at the time that the Supreme Court (relying on the district
court's finding, see id. at 876) issued its ruling. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 38, at 903-04, 958
n.238.
91. 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
92. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (noting that broadcast media are "uniquely pervasive" and
.confront the citizen . . . in the privacy of the home," and that "[blecause the broadcast audience is
constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from
unexpected program content"); seealso Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989)
("Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places a call
to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from
avoiding exposure to it.").
93. See Brief for the United States at 21, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511).
94. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (1996).
95. Reno, 521 U.S. at 869.
96. See Ranjit S. Mathoda, Government Power Over Internet Communications: Unborn Heirs of
the CDA, 1997 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 070902, 8 (visited May 26, 1999) <http://
infoeagle.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st...g/iptf/commentary/content/1997070902.html> (quoting the
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But here's the fun part: In June of 1997, the smart money was on push
technology. Industry leaders predicted that the Web would move to a
broadcast model, with push technology leading everyone to treat their
computers as another source of broadcasts. In the time since then,
however, the bloom has left the rose. The confident assumption that push
would become the dominant paradigm has yet to materialize, and now
many think it never will (but, of course, that could change, too). In fact,
the leading purveyor of push is now used by fewer people than used it in
1997, so the district court finding quoted above may be more accurate
today than it was when the Supreme Court ruled.'
The point of these examples is not that an updated version of the facts
necessarily would have fundamentally altered the Supreme Court's reason-
ing or its outcome, but simply that some of the facts on which the Court
relied were stale, and this put the Court in a very difficult position. What
is the significance of changes in the functions of the Web, age verification
feasibility, or push technology? The Court did not bother to tell us, or
even to acknowledge that the question existed. It ignored the issue, leaving
us to wonder how courts should deal with such situations.
The Court was clearly aware of the problem of changing facts. Justice
Scalia expressed his concern at oral argument in the quotation at the outset
of this Article.9" His sentiments were not new. The district court in
same district court finding regarding invasion of the home and stating that "[w]hile this was perhaps
true at the time the District Court wrote its opinion, a packet-based network can be used as a broadcast
medium, and the Internet has already demonstrated technologies that broadcast using the channel
metaphor of television"); Andrew L. Shapiro, Speech on the Line, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 3 ("The
hottest new-media story of the past year has been the rise of 'push' technology, which delivers content
directly to your desktop rather than waiting for you to 'pull' it from somewhere in cyberspace. Once
you subscribe to a push service .... the Web becomes a lot more like TV . ").
97. See Thomas E. Weber, Coming Soon: the Internet, 24/7, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1999,
available in 1999 WL-WSJ 5456703 (observing that "push-technology ... was all the rage in the
online world back in 1996... but the system never caught on the way proponents had hoped"). Other
companies are now attempting to revive the push concept for those who have 24-hour broadband
connections; but, to avoid the association with the failed "push," these new purveyors refer to their
service as a "notification" system. Id.
Meanwhile, a different aspect of the Internet has become more akin to broadcasting: web radio.
Computers need only click on a website in order to hear radio webcasts. See P.J. Huffstutter, Web
Surfing for the Next Wave in Radio, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2182726;
Thomas E. Weber, Web Radio: No Antenna Required, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1999, available in 1999
WL-WSJ 5462307. Some of the webcasters, in fact, are traditional broadcasters who send the very
same material over the airwaves and the Internet. See <www.wfmu.org> (visited Aug. 3, 1999).
Thus the only difference between a radio broadcast and a webcast for purposes of the listener is the
shape (and versatility) of the receiver and the fact that one involves turning a knob or pushing a button,
whereas the other involves typing a few letters or clicking a mouse. The concerns about invasiveness
and surprise that motivated the Pacifica Court seem now to exist equally for broadcasting and
webcasting.
98. See supra text accompanying note 3.
Judicial awareness of the potential impact of rapidly changing facts is by no means a creation
of the 1990s. In the 1951 case of RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951), RCA challenged an
FCC order that rejected RCA's method of color television transmission and instead chose CBS's
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ACLU v. Reno put the point sharply: "Because of the rapidity of develop-
ments in this field, some of the technological facts we have found may
become partially obsolete by the time of publication of these Findings. ",
Justice O'Connor, in her partial concurrence and partial dissent,
demonstrated an awareness of this issue. She was careful to note that her
views applied "to the Internet as it exists in 1997""° and in "the present
state of cyberspace,"'' and she peppered her separate opinion with the
words "currently" and "today."'" Her explicit statement that she was
evaluating the Internet "as it exists today"0 3 intimated that, in her view,
developments in the near future might change the constitutional analysis.
But it also revealed that she was taking into account the facts as they
existed (or, more accurately, as she understood them to exist) at the time
the Court was ruling, rather than the facts as they existed when the district
court made its findings in 1996.1°4
method as the exclusive one. On appeal to the Supreme Court (after a three-judge court sustained the
FCC's decision), RCA argued that its system was more advanced than CBS's, and that with each
passing day RCA's system came closer to being perfected. Id. at 419. In light of its system's
superiority and imminent availability, RCA sought to overturn the FCC's decision. The Supreme Court
rejected RCA's contentions, finding that the FCC had acted within its authority in refusing to delay its
choice of color television systems. Id. at 419-20. Justice Frankfurter wrote separately to express his
concern that the rapid pace of change in this technology might overtake the legal process:
Experience has made it axiomatic to eschew dogmatism in predicting the
impossibility of important developments in the realms of science and technology.
Especially when the incentive is great, invention can rapidly upset prevailing opinions of
feasibility. One may even generalize that once the deadlock in a particular field of inquiry
is broken progress becomes rapid. Thus, the plastics industry developed apace after a
bottleneck had been broken in the chemistry of rubbers. Once the efficacy of
sulfanilamide was clearly established, competent investigators were at work experimenting
with thousands of compounds, and new and better antibiotics became available in a
continuous stream. A good example of the rapid change of opinion that often occurs in
judgment of feasibility is furnished by the cyclotron. Only a few years ago distinguished
nuclear physicists proclaimed the limits on the energy to which particles could be
accelerated by the use of a cyclotron. It was suggested that 12,000,000-volt protons were
the maximum obtainable. Within a year the limitations previously accepted were
challenged. At the present time there are, I believe, in operation in the United States at
least four cyclotrons which accelerate protons to energies of about 400,000,000 volts.
One need not have the insight of a great scientific investigator, nor the rashness of the
untutored, to be confident that the prognostications now made in regard to the feasibility
of a "compatible" color television system will be falsified in the very near future.
Id. at 427 (Frankfurter, J., dubitante).
99. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 916, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Of course, our findings of fact are necessarily time-bound. We can
only determine whether the statutory provision at issue here, in light of the technology available during
the pendency of this case, comports with the First Amendment."), aft'd, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997).
100. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 888 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
101. Id. at 891.
102. Id. at 890, 891.
103. Id. at 891.
104. In fact, in contrast to the majority opinion, she noted the government's suggestion that chat
rooms and newsgroups were available on the Web (though she characterized the state of affairs more
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The majority opinion, by contrast, was not explicit about whether it
was judging the Internet as of 1997 or as of the time of the trial. Although
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion credits the majority opinion with
looking at the Internet as it existed at the time the Court ruled, the matter
is not so straightforward. In some places the Court spoke in the present
tense, about what is "present in cyberspace"' ° or "does not currently
exist. ""o In other places, however, the Court focused not on the current
state of the Internet but instead on what the district court found and what
existed at the time of trial."°  Notably, in its discussion of the availa-
bility of age verification the Court used the past tense, stating not that
credit card verification is unavailable but rather that, "at the time of the
trial, credit card verification was 'effectively unavailable.'" '0
B. United States v. Microsoft and the Future
We can also easily imagine future instances of factual transformations
during the appellate process. The computer industry, for example, pro-
vides some nice hypotheticals of continual factual change. Market share
in the computer software industry has proved quite volatile-much more
volatile than most any other industry. One year Lotus had the dominant
spreadsheet program; the next year its market share was plummeting at a
furious rate." The same is true of other companies and products that
once had seemingly commanding market shares and then suddenly faded
away-names from long ago (i.e., the early- and mid-1990s) like Prodigy,
weakly in saying that gateway technology "is just now becoming technologically feasible for chat rooms
and USENET newsgroups"; her only support for that statement was the government's brief, but the
government's contention, as noted above, was far stronger than that). Reno, 521 U.S. at 891.
105. Id. at 868.
106. Id. at 881.
107. See id. at 876 (relying on the district court's finding "that at the time of trial existing
technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access
to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults").
108. Id. at 856 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). A different,
and somewhat amusing, example of changing facts was provided by Carlin Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984). In that case, the fact-finder was the FCC. The issue was blocking
devices in telephone equipment. The court noted that the FCC had found that new equipment would
be required for such blocking to be feasible, and that "[a]ccording to industry commenters, 'no existing
commercial device has a screening capability that could be deployed within the subscriber's terminal
equipment.'" Id. at 122 (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 24966, 24999 (1984)). The Second Circuit went on,
however, to find and take cognizance of facts that developed after the fact-finding below had been
completed: "[C]ertain federal buildings actually have blocked all 976 calls, at least since substantial
billings were run up in calls from certain Washington offices to dial-a-por." Id. The Second Circuit
acknowledged that this new information arose only at oral argument. Id. at 122 n.15. On agencies
as fact-finders, see infra notes 292 & 320.
109. See Ken Yamada, Niche Players in the Software Market to Post Healthy Profits for the
Quarter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1993, at A9B, available in 1993 WL-WSJ 704767 (explaining that
"[s]ales of Lotus's 1-2-3 spreadsheet software, which dominated the DOS market, have been battered
in the Windows market by sales of... Microsoft's Excel software").
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Visi-Calc, and Borland." 0 Similarly, changes in underlying technology
can have dramatic effects. The recent litigation between Sun Microsystems
and Microsoft over the latter's use of Sun's Java programming
language,"' for example, relies heavily on the current configuration of
Microsoft's programs in concluding that Microsoft is violating a contract
with Sun.I" As those configurations change, the existence of any
contractual violation may change with it.
110. See Eric Wieffering, AOL Surfs New Territory, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Nov.
25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6377746 (noting that Prodigy and other online service producers found
their early market shares quickly usurped by America Online); Plugged into a New Millennium,
INFOWORLD, Oct. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21921395 (noting that the early success of Visi-
Calc's business software was thwarted by the introduction of Lotus 1-2-3 and Microsoft Excel, while
the popularity of Borland's Turbo Pascal was supplanted by "the cornucopia of today's application-
development choices"); see also David Colton, Microsoft and Innovation in a Digital Era (Nov. 20,
1999) <http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/97/1120/iccon.asp>; Declan McCullagh, Why
Exactly Is Microsoft on Trial Again? (June 3, 1999) <http://www.intellectualcapital.com/
issues/issue245/item5266.asp>.
111. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
112. Id. at 112 (granting a preliminary injunction against Microsoft based upon finding it likely
that Sun can establish that Microsoft violated an agreement between the parties in five of Microsoft's
current software products).
A 1993 law review article illustrates how quickly the market (and, in fact, the whole structure
of the wired world) can change. See Angela J. Campbell, Political Campaigning in the Information
Age: A Proposal for Protecting Political Candidates' Use of On-line Computer Services, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 517 (1993). That article advocated "passage of legislation requiring that large, commercial
information services companies afford equal opportunities and reasonable access to political
candidates." Id. at 522. In order to make sense of this proposal, one must remember all the way back
to 1993. In that bygone era, a few on-line service companies (as they were then called) had created
their own systems for members to chat with each other, send emails, and retrieve information; they did
not allow their users to go directly on to the World Wide Web (not that there would have been much
for their users to see; the World Wide Web was barely in existence). It was on this basis that Professor
Campbell rested her crucial premise-that a few large companies controlled the flow of information via
computer, dispensing proprietary information exclusively to their users (just like the few broadcast
networks), and that the only alternatives were online bulletin boards. See id. at 522 ("This Article is
concerned with access obligations imposed upon established commercial information services
companies. These are the entities that provide services that are similar to broadcast companies."); id.
at 534-45 (identifying bulletin boards as the only alternative to commercial services companies for
computer users).
Now that America Online and CompuServe have given their users direct access to the Web, the
proposition that regulation is necessary to break the providers' bottleneck on content seems untenable.
But, at the time it was written in 1993, it correctly described the provision of information on-line. I
have saved, however, the best for last: Campbell's article did not focus on America Online, which she
listed as a distant fourth among the major providers of on-line services; the focus of the regulation, in
her view, was to be the giants in the field-Prodigy, CompuServe, and GEnie (remember that one?).
See id. at 523 n.15 (listing America Online as by far the smallest of the four major companies); id. at
537 ("[Tjhe application of the model statute should be limited to those service companies that function
most like broadcasters: the major commercial on-line services, such as CompuServe and Prodigy.").
Now, of course, America Online is the biggest of these services, by far (and in fact has acquired
CompuServe). See, e.g., Andrea Petersen, Small Players Deluge Market with Free Disks, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 3, 1999, at BI, available in 1999 WL-WSJ 5462968 (presenting a list of the biggest Internet
service providers, with America Online's 17.6 million subscribers outstripping the next closest
competitor's 1.8 million as well as Prodigy and CompuServe-who were not big enough to make the
list).
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Although many plausible examples arise from hypothetical cases
involving the computer industry (e.g., after the trial court findings in an
antitrust action against Westlaw, the market for legal services changes and
Westlaw is overtaken by much cheaper Internet services), the most obvious
current possibility is the antitrust case United States v. Microsoft Corp."'
The case against Microsoft rests on the contentions that Microsoft has
utilized its monopoly position in operating systems to solidify its
dominance and extend it to other areas (most notably, to the Internet
browser market) to the detriment of competitors (most notably, the
Netscape Navigator Internet browser). Two critical elements of this
allegation are: first, that Microsoft has a monopoly in the market for
personal computer operating systems and thus is subject to antitrust
restrictions that would not apply to non-monopolists; and, second, that
browsers are separate functions from operating systems." 4 Microsoft has
contested both of these assertions. It contends that its admittedly huge
market share (Windows has a greater than 90% share of the market for
Intel-compatible personal computer operating systems" 5) does not consti-
tute a monopoly. It also argues that its browser (Internet Explorer) and
operating system are technologically intertwined, and that the integration
of the two provides significant advantages in terms of functionality; given
the benefits created by the integration of browser and operating system,
and given the difficulty of separating the two, Microsoft argues, its
bundling of its browser with its operating system is merely an example of
the kind of competition that the antitrust laws allow."6 In issuing his
findings of fact, Judge Thomas Jackson rejected these arguments. He
concluded that Microsoft does enjoy monopoly power in a relevant
market.' '7  He also found that "Web browsers and operating systems are
separate products,""' that bundling its browser with its operating system
offers no particular advantages," 9 and thus that Microsoft's decision to
113. No. CIV.A.98-1232, 1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998).
114. See Steve Lohr, Due Processor: Hey! Computers Go Faster Than the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1998, at Sec.4, p. 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting the central disputes
between experts as to whether the operating system and the browser are separate, and whether
combining the two enhances functionality); Andrew Pollack, Debate Grows over the Role an Operating
System Plays, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1998, at D1, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
115. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. CIV.A.98-1232 & CIV.A.98-1233, 1999 WL
1001107, at *9 para. 35 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1999) (findings of fact) ("Even if Apple's Mac OS were
included in the relevant market, Microsoft's share would still stand well above eighty percent.").
116. See Microsoft Corporation's Initial Proposed Findings of Fact (Aug. 10, 1999)
<http://www.microsoft.com/presspassltrial/fof>.
117. See Microsoft Corp., 1999 WL 1001107, at *9 para. 33.
118. See id. at *42 para. 154.
119. See id. at *50 para. 191. The validity of this assertion may be crucial. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in earlier litigation between Microsoft and the United States over
the interpretation of a consent decree, noted the importance of determining whether an operating system
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bundle its browser with its operating system represents an attempt by
Microsoft to utilize its monopoly in operating systems to control the
separate browser market."2
The problem is that both of these crucial assertions are subject to
change in the years between the findings of fact and the final appellate
ruling.'"I Judge Jackson demonstrated an apparent awareness of the
problem that changing facts can pose, as he went out of his way to state
not only that Microsoft is a monopolist but that it is likely to retain its
monopoly position in the future.'1 Others, however, see things differ-
ently; they believe that Judge Jackson accurately described Microsoft's
current dominance but greatly overstated the likelihood of it retaining its
monopoly, even in the near term."2 Imagine (as seems likely) that Judge
Jackson issues forward-looking relief (e.g., strictures on Microsoft's
placement of Internet Explorer on its Windows system). Imagine further
that Microsoft's worst fears come to pass, 24 and some clever competitors
and a browser were separate products and stated that: "We think that an 'integrated product' is most
reasonably understood as a product that combines functionalities (which may also be marketed
separately and operated together) in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are
bought separately and combined by the purchaser." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935,
948 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The existence of technological advantages conferred by integration is thus
central; and, as is discussed below, it is likely to change.
120. See Microsoft Corp., 1999 WL 1001107, at *13 para. 410; see also United States v.
Microsoft Corp., Nos. CIV.A.98-1232 & CIV.A.98-1233, 1998 WL 614485 at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 14,
1998) ("According to plaintiffs, Microsoft's strategy depended largely on leveraging its strong position
in the operating systems market to gain a foothold in the market for browsers.").
121. See Gary Rivlin, WindowsDressing, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 29, 1999, at 11 (projecting a final
ruling in United States v. Microsoft Corp. in 2003); Declan McCullagh, MS: The Saga Continues,
WIRED (June 12, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/story/20181.htnl> (projecting a
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp. in 2002 or 2003).
122. See Microsoft Corp., 1999 WL 1001107, at *13 para. 18, *5 para. 23, *7 para. 27, *8 para.
32, *9 para. 34.
123. See, e.g., Andrew Leonard, Is Linux the Real Remedy?, SALON MAGAZINE (Nov. 6, 1999)
<http:l/www.salon.comtech/feature/1999/11106/open .sourcelindex.html> (noting that Eric
Raymond, a leading Microsoft critic, agrees with Judge Jackson's findings about Microsoft's current
position but argues that by the time the Supreme Court rules in the case, "Microsoft will already have
been killed off by a host of factors, not least of which will be the growth of Linux-with or without
government help"); Steven Levy, Judging Jackson by His Actions, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1999, at 68
(stating that Jackson's findings as to the benefits of the integration of browser and operating system,
as well as Microsoft's dominance in operating systems were accurate when made but questionable as
to future events); Declan McCullagh, Let the Market Beat Bill Gates (Nov. 11, 1999)
<http://www.intellectualcapital.comlissues/issue318/item7203.asp> (contending that, because of the
time that the appellate process will require and the insecurity of Microsoft's market position, Judge
Jackson's findings will likely be overtaken by marketplace developments); Charles Piller, Microsoft's
Peril Grows in Evolving Marketplace, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 26193753
(cataloging threats to Microsoft's dominance).
124. Internal Microsoft documents (whose authenticity Microsoft has acknowledged) leaked to a
Microsoft foe suggest ominously that Open Source Software (OSS), and, more specifically, Linux,
represent a grave threat to Microsoft. See Eric S. Raymond, Halloween 1-1.14 (visited May 30, 1999)
<http://www.opensource.org/halloween/halloweenl.hml> (containing a Microsoft document that
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create and effectively market a competing operating system, with the result
that Windows's market share plummets from over ninety percent to less
than fifty percent by the time the Supreme Court is ready to issue its
opinion."z Or (even more ominously for Microsoft) imagine that there
is an explosion of simple computers embedded in every imaginable house-
hold product, connected by a system that has no need for a gargantuan
operating system like Windows; 2 in such a circumstance, Microsoft
might retain 90% of the market for "operating systems for Intel-compatible
personal computers" and still see Windows shrivel to insignificance
because everyone would be buying simple network computers rather than
Windows-based personal computers. 27 In either of these events (a
says, inter alia: "OSS poses a direct, short-term revenue and platform threat to Microsoft"; "OSS is
long-term credible"; "Linux can win"). The possibility that Microsoft intended for these documents
to be made public, in order to help it in the pending antitrust trial (by giving credence to its
competitiveness concerns) is undercut by other statements in these documents (e.g., suggesting that
Microsoft "deny OSS products into the market") that raise the specter of the sort of anticompetitive
behavior that Microsoft has been at pains to refute in the antitrust trial. See also Eric S. Raymond, The
Halloween Documents FAQ (visited May 30, 1999) <http://www.opensource.org/
halloween-FAQ.html > (asserting that "[tihese documents are way too dangerous to Microsoft to have
been leaked deliberately").
125. Given the speed at which the computer market can change and the length of the appellate
process, this scenario is by no means implausible. See Amy Harmon, The Rebel Code, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Feb. 21, 1999, at 34 (stating that "the Linux [operating system] has mutated in recent
months from geek fetish to a dark-horse challenger of Microsoft Windows"); McCullagh, supra note
110 (declaring that "[iln just a few months, Linux has transformed itself from a hacker curiosity to a
platform exploding with more than 200 % annual growth"); Hackers Rule, ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1999,
at 63 (reporting explosive growth in Linux and, more generally, the advantages that open source
software has over proprietary software). See generally John Markoff, Behind the Big Shift on Windows,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting that Microsoft is
changing its strategy on Windows in response to competition, but also that with its new strategy,
"Microsoft is leaving itself vulnerable to competition").
126. For instance, Sun has introduced a new system called Jini which, Sun hopes, will leave
Windows with no role to play. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, The Judicial System vs. the Operating
System, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1998, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("Employing
a concept known as distributed computing, Jini redefines the computer, its peripherals and other gadgets
as a community of devices functioning together within a dynamic network as a single virtual
machine.").
Jini is by no means the only threat in this regard. Another prominent example is Oxygen, a
research project at M.I.T. Laboratory of Computer Science whose goal is "to liberate the PC-centric
world it has occupied for the last two decades." John Markoff, A Project Aims to Unhitch Computing
From Its PC Harness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1999, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT
File; see also After the PC, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 79 (noting the movement toward pervasive
computing and the dangers that it poses for Microsoft).
127. Lest this sound far-fetched, I should note that far wiser and more techno-savvy heads than
mine are predicting just such a transformation in the very near future. See, e.g., John Markoff, New
Product From Sun Microsystems Allows Supercomputing at Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at C1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("[Distributed computing] could also shift the balance
of power in the computer industry. At a time when worried governments on three continents are
struggling to restrain Microsoft's iron grip on computing and its ambitions on the Internet, distributed
computing could level the playing field by shifting growth in high-tech industries to the millions of
consumer appliances that increasingly contain powerful embedded processors."); see also id.
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decrease in market share or a shriveling of the market), the case against
Microsoft would not seem to be moot, because the United States would still
have a ripe claim against Microsoft. But a crucial fact underlying the
suit-Microsoft's huge market share in the market for operating systems in
the dominant sector of the consumer computer market-would have
evaporated," leaving the arguments in favor of the judicially mandated
relief weaker.2 9
("Advocates of a distributed computing philosophy believe that with the advent of high speed
networking it is now possible to achieve the value of integration without submitting to the vast memory
requirements or the complexity of the Windows operating system.").
In fact, one writer explicitly posited that "Sun's announcement of Jini suggests that the current
pace of change could leave the legal system performing surgery on a beast that evolves from one
species to another on the operating table." Pollack, supra note 114. Pollack noted that in 1982 the
federal government acknowledged that, whatever the merits of its original charges brought against IBM
in 1969, those charges had become "'technologically irrelevant.'" Id. He then observed that the
problems for the legal system posed by changing technology are much greater today, as the 1970s and
1980s "were days of relatively slow development of computer technology." Id. See generally Lohr,
supra note 114 ("Business tactics that seemed questionable, even incriminating, yesterday can be
rendered irrelevant tomorrow by the rapid pace of technological change. That certainly seems to be
the lesson being learned in the government's marathon pursuit of Microsoft."); Jube Shiver, Jr.,
Changes in Industry Dim Relevance of Microsoft Trial, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at Al (noting the
possibility that changes in technology and computer markets "could leave moot the overall allegation
that Microsoft used its dominance in the software industry to stifle competition in Internet
technologies").
128. This, in fact, is what likely would have happened had the last major antitrust case involving
the computer industry-the United States' litigation against IBM-resulted in a judicial opinion
resolving the case. The impetus behind the case was IBM's seemingly unstoppable stranglehold on the
computer market, which at the time meant mainframe computers and workstations intended for
sophisticated business uses. See Jay Dratier, Jr., Microsoft as an Antitrust Target: IBM in Sofiware?,
25 Sw. U. L. REv. 671, 673-681 (1996). As it turned out, at the very point when the district court
would have been issuing its opinion and injunctive relief (the United States dropped the case in 1982,
and presumably the district court opinion would have been issued within a few years if the case had
not been dropped), the entire market was undergoing profound changes. Personal computers (then
called microcomputers) were bursting on to the scene; IBM's power in mainframes and minicomputers
no longer loomed so large, and its market share in the microcomputer market was dropping as a result
of new competition. See Peter Huber, Loose Ends, 4 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 1, 7-8 (1995). The antitrust
action against IBM would not have been moot, but it would have proved to be a bit ridiculous; the
markets were changing in ways that left IBM as just one of many players, so the raison d'etre of the
case vanished.
The comparison between the Microsoft and IBM cases has been noted by several industry
players. See, e.g., Rivlin, supra note 121 (noting that, by the time Judge Jackson issued his findings,
entrepreneurs were no longer so worried about Microsoft but instead focused on Amazon.com and
Yahoo: "By contrast, they look upon Microsoft with the same condescension with which Microsoft
once looked down on IBM-as a bloated behemoth hopelessly overrun by innovation").
129. The weakness of the antitrust claim if Microsoft's market share declined to less than 50%
would be obvious: Microsoft's stranglehold on the market would no longer exist, and thus the concerns
about its leveraging of its position would be undercut. The lower Microsoft's market share, the less
the concern about its leverage.
The status of the antitrust claim if Microsoft's market share remains but the market for personal
computers disintegrates is a bit more complex. If the claim against Microsoft were a straightforward
tying claim involving Windows and Internet Explorer, and if personal computers were treated as a
separate market, then the fact that the market for personal computers shrank would not eviscerate the
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Perhaps a more likely transformation is in the relationship between
operating systems and browsers. As was noted above, Judge Jackson
found that browsers and operating systems are separate products. He did
not make the bold predictive claim that they would remain separate prod-
ucts, with good reason; we can be fairly confident that both browsers and
operating systems will continue to mutate, as will the degree of integration
between them. Microsoft and Netscape, as well as their competitors, are
constantly updating their products. Change is the norm, and, in particular,
products once seen as wholly separate from operating systems have been
integrated into them (both for Windows and Apple's operating system). 3°
The problem with the assertion that browsers are separate products (and
thus that their integration into an operating system constitutes anti-
competitive behavior) is that the functionality of their integration will likely
increase over time.13 1 What happens when the case is on appeal and the
appellate court must decide whether to affirm a grant of relief against
Microsoft that is premised on a separation of functions that either has
changed significantly or, perhaps, simply no longer exists? 132
In light of the constantly morphing nature of the market, the only
prediction that I would make with any confidence about the Microsoft case
on appeal is that, with respect to any forward-looking relief in that case,
some of the relevant facts will likely have changed by the time the final
appellate ruling is issued. 33  The appellate court could, of course,
antitrust claim as long as there continued to be significant sales of new personal computers; Microsoft
would still have a monopoly in that market and would be using that monopoly power to tie its product
to another. If, though, personal computers become dinosaurs that are no longer produced (or, more
likely, are produced in smaller numbers as beefed-up alternatives to network computers), then the
antitrust claim against Microsoft would be quite weak, because there would no longer be a relevant
market in which tying was occurring. Separately, if the claim against Microsoft focused on predation
against Netscape more generally (rather than tying specifically), and if Netscape managed to gain
dominance in Web access via network computers, the case against Microsoft also would be weaker even
if some market for personal computers remained.
130. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet ime: Microsoft and the
Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 157, 191-93. See generally MICHAEL A.
CUSUMANO & DAVID B. YOFFIE, COMPETING ON INTERNE TIME: LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS
BATrLE WITH MICROSOFT (1998). See also Lohr, supra note 114, (noting that "the borders between
products vary over time as technology advances").
131. See, e.g., Colton, supra note 110 (arguing that the Microsoft case will be overtaken by
marketplace developments such as the integration of browsers and operating systems, because
"[tiechnology ... is moving fast and the browser and the desktop are merging"); Tom R. HaIlhill,
Good-Bye, GUI, Hello, NUI, BYTE, July 1997, at 60 (noting a trend toward the intertwining of Web
browsers and operating systems); Steve Hamm, Does Everyone Do It?, BUS. WK., Nov. 2, 1998, at
30, 30-31 (noting the increasing integration of the operating system into a single environment).
132. Such change is already afoot. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An AntitrustRemedyfor Monopoly
Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1998) (noting that greater integration
of the Windows operating system and the Internet Explorer web browser undercuts the government's
central argument in the case, and arguing that technological change, in the form of such integration,
has already undermined the government's position).
133. Some, in fact, argue that such changes are already occurring, with more on the way. See,
e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & George Bittlingmayer, Befuddled by 'Internet ime': The Government's
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respond by remanding the case to the trial court for updated findings, but
during the time the case is on its way back those same facts, or other facts
that had not previously changed, might become outdated.
C. Earlier Cases Not Involving Advanced Technology
Examples of rapidly and continually changing facts are not limited to
current events or the world of technology; other instances of such change
occurred in earlier eras and involved nothing particularly high tech. One
prominent example was one of the biggest antitrust cases of the middle of
the twentieth century-the Alcoa antitrust litigation. 134  In 1937, the
United States initiated an action contending that Alcoa was unlawfully
maintaining a monopoly in the market for aluminum ingot. The very size
and scope of Alcoa's business (and its alleged monopolization) produced
a massive record, the result of a trial that lasted more than two years as all
the evidence was brought together. It took another two years for the
district judge to write his comprehensive opinion (which dismissed the
government's complaint on the merits), the length of which-215 pages of
the Federal Reporter-reflects the gargantuan size of the record. 13 5
On appeal, the government requested that the district court's ruling be
reversed and that the Second Circuit issue a judgment that Alcoa be
dissolved. In the years between the time that the trial ended in the-district
court and the case was heard on appeal in the Second Circuit, 136
however, the aluminum industry, and Alcoa's role in it, changed signifi-
cantly. The government by then owned plants that had a greater capacity
than did Alcoa's plants, and two of Alcoa's rivals had also grown in size.
Moreover, further changes in Alcoa's position were expected after the war
ended (when the government would likely transfer its plants to other
Pointless Lawsuit Against Microsoft, WKLY. STANDARD, July 5/July 12, 1999, at 23, 25 ("For all its
haste, [the Department of] Justice is still too late. As the case enters its second year, the government's
original complaint is ancient history ... ."); id. (referring to "the government's original complaint,
with its ambitious predictions, now laughably outdated"); McCullagh, supra note 110 ("[T]he worst
fears of government attorneys have come to pass: Their well-publicized and career-boosting lawsuit,
which focused largely on the Internet Explorer vs. Netscape Navigator battle, seems to be growing
more irrelevant every day."). See generally A Look at What Has Changed Since Microsoft Case Began
(Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.mercurycenter.com/business/microsoftltrial/breaking/docs/
msanl10599.htm> (chronicling changes in the computer industry since the trial began in October
1998).
134. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
135. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); see also
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 421 (describing the huge size of the record and the length of both
the trial and the oral ruling).
136. The relevant procedure provided for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, but four justices
recused themselves, and it went instead to a panel of the Second Circuit. See Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d at 421.
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owners).1 37 Both parties noted the changes and invoked them before the
Second Circuit:
Alcoa argues that, when we look at the changes that have taken
place-particularly the enormous capacity of [the government's]
aluminum plants-it appears that, even though we should conclude
that it had "monopolized" the ingot industry up to 1941, [the
government] now has in its hands the means to prevent any possible
"monopolization" of the industry after the war, which it may use as
it wills; and that the occasion has therefore passed forever which
might call for, or justify, a dissolution: the litigation has become
moot. 3
The government, meanwhile, requested that the Second Circuit take
cognizance of the intervening war by issuing the requested judgment of
dissolution but ordering that its execution occur after war ended.139
The Second Circuit construed the parties' briefs as requesting that the
court take judicial notice of the new developments."4 But in the court's
eyes, the new evidence, even when in the form of government reports, was
merely evidence; judicial notice seemed inappropriate because even the
government report on aluminum "would not be conclusive, or more than
evidence.... At most we could do no more than treat the report as newly
discovered evidence, and send the issue back for another trial .... ,,'
The Second Circuit, in apparent recognition of the time and resources
involved in a remand (and perhaps recognizing the danger that the facts
might change again when the case was on appeal after such a remand),
stated that it would not remand for a new trial. 42 At the same time,
however, the court recognized that its judgment would have a prospective
effect and, therefore, that it would be problematic for it to be based on a
set of facts that no longer existed. 43 The Second Circuit attempted to be
Solomonic by ruling that it would send the case back to the district court,
not for a new trial but instead for a new proceeding regarding the remedies
for Alcoa's monopolization.
The government opposed this resolution, and with good reason. On
remand, Alcoa predictably (and understandably) argued that, because it was
no longer a monopolist, the appropriate "remedy" was for the district court
to take no action against it-precisely the same result, of course, that would
137. See id. at 446-47.
138. Id. at 445.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 446.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 445 (noting that "the judgment in this action should speak from the time of its
entry").
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have obtained if it had won its case before the Second Circuit. The district
court agreed to hear new evidence so that it could determine "whether
[Alcoa] still has a monopoly of the aluminum ingot market in the United
States," 144 and the government failed in its attempt to prevent a new trial
on this issue. 45
As one might expect, the subsequent district court opinion in the case,
though technically simply a remand after a finding of liability, in fact
denied virtually all the relief requested by the government because Alcoa
no longer had a monopoly share.'" The district court retained jurisdic-
tion for five years-the aluminum industry was still changing, after
all-and in 1957, twenty years after the complaint had been filed, the
government's application for a remedy was finally denied. During that
twenty year period, the appellate courts had managed to issue exactly one
opinion on the merits (the Second Circuit opinion discussed above); and
that one opinion relied on a set of outdated facts to produce a holding (of
monopolization) that proved hollow.
A more recent example (though one from a bygone era, technolog-
ically speaking) is Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America.14 In that case, the district court (in 1979) refused to grant
declaratory or injunctive relief to copyright holders like Universal Studios
against the makers of videocassette recorders (remember the Betamax?),
based in significant part on its findings about how such recording devices
were actually used by the general public.4 By the time the Supreme
Court decided the case on appeal, however, five years had elapsed from the
time that the district court made its findings, and VCR use had changed
significantly. The studios attempted to bring to the Court's attention newer
information about the way that VCRs were being used, which they believed
considerably strengthened their case; 49 but the Court ignored any and all
144. United States v. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 171 F.2d 285, 285,
286 (2d Cir. 1948).
145. See id.
146. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see
also RIcHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS 628 (1981) ("[Ihe decree finally entered [by the district court in the Alcoa case]
seems the equivalent of a dismissal of the case. The explanation for this surprising outcome is that
events overtook the tortoise-like progression of the government suit.").
147. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S.
417 (1984).
148. Universal City, 480 F. Supp. at436-39. This case demonstrates that private parties' foresight
is no better than that of courts: Universal and the other studios opposed the introduction of VCRs
because they believed that such devices would cannibalize their movie and broadcast markets; in fact,
subsequent experience suggests that the studios' loss was fortuitous for them, as their profits from tape
sales and rentals exceeded their wildest expectations (even as their preexisting markets continued to
grow).
149. See Respondents' Brief at 5-6, 43-46, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 96-511).
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developments between 1979 and 1984, and decided the case (5-4) based on
the facts that had been developed when VCR use was in its infancy. 5'
IV. Possible Responses to Rapidly and Continually Changing Facts
The preceding discussion raises the central question that this Article
addresses: Given that the state of the world is changing rapidly in realms
like telecommunications and cyberspace, and that we cannot be sure when
this process of change will stop, how should the federal courts respond to
such changes? In such situations, when there is reason to believe that the
facts before an appellate court may be stale, what should the appellate court
do?
A. Legislatures Refrain from Legislating in the First Place
One might attempt to preempt this messy issue by arguing that Con-
gress and all other lawmaking bodies should not pass legislation in areas
subject to rapid change, so that there would be no legislation that could
then be the subject of litigation. The idea would be that legislatures refrain
from legislating in rapidly changing fields and thus avoid the problems that
courts face in adjudicating disputes about allegedly intrusive legislation by
eliminating the source of the problem-the legislation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that this proposal is of course
counterfactual; for better or worse, lawmakers have legislated and parties
do bring litigation. But even assuming the implausible hypothetical of
either universal restraint among lawmaking bodies or federal legislation
that both abjured all forms of regulation and preempted all state
regulation,' the problem for the judiciary would remain because some
of the troubling litigation would still exist. Some of the cases that could
or do involve rapidly changing facts are based on legislation that is neither
new nor aimed at cyberspace. The cases against Microsoft and Alcoa, for
example, were applications of the Sherman Act (enacted over one hundred
years ago), and some have interpreted Title VII 52 as requiring Internet
filters (if effective filters exist). 53 The only way for lawmaking bodies
150. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 421-28.
151. In order to have the desired effect, of course, the statutory language would have to be very
broad (e.g., "No state shall promulgate a law affecting telecommunications or other areas subject to
rapid change."). On preemption, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1172-95
(3d. ed 1999).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
153. The library board that enacted the filtering requirement at issue in Mainstream Loudoun v.
Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998), argued that Title VII compelled such filtering.
Id. at 565 & n. 16, 787; see also Michael W. Lynch, Will Sex Harassment Laws Colonize Cyberspace?,
INv. Bus. DAILY, Jan. 23, 1998, at A30 (noting that "[tihe [Loudoun County] library board didn't
write a policy on cyberpom, but a 'Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment'"); Michael Barrier, Don't
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to shut down all litigation that might present the issues raised in this Article
would be for them to revise all their previous enactments by adding an
exception for situations where facts are changing rapidly. Even indulging
the proposition that legislators might so desire, how would this new legis-
lation be phrased? That one could bring litigation only if the facts
appeared to be settled? That if facts changed during the litigation, the case
would instantaneously self-destruct (perhaps it would unripen, or the parties
would lose standing)? The first option would eliminate too much litigation,
and the second would raise serious concerns under Article III; both options
demonstrate the absurdity of any legislative attempt at preventing litigation
that involves rapidly and continually changing facts.
Finally, even as to new legislation, the proposal would be problematic.
What if Congress (and the nation, and even law professors) believes that
some new development must be stopped in its tracks in order to prevent an
irreversible catastrophe? Absent constitutional constraints (like the First
Amendment), does it really make sense to prevent Congress from acting?
For those who believe in government intervention, rather than leaving
developments to private parties and the market, potentially the most impor-
tant time for intervention is when industries are in a state of flux; that is,
when patterns are being created that might influence future developments,
such that it is the government's point of greatest leverage. 54 In addition,
the Supreme Court opinion in Reno v. ACLU indicated that once a regula-
tory pattern becomes established, its very entrenchment may persuade some
Justices that it is too late in the day for Congress to begin regulating out
of the blue. 55 In light of these considerations, legislatures intent on
Get Caught in the Net's Web, NATION'S BUS., Mar. 1, 1997, at 22, 24; Michael Zweig, Cyberspace
and the Law, DELANEY REP., Jan. 27, 1997; Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Is Restricting
Cyberspace Access (visited July 26, 1999) <http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/harass/
cyberspa.htm> (all noting the potential of Internet downloading to create a hostile work environment
actionable under Title VII).
154. Many commentators, in fact, have suggested that path dependence-the condition obtaining
when initial developments (e.g., how to design and control a network) will have a significant effect on
later developments (e.g., how the network is used) by rendering some otherwise plausible later
developments unlikely because of the cost of starting anew-applies particularly well to fast-changing
fields like telecommunications and cyberspace. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 597-98 (1998); Joel P. Trachtman,
Cyberspace, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Modernism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 576-79
(1998).
155. One of the main ways that the opinion in Reno v. ACLU distinguished the Internet from
broadcast was to emphasize that broadcast had been regulated since its inception, and the Internet had
not. Id. at 867 (noting that while radio has traditionally been regulated, "the Internet, however, has
no comparable history"). The implication of the distinction is that if Congress wants to regulate a new
technology or means of communication, it should start regulating as soon as the innovation becomes
widely used (as was the case with broadcast), rather than waiting until it gains mass acceptance (as was
the case with the Internet by 1996 when Congress passed the Communications Decency Act). In other
words, Reno v. ACLU suggests that, when a new technology becomes available, a legislature that
believes in regulation should act quickly or lose its opportunity.
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influencing future patterns might understandably choose to exercise their
authority at the earliest possible stage.
It may be that the government's attempts at control are misguided, but
that simply reflects the possibility that government control ultimately will
be counterproductive. If one is willing to indulge the possibility that a
reasonable legislature may legitimately seek to intervene in rapidly devel-
oping fields, however, delay becomes hard to justify.
B. Delay Adjudication Until the Facts Settle
The preceding discussion may seem to support a different possibility:
If legislative restraint is undesirable and/or unworkable, judicial restraint
is still possible. That is, the appellate court could delay adjudication until
the facts stopped developing and the situation became calm. This could be
achieved either by the court retaining jurisdiction and delaying resolution,
or by its sending the case down to a lower court with instructions to await
a stable environment. 6 The obvious advantage of this proposal is that
it allows courts to avoid expending valuable judicial resources only to find
that the facts on which their opinions rest-and therefore the opinions
themselves-are soon outdated. Rather than engaging in the futile exercise
of chasing changing facts, the courts could simply wait out the changes
until they settle down.
Such an approach may seem to gain support from the admonition artic-
ulated by Justice Souter in his concurrence in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC'57 -namely that given the
fast-changing nature of telecommunications, the judiciary might be well
advised to heed the proposition, "First, do no harm." 58 Justice Souter
never intimated, however, that the judiciary refrain from deciding cases
involving telecommunications, or even that the Supreme Court do so.'59
Rather, he suggested that in the course of adjudicating cases in which the
facts may change in the future, the Court should recognize the possibility
156. The latter course is, in fact, the one the Supreme Court adopted in Waits, Watts & Co. v.
Unione Austriaca diNavigazione, 248 U.S. 9, 22-23 (1918). That case is not entirely apposite, though,
in that the expressed reason for the Supreme Court's mandated delay was simply that the Austro-
Hungarian respondent could not defend itself adequately, because both legal and practical barriers
prevented intercourse between Austria-Hungary and the United States. See id. (directing delay until
"it may become possible for the respondent to present its defense adequately"). Thus Watts did not
justify delay based on the notion that unsettled facts complicated the courts' task in finding and applying
the appropriate rule of law; it justified delay solely because of the practical concern that one side would
not be adequately represented.
157. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
158. Id. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting the Hippocratic Oath).
159. The Supreme Court could accomplish this by denying petitions for certiorari in cases where
the facts seem likely to change, or, if the Court has already granted a petition and the facts then
change, by dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. On such possibilities, see infra
notes 218 & 343.
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of such change and thus not bind itself to any particular analysis; the
Court, he said, should "be shy about saying the final word today about
what will be accepted as reasonable tomorrow."'" His position was that,
in recognition of the changes afoot, the courts issue opinions that allow for
future developments, not that the courts decline to issue opinions at all. 161
In any event, the possibility of courts declining to adjudicate disputes
until the facts settle seems unsatisfactory. Where facts are continually
changing, it is not clear when, if ever, the facts will settle down. Waiting
for a more certain time may mean waiting indefinitely. The practical result
of this approach for litigants is an indefinite preservation of the status quo.
A court cannot hide behind the pretense of not deciding, because not
deciding has the practical effect of denying relief: either way, the litigant
is subject to the allegedly illegal conduct or constraint for an unknown
period of time. This effect is just as troubling when seen through the lens
of the role of the legislature. Courts' refusal to decide effectively gets the
judicial branch out of the business of reviewing laws. It simply cedes
power to the political branches, removing the important check that is
provided by the judiciary. That is, delaying adjudication has the effect of
empowering the political branches and leaving the judicial process out of
the picture; litigants with real concerns would find that the status quo
would continue indefinitely, because the courts would be unwilling to act.
C. Remand, Issue the Opinion, or Update the Facts
Given, then, that lawmaking bodies do enact laws that apply to rapidly
and continually changing areas of the world, that litigation does sometimes
arise in which relevant facts are subject to such change, and that postpone-
ment of adjudication until facts settle cedes too much power to the political
branches, the question remains: when an appellate court is faced with a
credible assertion that relevant facts found by the trial court are no longer
true, how should the appellate court respond? 62
160. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 777 (Souter, J. concurring).
161. This is not to suggest that this less sweeping proposition ("do no harm" as counseling judicial
flexibility, rather than inaction) is unassailable, but merely that it appears to be what Souter intended.
The problem, as Justice Kennedy and some commentators have pointed out, is that it is not clear what
the "do no harm" position is. See id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Gary D. Allison, Free Speech, Indecency and the Electronic Media: The Fragmentation of the Supreme
Court, 32 TULSA L.J. 403, 427 (1997). It could indicate, as Justice Souter's vote in the case suggests,
that a court should refrain from striking down a statute absent a particularly compelling case to do so;
or it could counsel in favor of invalidating a questionable statute, in order to avoid the danger of
trampling upon individual rights. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Simply stated, it is not clear how we should construe the relevant "harm": is
it the harm of invalidation or the harm of rights-chilling? To put the point somewhat differently, the
"do no harm" dictum privileges a default position, but it is not clear what that default position should
be-and therefore "do no harm" is indeterminate.
162. One might be tempted to say that the appellate court should move slowly or take small steps,
but that is inapposite in this situation; whether it moves slowly or quickly, with little or big steps, it
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The most obvious choice is for the appellate court to remand the opin-
ion. The simplest way to do so would be for the appellate court to refrain
from issuing an opinion and simply remand the case to the original fact-
finder so that it can update the facts that it found. A more time-intensive
alternative (from the appellate court's perspective) would involve the
appellate court issuing an incomplete opinion, deciding what it can and
remanding the rest. Arguably, this is similar to what the Supreme Court
does when it announces a rule of law that it does not apply because the
facts made relevant by the rule of law are not sufficiently clear to permit
a determination by that Court.
A different possibility would be for the appellate court to issue its
opinion without updating the facts. The simplest method would entail the
appellate court issuing an opinion noting that its decision is based on the
facts as found by the trial court without consideration of any factual
developments since that time. In other words, the appellate court would
render a decision as of the time that the trial court found the facts.
In light of the obvious drawback to this proposal-that the appellate
court may issue a final opinion that relies on an outdated version of the
facts-an appellate court might be tempted to consider a different
possibility: issue an opinion based on the old facts that would not be a final
resolution of the dispute between the parties, but rather would be a
tentative first cut subject to later modification. The appellate court could
issue an opinion laying out its initial view, with instructions to the. fact-
finding court that it should revisit the opinion if the assertions of factual
change alleged by one or more of the parties proved to be correct. 63 At
first glance this system may seem an attractive way to avoid some potential
disadvantages of other possibilities. Rather than either accepting the
parties' assertions and remanding, or rejecting them and simply issuing a
final opinion, this option provides a middle course whereby the appellate
court need not determine whether the alleged new facts actually exist but
can still issue an opinion. More generally, this proposal allows the
appellate court to issue an opinion (thus avoiding the deadweight loss of an
appellate court expending its resources without issuing any ruling) while
recognizing the possibility of change; the appellate court would be
acknowledging that the facts might be different, but would still be
providing guidance.
still must figure out what to do about the facts that have changed. The appellate court will have a live
case before it, and it must decide how to handle it.
163. This option should be distinguished from two slightly different possibilities: first, an appellate
court could issue an opinion but retain jurisdiction so that it could immediately consider any new facts;
this is discussed infra note 165. Second, the appellate court could issue an incomplete opinion, finally
deciding what it could and remanding the remainder; this is discussed infra in the text accompanying
note 219.
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Upon closer inspection, however, this proposal has little to recom-
mend it, because the notion of a "tentative opinion" is an oxymoron under
Article III. If the opinion is not intended to resolve the parties' dispute,
then it would be a mere advisory opinion. Appellate courts are not in the
business of giving good advice, but rather are charged with ruling on
pending cases or controversies; if an opinion is not binding on the parties
and does not issue an actual judgment, it is hard to see how it could be
construed as anything other than an advisory opinion. If, on the other
hand, the opinion is intended to resolve the parties' dispute (as seems more
probable), then it is not clear what the modifier "tentative" adds to the
mix. It could not mean that the opinion would somehow become final and
unreviewable once the district court got a chance to review any new sub-
missions, because of course the parties would have the right to appeal from
any new determination made by the district court. Perhaps it could be
thought to underscore that the opinion may have to give way if the facts
actually have changed, but the possibility of the parties reentering district
court upon issuance of this opinion would not be affected by the suggestion
of tentativeness; either the opinion would not resolve their dispute (in
which case it would be advisory), or it would resolve it (in which case the
parties would be in the same position as if the appellate court had issued
an ordinary opinion deciding the matter without updating the facts). The
possibility of a tentative opinion, then, either runs afoul of Article III or
collapses into the possibility of the appellate court simply issuing its
opinion without updating the facts.
The proposals discussed so far are all variations on a theme-an appel-
late court sending the case away without addressing the significance of any
alleged factual changes. The appellate court can remand the case for
development of new facts, decide the case despite the suggestion of new
facts, or try to take some sort of half-measure that would not represent a
final decision but would have the result of sending the case back down to
the fact-finder. But whichever of these routes it chooses, the appellate
court would manage to avoid its own determining (much less weighing) of
any new facts and would leave any further work to be done by lower
courts.
As was suggested above, the appellate court could also take a different
tack: rather than send the case elsewhere, the appellate court could retain
jurisdiction and determine the new facts on its own. A mechanism would
be that, when a party asserts that relevant facts have changed in the time
since the original fact-finding, the appellate court would accept presenta-
tions from the parties on the existence and significance of such changes,
and then make its own determination about them."6  The advantage of
164. Section V(C)(3), infra, discusses at greater length how such updating of facts might be done.
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this proposal is that it allows the appellate court to rule on the controversy
as it exists; none of the other proposals do the same, because they provide
for either sending the case back to lower courts without resolution or
deciding the case based on stale facts. This proposal, in other words,
allows an appellate court to do exactly what courts normally do when
parties before them present a live controversy: issue an opinion resolving
their dispute."
V. Merits and Demerits of the Various Options
Thus we have three basic choices: the appellate court could simply
decide the case based on the old facts; it could remand the case back to the
trial court for further fact-finding; or it could update the facts on its
own166 and then issue its opinion. How do we choose among them?
We could start (and end) with theories of appellate adjudication. For
instance, if our only consideration is that appellate courts correct trial court
errors, then an appellate court should ignore any changes in facts and
simply issue its opinion based on the facts as found by the district
court. 67 The only relevant inquiry would be whether the district court,
based on the evidence before it, erred in its findings of fact or law; post-
trial developments would not affect how the district court should have
165. A slightly different possibility would combine aspects of the two options discussed
immediately above (updating the facts and issuing a tentative opinion): rather than issue a tentative
opinion and send the case to the district court, the appellate court could issue an opinion and then allow
the parties to present to the appellate court any facts that developed after the trial court fact-finding.
The idea would be that the appellate court, in its initial resolution of the case, could avoid the messiness
of updating the facts found below; any updating could then be limited to facts that the court's opinion
made relevant.
Such a limited updating has some advantages. Before any final ruling from the appellate court,
the parties would not know what facts the court would find relevant and thus would likely bring forth
every fact that might potentially be relevant. After the court issued a preliminary ruling, the parties
would have a much better sense of which facts the court would consider relevant and which it would
not; as a result, they could limit their submissions-and the court could limit its consideration-simply
to those facts.
This procedure I am proposing may sound unorthodox, but in fact both the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the Rules of the Supreme Court allow for it. Both sets of rules permit the
parties to submit motions for rehearing after the court has issued its opinion. See FED. R. App. P. 40;
S. CT. R. 44. It is true that appeals courts rarely, and the Supreme Court almost never, actually grant
one of these requests, but the procedure is readily available if the relevant players invoke it and take
it seriously. It would also have a side effect (salutary, in my view) of getting courts in the habit of
reviewing their decisions when it turns out that they assumed a fact or facts that are inaccurate.
166. Such updating might be done with the assistance of a special master. See infra notes 346-60
and accompanying text.
167. Leon Green took this position (or one almost as absolute). See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND
JURY 392-94 (1930) (advocating "a more serious trial and an informal checking up on the trial court's
work" instead of "a more or less preliminary trial and a serious appeal" in the hope that this would
simplify judicial administration); see also Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience ofAppellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751, 778-81 (1957) (objecting to the expansion of appellate review and the
consequent expense, delay, and mistrust of trial judges engendered by this usurpation of power).
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decided at the time. Picking this theory, then, yields a clear answer to the
question of how an appellate court should respond to rapidly changing
facts. We could, of course, choose this theory of adjudication, but that has
the flavor in this context of picking one's conclusion.
At the other extreme, we might say that the exclusive focus of appel-
late adjudication (indeed, all adjudication) should be on doing justice
between the parties.'68 If so, it would seem that the only priority for all
courts, appellate and otherwise, should be getting the facts right. Thus,
just as a focus on error correction resolutely points toward an appellate
court deciding the case based on the old facts, so this consideration
resolutely points against that option; after all, if the focus is on the parties
and recognizing the true state of affairs, then the court must take into
account the new factual developments. Once again, though, there is the
question of arbitrariness and result orientation; why focus on justice
between the parties and nothing else?
Other theories of appellate adjudication, meanwhile, operate at a
higher level of abstraction and thus are not so resolutely conclusive in all
situations; perhaps unsurprisingly, they are fairly indeterminate. For
instance, a commonly expressed view is that, while trial courts should
focus on doing justice between the parties, appellate courts should try to
maintain coherence in the law. This view was ably articulated by Judge
Posner in Mucha v. King.'69 The case involved a question that the
Supreme Court still has not resolved-the standard of review for mixed
questions of law and fact. 7 Posner's opinion squarely addressed this
unresolved issue (holding that appellate courts need not review de novo
mixed questions of law and fact). In so doing, Posner suggested that an
appellate court's "main responsibility is to maintain the uniformity and
coherence of the law, a responsibility not engaged if the only question is
the legal significance of a particular and nonrecurring set of historical
events. "171
In most cases, this will be an argument against appellate fact-finding-
as it was for Posner in Mucha. In the case of rapidly changing facts,
168. See Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of
Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507, 527 (1969) (defending broad appellate power on the theory that "three
heads are better than one," presumably making it more likely that an appellate court will reach the right
or just decision). See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of
Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 248-50 (1991)
(comparing different scholarly views of the proper function of appellate courts).
169. 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 605; see also Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (suggesting
that "deferential review of mixed questions ... is warranted when it appears that the district court is
'better positioned' than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate
scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine"); infra text accompanying notes 335-39.
171. 792 F.2d at 605-06.
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however, the argument frequently may cut the other way. The sort of facts
that might be subject to rapid and relevant change often will not be "a
particular and nonrecurring set of historical events." They often will have
future significance, and often will have applications beyond the four
corners of the case before the court. And, in light of the role of precedent,
such broader facts may influence the resolution of other cases (witness the
potential significance of Reno v. ACLU's findings about the Internet, and
the actual long-term significance of Red Lion's finding of spectrum
scarcity). In other words, though they are not questions of law, some of
these facts may be as central to the uniformity and coherence of the law as
straight legal questions are.
Maybe appellate action on changing facts should depend on which
appellate court is deciding. Rulings issued by courts of appeals are simply
not as influential as Supreme Court opinions. Not only does the Supreme
Court cover more territory, but its opinions are more widely read,
digested, and followed by judges, by members of the executive and legis-
lative branches, and by members of the public. This consideration,
however, could lead to two different conclusions. We might say that
accurate, updated fact-finding is more important in the Supreme Court,
because their decisions are more closely watched and followed; we need to
have accuracy because the stakes are so high, both for the parties and,
more important, for future litigation. Or we might contend that updated
fact-finding is less important in the Supreme Court, because the Supreme
Court decides issues, not cases; the Supreme Court is making broad
pronouncements anyway, so the facts are not as important."T
Instead of the top-down approach of starting with a broad theory, we
might instead employ a bottom-up approach that compares each possibility
to the ordinary course of adjudication and to each other. Such an approach
allows us to bring into focus not only Article III but also systemic
considerations, such as efficiency and relative institutional capabilities, that
provide metrics by which we can compare among the alternatives. This
Article will adopt such an approach, on the theory that it will give us a
fuller picture of the choice between the options. Thus I will assess the
relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach; in the course of doing
so, the answers suggested by the various considerations-and the trade-offs
between those considerations-will become clearer.
A. Issue the Opinion Based on the Facts As Found by the Trial Court
Should the appellate court simply rely on the possibly outdated facts
found by the district court and issue an opinion? Deciding the case based
172. Of course, that raises some awkward points: are we saying that the Supreme Court ignores
the command of Article III to be rooted in the facts? That it should?
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on old facts avoids the danger that the appellate court never gets to issue
a ruling (or, perhaps more likely, issues an opinion only when facts have
settled and thus it is too late for the appellate court to play a role in the
development of the relevant field of endeavor). At the same time, deciding
the case based on old facts has, or seems to have, some advantages over
appellate updating of the facts.
One seeming argument for issuing the opinion without updating the
facts is that it would encourage the parties to bring all their factual
arguments in one venue. The idea is that an appellate court's willingness
to find facts will turn the trial court's adjudication into a mere warm-up.
The way to force the parties to present all their evidence to the trial court
is for the appellate court to refuse to consider factual assertions. That way,
the parties know that their submissions will be considered by the district
court no matter what, so they have no incentive to sandbag and instead
have an incentive to make their best case to the district court. If the goal
is merely not to reward such sandbagging, then this would be an argument
for remanding for additional fact-finding; if the goal is to penalize this
behavior, then it becomes an argument for deciding the opinion without
further fact-finding of any sort.
Although this may make sense in ordinary cases, it has little weight
in the context of this Article. The facts at issue are, by hypothesis, new;
the parties could not have raised them before the district court, because
they did not yet exist (or exist in that form). So there is no point in giving
the parties an incentive to submit these facts, because such submission
would have been impossible.
A more plausible advantage of an appellate court deciding based on
old facts would arise if the appellate court were inclined to issue an opinion
that would render the outdated facts, and therefore their updating, irrel-
evant. If the Supreme Court were, say, to replace a particular First
Amendment test with one that was less fact dependent and on that basis
planned to disregard facts that the parties (operating under the existing
regime) had thought relevant, the most efficient action for the Court to take
would be to decide the case and lay out the rule of law; any time spent
updating facts would just be wasted.
The strength of this argument is diminished by the consideration that
receiving new facts that prove to be irrelevant need not take up a huge
amount of an appellate court's time. If a judge or justice knows that she
plans to apply lenient scrutiny, she need not detain herself on the intricacies
of narrow tailoring. Judges do this all the time with respect to existing
facts-that is, they spend little time on portions of briefs discussing matters
that the court would reach only if it adopted a test that the particular judge
is not inclined to adopt-and there is no reason to believe that judges would
have any more difficulty with respect to newly developed facts. Still, the
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extra briefing is a cost for the system, particularly for the parties. And,
short of a more fundamental change in the way that appellate courts decide
cases (e.g., a routine practice whereby the appellate court simply tells the
parties what issues it finds important or troubling), those costs will remain.
The discussion above may seem to miss the main advantage of decid-
ing a case based on the facts below: it allows the court simply to issue its
opinion in the ordinary manner, without taking any special fact-finding
actions that might tax the court's resources. In so treating a case in which
the facts have changed as it would treat any other case, this option may
seem to conserve both the courts' and the parties' resources.
These benefits shrink upon closer inspection, however, and in fact
highlight potential problems with an appellate court deciding the case based
solely on the record that was developed by the district court. The prob-
lems arise from the possibility that the opinion issued by the appellate court
relies on facts that no longer exist, and thus is outdated on the day it is
issued. We can explore one problem this creates by examining the two
basic possible scenarios of what happens next: either the district court
reconsiders the newly issued appellate opinion, or it does not.
We can imagine how the various possibilities might play out. If an
appellate court issues relief that operates prospectively (whether couched
as injunctive or declaratory relief173), but facts relevant to the holding
have changed, the losing party would likely enter the district court seeking
reconsideration.74 By hypothesis, one or more parties would have put
forth a credible claim that crucial facts had changed since the original fact-
finding, and the appellate court would have ignored that suggestion. As
soon as the appellate opinion was issued, therefore, the losing party would
presumably return to the court that originally issued the relief and request
that the court reconsider the issuance (or nonissuance) of the relevant
injunctive and/or declaratory relief.
If the district court were willing to reconsider the prior ruling in light
of the changed circumstances, the appellate court's issuance of its opinion
without considering new facts would have achieved very little. It would
not save judicial resources or the parties' resources if, upon issuance of the
appellate opinion, the parties immediately go back to the district court
requesting that it reopen the injunction based on new facts. The parties
would then present all their arguments to the district judge; and the judge
would have to reacquaint herself with the old facts (and, of course, digest
the new facts) with sufficient depth to allow her to compare the new and
173. See supra subpart 1(A).
174. It is, of course, possible that the losing party would abandon hope and thus refrain from
seeking reconsideration-particularly if it seemed probable that the district court would grant no relief
(based either on preclusion or on the notion that it would be improper for a lower court to reconsider
a decision made by a higher court). See infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
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old facts. Even as to the appellate courts' resources, considered alone,
there is no reason to expect any savings: once the district court issued its
ruling, the parties would then proceed back up the chain of appeal, and the
appellate court would have to familiarize itself with the case anew. 75
The litigation, in other words, would never end; it would just change
venue.
This discussion, though, raises the specter of an even more significant
drawback for the proposal that appellate courts issue opinions based on old
facts: the district court might not be willing to reconsider the injunctive/
declaratory relief, on the theory that such relief had been blessed (or
rejected) by a higher court. If so, the cost of an appellate decision based
on old facts could be quite high.
How might this happen? First, any litigant who sought to reopen a
judgment would be faced with a suggestion of preclusion-that the matter
had already been fully and finally litigated, and so was not subject to
further review. Presumably, the movant would respond by arguing that
she should be granted relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment
if, among other things, "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application." 76 This language obviously does not
mention new facts, but the Supreme Court has suggested that Rule 60(b)
applies to new factual developments."7 Alternatively, an aggrieved party
175. An appellate court with discretionary jurisdiction-Le., the Supreme Court-could avoid this
expenditure of energy by denying certiorari the second time around, but this possibility has serious
shortcomings of its own. See infra note 218.
176. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(5). A movant might also invoke Rule 60(b)(2), which provides for
relief if there is newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered during the original trial.
The weight of authority, however, is that "[n]ewly discovered evidence must be of facts existing at the
time of trial," and the new evidence relevant here would, by hypothesis, not have existed at the time
of trial. See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2808 (2d ed.
1995); see also Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1988) ("'Newly
discovered evidence' under Rule 60(b)(2) . . .must be evidence of facts existing at the time of the
original trial."). For the situations addressed in this Article, then, Rule 60(b)(5) is the more likely
vehicle.
177. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992) ("A party seeking
modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing a significant change either in
factual conditions or in law."); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997) (citing the Rufo holding
that a Rule 60(b) motion can be granted on the grounds of a significant change in either factual
conditions or the law). One potential loose end is that these cases arose in the context of consent
decrees and injunctions, rather than declaratory relief. But Rule 60(b) is not limited to particular kinds
of relief (it focuses on judgments with "prospective application"). And, as this Article has argued,
declaratory relief often has a prospective effect, so the principle would seem to apply to that relief as
well. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 176, § 2863 n.13 ("Relief seems to be possible under [Rule
60(b)] from the prospective operation of a declaratory judgment."). After all, it would seem strange
for a district court to inform a litigant both that it could not challenge declaratory relief after it had been
issued (because Rule 60(b) did not apply to such relief) and that such relief was binding upon that party
prospectively. (And, of course, if the court said that the relief was not binding upon that party
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could argue that she should be permitted to bring her suit anew because the
new factual developments rendered preclusion inappropriate. 78  Neither
of these arguments would be a knock-down winner: Rule 60(b) is too
vague, and the threshold applied to new facts in order to avoid preclusion
is too muddled, to offer certainty."9 Given, though, that the factual
change, by hypothesis, casts doubt upon the issuance (or nonissuance) of
prospective relief, there is a reasonable chance that the movant would be
able to renew her suit. It should be noted, however, that if a district court
was not willing to reopen an opinion that was based on outdated facts (or
if the losing party decided the chances of success were too slim and thus
did not seek reconsideration in the district court in the first place), then the
cost of an appellate court deciding the case based on the facts as found by
the district court would be disturbingly high. The intolerable tension
discussed in Part II in the context of facts that change after the appellate
process is complete-that the opinion lays down the current status of the
law but in fact misdescribes the world as it has come to exist after the
opinion was issued'°-would apply here as well; the appellate opinion
would never have applied to the parties' actual dispute, yet it would bind
them into the indefinite future.
Assuming that the moving party overcomes the suggestion of preclu-
sion, a second potential obstacle quite possibly would produce a similar
result in the district court: The court might find no preclusion but
nonetheless conclude that it was unable to grant any relief. The district
court might consider it improper for a lower court to reconsider the factual
basis for the decision of a higher court, as such reconsideration would of
course entail a reconsideration of the opinion that relied on those facts.
That is, the district court might conclude that it was the prerogative of the
appellate court that issued the original opinion (or a higher court) to
prospectively, then the party could simply treat the declaratory relief as a dead letter on the theory that
the facts had changed, and prepare for a new lawsuit on the issue.)
178. See, e.g., Southeast Fla. Cable, Inc. v. Martin County, 173 F.3d 1332, 1336 (1lth Cir.
1999) (concluding that because underlying facts had changed, resjudicata did not apply); 18 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4417 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (1980) ("Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action
with respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent
facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the
first.").
179. See WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 178, § 4417 (discussing different approaches to assessing
whether factual change is sufficient to render preclusion inappropriate).
The nonmoving party might try to argue that the changes were not actually new because they had
occurred while the case was on appeal. This argument should lose, as long as the parties attempted
to bring the new facts to the appellate court's attention. After all, the reason for the new suit would
be that the appellate court had refused to consider those new facts, so preclusion would mean that the
movant attempted to put forward facts as diligently as possible but nonetheless never got her bite at the
apple.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 45-67.
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reexamine either its holding or the facts that provided the underpinning of
the holding. Or the district court might be willing to make new factual
findings, but not be willing to change the relief granted even if the new
factual findings, absent the previously issued appellate opinion, would lead
to a different outcome. Such reasoning would flow from the notion that
a lower court is bound by the decisions of a higher court-even if they are
outdated or otherwise wrong-until such time as the higher court abandons
its precedent."'
Such a position gains some support from the Supreme Court's prece-
dents themselves. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has chastised
lower courts that have anticipated Supreme Court overruling of a decision;
the Court has made it clear that it, and not any lower court, has the
authority to reject its decisions."n As the court recently stated in State
Oil Co. v. Khan,"8 3 even if the original opinion suffers from
"'infirmities, [and] ... increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations,'..
it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents."" s
Arguably, factual changes are different: the lower court would not be
ruling that the legal reasoning in the original appellate opinion was invalid
and had to be rejected, but rather would simply be ruling that changed facts
resulted in a different outcome under the preexisting legal analysis. To put
the point somewhat differently, one could argue that the lower court would
not be rejecting the earlier precedent but would simply be distinguishing
it, because its factual pattern did not apply anymore. In addition, the
appellate court, by hypothesis, would not have made its own factual
findings but would merely have accepted findings from lower courts; one
might contend that the lower court would really be reconsidering the
finding that it (or a coequal court) originally made, even if that finding had
been the basis for a higher court's opinions. These arguiments, however,
are by no means irrefutable: one might respond that rejecting a key under-
pinning of a decision but "leaving the reasoning in place" is effectively a
rejection of that case and thus must be left to the issuing court (or one
above it), because the opinion would no longer apply to the world.
Relatedly, one might contend that key factual assertions (especially
181. Some commentators reject this proposition, see, e.g., John M. Rogers, Lower Court
Application of the "Overruling Law" of Higher Courts, 1 LEGAL THEORY 179, 181 (1995), whereas
others embrace it, see, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 4
(1989). This debate, though interesting, does not concern me here; my point is that, whether or not
they should, some lower courts likely will defer not only to the legal conclusions but also to the
underlying factual assertions made by a higher court.
182. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989);
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237.
183. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
184. Id. at 20 (quoting Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (1996)).
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assertions that are not specific to the parties) should be understood as part
of the holding and thus be entitled to deference."
For purposes of this Article, what is important is not the question of
which understanding of precedent is preferable, but rather the possibility
that some lower courts may be swayed by the argument that they are not
free to reconsider the factual underpinnings of a decision by a court that is
above them in the hierarchy. Would, for example, some lower courts con-
sider themselves bound by the findings in Reno v. ACLU' upon which
the Supreme Court relied, and thus be unwilling to reconsider the constitu-
tional status of the CDA in light of, for instance, the fact that the obstacles
to age verification on the Internet existing in 1996 are considerably
diminished today?"8  It appears that some lower courts consider
185. The Supreme Court appears to have so treated its own factual assertions in other contexts.
One example is the historical record surrounding Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
which had allowed a citizen of South Carolina to bring a suit against the state of Georgia in federal
court, and the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment (which prohibited suits against states by citizens
of another state). In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), the Supreme Court
stated that Chisholm "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once
proposed and adopted." Id. at 325. Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996), however, cited numerous historical sources indicating that the reaction to Chisholm
had not been one of surprise or outrage, and that the Eleventh Amendment was not immediately
thereafter adopted. Id. at 106 n.5, 106-14 (Souter, J., dissenting). This historical fact was important
to Seminole Tribe (which involved the question of congressional abrogation of state immunity from suit
that was not grounded in the text of the Eleventh Amendment) because the majority had contended that
Chisholm violated a widely understood principle of state immunity from all suits in federal court, see
id. at 69-an assertion that was necessary to the majority's position in light of the conceded
inapplicability of the Eleventh Amendment; the majority claimed that Chisholm was an aberration and
was universally regarded as such by the Framers' generation.
The majority in Seminole Tribe did not respond to the dissent's historical sources with its own
historical material; rather, it simply asserted that Chisholm had created a shock of surprise, and its only
support for that statement was the dictum from Monaco. Id. at 69. As Justice Souter pointed out:
The Court's response to this historical analysis is simply to recite yet again Monaco's
erroneous assertion that Chisholm created "such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted.". . . Monaco's ipse dixit that Chisholm
created a 'shock of surprise' does not make it so. This Court's opinions frequently make
assertions of historical fact, but those assertions are not authoritative as to history in the
same way that our interpretations of laws are authoritative as to them.
Id. at 106 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). In other words, the Court felt no need to respond with historical
sources because the statement from an earlier precedent (even one decided more than 100 years after
Chisholm) was good enough. Apparently, the historical question was to be treated as settled by the
Monaco decision; and if it would be so treated by the Supreme Court, then a fortiori a lower court
should so treat the Court's rendition of history as well.
186. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
187. The district court that granted a preliminary injunction against the new Internet indecency
act-the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. 1999)-was somewhat coy on this issue.
See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1999). The district court made its own
findings but also emphasized findings relied upon by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU, pointedly
noting, for example, that "the Supreme Court adopted the district court's finding that 'existing
technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access
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themselves so constrained in related contexts. To return to the example of
Red Lion, 8' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has on
several occasions suggested the invalidity of Red Lion's notion of spectrum
scarcity, but the D.C. Circuit has also stated that it will defer to the
Supreme Court's finding absent further word from the Court itself.'8 9
In fact, in the most recent of these cases, the D.C. Circuit, apparently
treating the Supreme Court's assertion of spectrum scarcity as an integral
part of the Court's holding, explicitly stated that it was not free to
reexamine the scarcity doctrine, relying on the language from State Oil v.
Khan quoted above."9
What is the harm of a lower court refusing to reconsider the relief
granted (or denied) by a ruling of a higher court, whatever the lower
to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults.'" Id. at 494 (quoting Reno,
521 U.S. at 876).
188. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
189. See supra notes 38-48.
190. See Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The most famous counter-example, Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 220
F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964),
has a subsequent history that, if anything, supports the D.C. Circuit's position on RedLion. Stell came
nine years afterBrown v. Board ofEducation, in which the Supreme Court had supported its conclusion
that segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority" among African-Americans by stating that "this
finding is amply supported by modern authority" and citing seven publications. 347 U.S. 483, 494 &
n. 11 (1954). In Stell, the district court refused to order a school board to dismantle a segregated school
system because the court revisited Brown's factual assertions about the effects of segregated education
and found them untenable. The district court justified its reconsideration of the effects of segregation
as follows:
Whether Negroes in Kansas believed that separate schooling denoted inferiority,
whether a sense of inferiority affected their motivation to learn and whether motivation
to learn was increased or diminished by segregation was a question requiring evidence for
decision. That was as much a subject for scientific inquiry as the braking distance
required to stop a two-ton truck moving at ten miles an hour on dry concrete.
... The Supreme Court put at rest any residual question on the nature of its
inquiry when it indicated its reliance on scientific information: "Whatever may have been
the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is
amply supported by modern authority." The teachings of psychology in 1896, in 1954,
or in 1963 are inquiries requiring evidence in the same sense as repeated determinations
of "seaworthiness." Actually, the non-legal authority to which the Court referred was
neither testimonial nor documentary in character but came from a "Brandeis" type brief
filed directly in the Supreme Court by the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.
Stell, 220 F. Supp. at 678. The Fifth Circuit quickly reversed the district court, stating:
We do not read the major premise of the decision of the Supreme Court in the first Brown
case as being limited to the facts of the cases there presented. We read it as proscribing
segregation in the public education process on the stated ground that separate but equal
schools for the races were inherently unequal. This being our interpretation of the teaching
of that decision, it follows that it would be entirely inappropriate for it to be rejected or
obviated by this court.
Stell, 333 F.2d at 61.
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court's reasoning? 9' For litigants, they would have to go through the
motions (literally and figuratively) at the district court with no possibility
of actually winning; and only after this exercise-and perhaps another in
the court of appeals, if the issuing court was the Supreme Court-would
they appear before a court that would consider itself able to reconsider the
case. This would.be extremely costly for litigants, who would have to
fund futile litigation in lower courts before they were given the green light
to seek actual redress in the issuing court. For that issuing court, nothing
would be saved, because it would still have to deal with the case. And for
the lower courts, a significant amount of time and energy would be spent
sending the case up the appellate ladder, with nothing to show for it. In
addition to all of those considerations, there is the problem of extending the
life of outdated facts. Remember that during all of this period, the old,
outdated opinion will be on the books. Findings made by the district court
in year X will not only last to year X + 2 (when the appellate court issues
its opinion relying on those findings), but until X + 4 (when the appellate
court finally issues its second opinion)." If the findings were indeed
invalid by year X + 2, it would be quite troubling for a ruling that rests
upon such findings nonetheless to remain in force for two more years of
litigation, working its way up the appellate chain. The concern about the
continued force of obsolete factual findings would apply here, too; the
outdated opinion would have force until the appellate court got around to
seeing the case again. 93
The danger that appellate courts are issuing opinions based on stale
facts also raises a separate, but related, jurisprudential concern. At the
191. It may make little difference to the litigants, as a practical matter, whether the reasoning is
based on preclusion or on the role of lower courts in the hierarchy; either way, the lower court would
refuse to grant the moving party any relief and she would then have to appeal.
192. The situation would be even worse if the district court were unwilling even to make any new
factual findings (much less to reconsider the appellate opinion's result), on the theory that the findings
in the original litigation had been accepted, and therefore insulated from lower court scrutiny, by the
appellate opinion. See supra text accompanying note 181. In such a situation, the litigant would have
to litigate all the way up to the issuing court only to find that the issuing court would likely refrain
from making its own findings but instead would remand to the district court, this time clarifying that
it can, in fact, make new findings. Only then (we are probably up to year X + 5 or so) would the
litigant get a chance to persuade a court that the factual findings made years earlier were no longer
valid.
193. There are ways of avoiding this problem: most obviously, the appellate court could make it
clear that, if a subsequent district court found the factual underpinnings of the appellate court's opinion
to be invalid, the district court could reconsider those facts and the ruling on which it rested. This
could be achieved either by the appellate court so stating in its opinion or by remanding the case to the
district court; either way, the appellate court would thereby clarify that district court reconsideration
of the case and its crucial underpinnings would be permissible.
Such an outcome would avoid the dangers of an entrenched opinion relying on a set of invalid
facts, but it would simply leave us back in the position that I noted at the outset of this discussion: the
litigation continues in another forum, and thus this possibility does not do much for the conservation
of either judicial or private resources. See supra text accompanying note 175.
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outset, it should be noted that, depending on the way that the facts have
changed, the case could be moot. 94 If, for example, Microsoft stopped
selling its Windows operating system because Windows had lost so much
market share that it was no longer profitable, a court would likely find the
antitrust case against Microsoft moot."9 This is particularly interesting
because a determination about mootness requires the court to weigh the
likelihood of the challenged action occurring in the future-specifically,
whether there is a "reasonable expectation" of the alleged harm
recurring.'96 That is, a decision about mootness obliges a court to weigh
facts on its own and make its own determination about the likelihood of
particular events. Thus, any time there is a credible suggestion of
mootness, from any source,t97 judges must gather the new facts and make
194. The Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that Article III of the Constitution does
not permit federal courts to hear moot cases. See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.
472, 477 (1990) ("[F]ederal Courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.");
Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) ("Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases
derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial
power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy."). The proposition that adjudication of
moot cases is inconsistent with Article III is widely, but not universally, accepted on the Court. The
lone dissenter is Chief Justice Rehnquist, who suggested in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), that
the Court reconsider its position that Article III squarely forbids the adjudication of moot cases. He
contended that "while an unwillingness to decide moot cases may be connected to the case or
controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated connection that may be overridden where there
are strong reasons to override it." Id. at 331 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Interestingly (for purposes
of this Article), he argued that "we should adopt an additional exception to our present moomess
doctrine for those cases where the events which render the case moot have supervened since our grant
of certiorari or noting of probable jurisdiction in the case." Id. at 331-32.
No Justice joined Rehnquist's opinion in Honig, however, and none has taken up his call to
reconsider whether moomess has constitutional underpinnings. See Pushaw, supra note 13, at 457.
Apparently, all the other Justices see no reason to disturb the longstanding doctrine that Article III
prevents federal court adjudication of moot cases.
195. One exception to the moomess doctrine is that a case will not be moot if the defendant
voluntarily ceases the challenged behavior but is free to return to it at any time. This exception does
not apply, however, "if the defendant can demonstrate that 'there is no reasonable expectation that the
wrong will be repeated.'" United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (quoting United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945)). If Microsoft stopped selling
Windows because the market for it had dried up, the appellate court would then have to determine
whether there was a reasonable expectation of a Windows revival (and, of course, of Microsoft's
allegedly illegal practices with respect to Windows).
196. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998); Lewis, 494 U.S. at 481; Gwalmey of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66 (1987); Honig, 484 U.S. at 319-20
& 318 n.6; W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633 (all stating that a claim is moot absent a "reasonable
expectation" that harm would recur).
197. The Supreme Court has consistently held that it has no power to hear a moot case, see supra
note 194, so it does not matter who raises the issue of moomess; and all parties are obliged to raise
it if it might be relevant, even if the parties believe that the case is not moot. See Board of License
Commissioners of the Town of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238, 240 (1985); Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.23 (1997). Anyone-a party, an amicus, the Court acting on
its own, a taxi driver-can raise a question of mootness, and the Court then considers the matter for
itself.
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a finding based on them. 9' And, to return briefly to the issue of
efficiency, if an appellate court looks at the facts and then determines that
a case is not moot, it has already invested the time to consider the
significance of the new facts; in such a situation, the additional cost of
taking those facts into account in its decision on the merits seems relatively
small, particularly in comparison to the deadweight loss that would result
if the court nonetheless relied solely on the original facts and then left the
district court to start all over again with a new fact-finding.
In most situations, however, it seems likely that mootness per se will
not be an issue. Still, there is a lurking issue of the role of federal courts,
an issue that has both prudential and constitutional implications."9
Simply stated, acceptance of stale facts seems inconsistent with the whole
notion of prospective relief. The appellate court would be saying not that
a given law or practice was illegal at the time, but that it had been illegal
in the past. Take the possibility I suggested in Part III regarding
Microsoft's market share for personal computer operating systems dropping
precipitously from over ninety percent to less than fifty percent. The case
would not, as a technical matter, be moot. There would still be a concrete
dispute, and the parties would have a stake in that dispute (unless the
United States were to concede that no controversy remained because of
Microsoft's loss of market share). The United States has a ripe antitrust
claim against any market participant that the United States believes is
violating the law; even if a company's market share were only five percent
198. Appellate courts can, of course, remand to lower courts for consideration of moomess, see
United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 516 U.S. 415, 416 (1996) (remanding for
consideration of whether the case was moot in light of the newly enacted Telecommunications Act of
1996), although in many cases the Supreme Court simply decides the moomess issue for itself rather
than send the case to a lower court to make this determination. See discussion infra subsection
V(C)(1)(a).
Significantly, even when the appellate court remands for consideration of moomess, it still must
make the determination whether the new facts present a sufficiently credible claim that mootness is an
issue. Mootness is raised in many cases, and it would be ridiculous for an appellate court to send every
case about which someone has suggested mootness (because, as noted above, mootness is a
constitutional issue that can be raised by anyone) to a district court for consideration of the issue.
Similarly, it would be absurd (and inconsistent with the constitutional basis for mootness) for an
appellate court to ignore allegations of moomess and simply decide the case without considering the
issue of moomess. The bottom line, therefore, is that even when it remands for consideration of
moomess, the appellate court gets sufficiently involved with the facts to determine whether or not a
remand is appropriate.
199. It bears noting that state courts are not subject to Article III, even when adjudicating federal
law claims. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990) (holding
that state courts are not bound by Article III); Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (noting
that "[a]lIthough the state courts are not bound to adhere to federal standing requirements, they possess
the authority . . . to render binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations of federal
law"); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) ("[The special
limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not
binding on the state courts.").
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of the market, the United States would have a justiciable claim against
it.' The problem in such a situation, of course, is that the government
would now have a losing (but ripe) claim. The case against Microsoft,
then, would not be moot, but a crucial fact underlying the suit-Microsoft's
huge market share in the market for operating systems-would have evapo-
rated, leaving the arguments in favor of the judicially mandated relief very
weak.
Would it really make sense for an appellate court to affirm the district
court's ruling by relying on the facts as developed by the district court
(when Microsoft was still riding high)? What would such an appellate
ruling mean? That as of the time the district court ruled, forward-looking
relief was appropriate, even though such relief is inappropriate now? And
what would be the legal effect of such a ruling? Given the changes sug-
gested in the previous paragraph, the hypothetical appellate court ruling
would seem to be dead on arrival. If it were injunctive relief, Microsoft
would enter district court the next day and either would find that it could
not get the injunction modified (which raises the problems of entrenchment
discussed above) or, more likely, would be able to get the injunction
modified in short order. Similarly, if it were declaratory relief, Microsoft
would have a strong argument that it could ignore the declaration immedi-
ately, as the declaration would no longer apply to the real world. It would
seem, then, that the appellate ruling would be mainly of historical interest;
the appellate court would be telling the fact-finder that, given a certain state
of affairs, certain forms of relief are appropriate. But in light of the fact
that the state of affairs no longer existed, the appellate court might as well
opine on other disputes the parties had in the past (perhaps it could revisit
the question whether the original version of Windows 3.1 should have been
modified)."'
As the preceding discussion suggests, issuing an appellate opinion with
prospective effect based solely on outdated facts seems to confound our
notion of what judicial opinions are. Deciding a case in that situation has
the flavor of issuing an opinion just for the sake of getting one's views out
on paper. In this way, it raises the same kinds of concerns that advisory
opinions do. The appellate court would be issuing an opinion in a now-
200. Cf. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 651 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir.
1981) (rejecting a jury instruction that a market share of less than 50% was sufficient to find no
monopoly).
201. One way of thinking about this is to imagine that Congress passes a statute giving anyone
subject to a particular time-specific harm (say, the Y2K fears that our computer-reliant society will
collapse into chaos at the beginning of the year 2000) the right to an injunction to prevent that harm
(requiring Y2K remediation before January 1, 2000), and that the statute specifically had no sunset
provision. If a district court issued an injunction based on this law in December of 1999 to allay
someone's fears, and the case was then appealed, what would any appellate decision issued in the year
2000 mean?
1999]
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hypothetical "case." 2' It might provide some guidance to its readers,
but, as was noted above, as a legal matter it would probably be dead on
arrival.'0 3 Thus, with respect to the parties, it would seem to constitute
little more than useful insights.
This relates to one other point, namely that appellate decisionmaking
based on stale facts from below undercuts the role of appellate courts.
Think about the shelf life of an appellate opinion that is based on stale
facts. The opinion would remain controlling only until a new court
(probably the same district court that made the original findings) had a
chance to consider the new facts; that would be measured in days or
weeks. And think about the larger significance of this fact: rather than the
appellate opinion remaining in effect until the facts changed again, it would
be a new opinion from the district court that would control until further
change occurred. The design of our federal system assumes that there are
advantages to appellate decisionmaking; it could reside final authority in
district courts but does not. But an appellate court decision based on old
facts, in the face of new facts, effectively means that the controlling
decisions will, almost all the time, be issued by district courts. The only
exception will be the brief period of time when the district court is
202. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937) ("[A "controversy" under
Article III] must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of
a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts."); Calderon v. Ashmus, 118 S. Ct. 1694, 1698 (1998) (quoting this
statement from Haworth).
203. The Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), provides an interesting case study. As was discussed in subpart III(C), the Second Circuit
wrote an opinion finding that Alcoa was monopolizing the aluminum ingot market, even though factual
changes postdating the trial court's fact-finding had substantially weakened (if not eviscerated) the
monopolization claim, but the court also remanded to the district court for consideration of the new
facts in structuring the relief that would be granted. See id. at 445. On remand, the district court,
faced with the serious problems discussed in this Article inherent in issuing prospective relief based on
facts that no longer exist, understandably chose to gather and evaluate the new evidence about Alcoa's
current monopolization; when that new evidence revealed that Alcoa no longer had its monopoly, the
district court ordered no relief. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). The district court's opinion thus effectively (and unsurprisingly) left the Second
Circuit's opinion with no real impact on the parties.
What, then, did the Second Circuit's opinion actually do? It did not apply to Alcoa's current
situation. It did not resolve the parties' dispute as it then existed (remember, in fact, that both parties
requested that the Second Circuit take the new facts into account in issuing its opinion). It did not even
give any guidance to the parties, the district court, or the world at large about the effect of antitrust
laws on Alcoa's current practices. The most that the opinion did was simply to lay out guidance that
might apply to other parties in other situations. That is, like any opinion, it could be read by future
lawyers as indicating that when conditions X, Y, and Z exist, an antitrust action will be viable. But
ordinary opinions that so state do so in the context of a concrete dispute that they are resolving; the
guidance is a by-product of the resolution of the dispute. Here, there was no meaningful resolution.
The Second Circuit opinion proved to be guidance for the sake of guidance. It functioned, in other
words, as valuable advice regarding potential future developments-fine for lawyers, management
consultants, and psychics, but problematic for Article III courts.
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considering the new facts brought before it. By contrast, if the appellate
court updates the facts, its opinion will be controlling for however many
months or years it takes for the facts to change in a relevant way; its
opinion will not last forever, but at least it will control for a nontrivial
period of time.
These potential drawbacks of an appellate court issuing its opinion
based on the facts as found by the district court would be mitigated to the
extent that the appellate court could determine that, even though some of
the facts were outdated, the opinion did not rest on those facts and thus the
factual changes would not undercut the opinion. That is, the appellate
court could minimize the problems addressed above if it made sure that its
opinion did not rely on the facts that might have changed. The catch, of
course, is that this would require that the appellate court familiarize itself
with the assertions of factual change, so that it will know which findings
may be infirm; and the time the appellate court spends familiarizing itself
undercuts the main rationale for deciding based on old facts in the first
place-namely, that it would save the appellate court's time. The more
time that the appellate court spends ensuring that its opinion will not be
outdated, the less the appellate court actually is relying on the record below
and the less sense it makes for the court to decide the opinion based on
those old findings.
This point relates to one final consideration: When an appellate court
issues an opinion-whether based on new facts or old-its investment of
time and energy is quite considerable. If that opinion relies on stale facts,
then the appellate court is expending a large quantity of resources to
produce an outdated opinion that likely will be immediately reopened. For
an added increment of resources which often will be small relative to the
total resources expended, the court could instead issue an opinion that
actually applied to the parties' current situation, and that settled the dispute
(at least until the facts changed again sometime in the future).2 4
B. Remand
As was mentioned above, remanding to the trial court is an obvious
choice. Why remand? The main arguments for remanding are related: the
trial court has more expertise in fact-finding as a general matter; 5 it has
a greater ability to find facts because it can hold oral hearings and judge
witness credibility;' and it has more familiarity with the underlying
204. See infra notes 341-57 and accompanying text.
205. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) ("The trial judge's major role is
the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.").
206. See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 122 (4th ed.
1998); Brewer, supra note 20, at 1543 (suggesting that "[a]ppellate courts are not institutionally
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facts of the case at hand because it has already seen the witnesses and
resolved factual disputes at the trial level.2 7
The first two arguments rely on the perceived disparity between the
abilities of district courts and those of appellate courts, as well as the
perceived value of evidentiary hearings. They are the best arguments for
remanding and, not coincidentally, the best arguments against appellate
updating of facts. Those issues are considered at some length in the next
section, so, in the interest of economy and clarity of analysis, I will bracket
consideration of these advantages of remanding until then. It bears
mentioning, though, that. district court judges are not the only actors to
whom expertise and the ability to hold hearings would be attributed: the
same is true of special masters.2°8
The third argument for remanding-based on the trial court's famil-
iarity with the facts of the particular case as a result of seeing live
witnesses and resolving factual disputes-is unaffected by the potential
existence of a special master, because it privileges the actual fact-finder
from the original case. It should be noted, however, that it will not always
apply: many cases (especially those raising significant constitutional or
statutory issues) are decided via summary judgment based on the briefs and
memoranda submitted to the trial court, with no formal gathering of evi-
dence or resolution of factual disputes;' indeed disputes regarding
material facts would preclude summary judgment. 10
The significance is that, where the trial court has not weighed and
evaluated disputed facts, the trial judge may have no greater familiarity
with the facts than do the appellate judges who have the briefs and record
before them. The perceived benefits of seeing live witnesses will not apply
if there was no oral hearing that the judge attends; she, like the appellate
judges, will decide based on a cold record. So the apparent advantages of
designed to examine testimonial evidence and other kinds of evidence firsthand and so are far less
well-situated than factfinders to make an accurate factual judgment in the face of competing factual
claims").
207. Another potential argument-that remanding eliminates any incentive for the parties to
withhold some of their factual submissions at the trial level in the hope of getting a more favorable
response from the appellate court than they would expect from the trial court-is discussed in subpart
V(A), supra.
208. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
209. Trial courts that grant summary judgment often write opinions that include findings of fact,
but those findings usually summarize a set of facts that the parties do not dispute (because, of course,
disagreement would preclude summary judgment), rather than actually decide between disputed factual
assertions. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 176, § 2716.
210. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ... ."); FED. R. CIv. P. 50(a)
("Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or
56 .... ."). See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (putting forward a broad
interpretation of the authority to enter summary judgment).
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a trial judge who has the intimate knowledge of the facts that is associated
with live witnesses and resolution of disputed facts simply will not exist in
many cases.
I should emphasize that these considerations mitigate the strength of
the argument based on familiarity, but by no means do they eviscerate it.
The argument based on familiarity retains force in the many cases in which
the district court held a hearing and/or weighed and resolved disputed
facts. And even in cases involving no hearing or weighing, the district
judge on some occasions may spend much more time immersing herself in
the facts than the appellate court would likely do in gaining enough
familiarity with the case to determine whether remand is appropriate. In
such circumstances- assuming that the original fact-finder is
available' '-remand thus sends the case back to a judge who is more
familiar with the case, and lets appellate judges focus on their own
specialty.212
There are, however, two separate countervailing considerations that
render remanding less attractive. First, it may not be a good use of the
appellate court's resources (not to mention judicial resources more
generally213). Matched against the benefit of sending the case away for
the messy job of fact-finding, there is a potential cost to remanding any
time an appellate court does it: rather than issue a final opinion in the case,
it sends it back to the district court, knowing that the case may come back
again (when the appellate court will have to familiarize itself with the case
all over again). In those situations in which the fact-finding would not be
terribly time consuming for the appellate court, the cost of remand may
outweigh the benefit: remanding means foregoing the opportunity to
resolve the entire case then and there;2'4 instead, there will be a new
211. Of course, the appellate court or the chief judge of the district court may prefer that a
different judge handle the case on remand. This occurs, for example, when there is some reason to
doubt the district judge who originally handled the matter. See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141
F.3d 699, 701, 706 (7th Cir. 1998) (expressing annoyance at the fact that the district court allowed a
48 day trial and took a year to render a decision), on remand, 17 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (noting that the case had been remanded to him as opposed to the original trial judge). In cases
where the facts changed after the original facts were found, such changes presumably would not call
into question the district judge's competence or good faith in making the original findings.
212. Indeed, in most cases in which factual changes took place while a case was pending before
an appellate court, the court did, in fact, remand the case to the lower court for further fact-finding.
See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
213. See infra text following note 344.
214. There are two complicating factors: first, the possibility that neither party will appeal the trial
court's judgment on remand; and second, the chance that after the appeals court finally resolves the
case, further factual change leads to the filing of a new lawsuit on roughly the same sort of time frame
as a remand would entail, anyway. The first possibility reduces the cost of remanding (because it gets
rid of the case); the second possibility also reduces the cost of remanding (relative to the cost of
appellate updating) because, either way, the appellate court would soon hear a case raising the issues
(whether the original case after remand or a new case after a final appellate ruling). Further
1999] 329
Texas Law Review [Vol. 78:269
proceeding in the trial court and, quite possibly, a new appeal up the chain
(and perhaps an entirely new cycle of the appellate court familiarizing itself
with the case and then remanding, if the facts have changed again). 215
So if the fact updating can be done fairly quickly, then doing so may
conserve appellate resources.1 6
The second, and bigger, problem with remanding is similar to the
danger of postponing adjudication. Not only are the changes rapid but, by
hypothesis, they are continual, with no clear ending point. Thus remand
to the fact-finder raises the possibility of an infinite loop: the trial court (or
other fact-finder) makes findings; the case goes back to the appellate court,
where briefs are written and argument is scheduled; in the months between
the issuance of the factual findings and the issuance of the appellate
opinion, relevant facts (whether the same facts that changed before or facts
that had not changed the last time around) change again, necessitating
another remand; and so on. After all, think of the Internet, or computer
software, or voice communications; is there any basis for confidence that
the next twenty-four months will see fewer changes than the previous
twenty-four did? If not, then why does remanding make any sense? Rele-
vant facts changed as the case was on its way up the first time, and there
is no reason to conclude that those same facts would not change again-or
that other facts, that previously had not changed, would not change during
the second interval of time."t 7
complicating the analysis is the fact that each possibility is just that-a possibility-whereas, with
respect to the second scenario, the existence of the current case is a certainty.
215. This, of course, would be an instantiation of the infinite loop, discussed immediately below.
216. The Supreme Court arguably engages in this cost-benefit calculation: sometimes-especially
when it can be done on a cold record-the court finds facts on its own rather than remanding. The
problem is that it does so without routinized procedures; it just makes its own findings or accepts them
from the briefs. My proposal would regularize that process. See infra section V(C)(1); discussion infra
last two paragraphs of section V(C)(3).
217. An appellate court might try to mitigate this problem by remanding the case to the district
court for expedited factual updating. Appellate courts have no control over district courts or district
judges, so the appellate court has to hope that the district judge will move with all deliberate speed.
And it should be noted that district courts' responses to such requests for expedition have been uneven.
Compare Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Reich, 57 F.3d 1099, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(remanding for expedited consideration), and Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Reich, 74
F.3d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (issuing the opinion only eight months after expedited remand), with
Connor v. Coleman, 431 U.S. 407, 410-13, 426 (1977) (recounting multiple occasions on which the
district court had not moved with sufficient alacrity despite the Supreme Court's repeated ordering of
expedited consideration, and again ordering expedited consideration), and Connor v. Finch, 440 U.S.
612, 614-21 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recounting the same history and noting that "[tihe case
now comes before us for the eighth time, after the District Court chose to ignore our directive, issued
nearly 22 months ago, that it resolve this controversy expeditiously").
Moreover, unless the appellate court is willing to streamline its own procedures, the expedited
process below might not make much difference. A big part of the problem, after all, is the time it
takes after the district court completes its work. (And, of course, if the appellate courts' procedures
were streamlined, the problem of changing facts would occur less often in the first place. See infra text
330
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In light of the danger of an infinite loop, remand seems problematic.
First, by indefinitely delaying appellate involvement in the merits, a
remand means appellate courts are on the sidelines as industries are
transformed; trial courts are involved, and appellate courts have no role.
Thus, whatever benefits appeals are thought to produce-and the existence
of an appeal as of right to the courts of appeals as well as a discretionary
petition to the Supreme Court suggests a belief that such benefits exist-
would be lost; no appeals court would ever get to the merits. This seems
troubling. As long as the judiciary is going to be involved, how does it
make sense to have only a district court consider the issue?
This point is related to a second problem with remanding, namely that
we would lose the unifying role served by appellate courts and, in par-
ticular, by the Supreme Court. An important function of appellate review
is to resolve conflicts among lower courts, to provide uniformity and
thereby fairness to litigants and the people more generally. If lower courts
are split on an issue, appellate review is essential in order to avoid a crazy
quilt of different rules in different jurisdictions. Once again, keeping the
merits away from appellate courts prevents that from happening.2"'
accompanying note 361.) It should be remembered that Reno v. ACLU involved expedited review (and
no intervening court of appeals), but even then the facts changed in the time between the district court's
findings and the Supreme Court's opinion. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
With respect to ordinary cases in the Supreme Court, even if it expedites its proceedings, and
even if the district court does the same, the Supreme Court must also hope that the court of appeals
moves with alacrity. This problem can be mitigated if the Court sends the case directly to the district
court, and the Court has done so on at least one occasion. In Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966),
when presented with questions about a capital defendant's mental competence, the Supreme Court
stated: "[W]e shall retain jurisdiction over the cause in this Court and direct the District Court to
determine Rees' mental competence .... The District Court will hold such hearings as it deems
suitable... and will report its findings and conclusions to this Court with all convenient speed." Id.
at 314. Such a procedure effectively treats the district court as a glorified special master and raises
jurisdictional questions of its own. The subsequent history of this case is not terribly encouraging,
however: the Court never acted on the case and finally dismissed the certiorari petition in 1995, 29
years after its order for an expedited hearing-and after Rees' death. See Rees v. Superintendent of
Va. State Penitentiary, 516 U.S. 802 (1995).
218. These problems apply to other possibilities: that the Supreme Court denies certiorari in cases
involving facts that may be subject to dramatic change, or that the Court, after having granted certiorari
in a case, dismisses the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted if the facts change subsequent to the
grant of certiorari. At the outset, it should be noted that these approaches could not resolve the
problem addressed in this Article, because litigants have an appeal as of right to federal courts of
appeals; so, even if the Supreme Court took these actions to avoid the cases, circuit courts could not
do the same.
More fundamentally, though, this tactic has the drawbacks listed above in depriving litigants of
Supreme Court review of issues that would otherwise merit such review. (If the case does not
otherwise merit review, then this approach would not come into play, because the Court would deny
certiorari anyway.) And, in the case of disagreement among lower courts (which is the most common
basis for the Court to grant certiorari), it would thwart what is probably the best reason to have a
Supreme Court: namely, its ability to resolve disputes among lower courts and thus provide for
uniformity in the application of legal rules.
In addition to all these disadvantages, the proposal for denial or post-grant dismissal has
problems all its own. Once the Supreme Court grants certiorari, it expends considerable resources in
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Third, and finally, an infinite remand loop would constitute a poor use
of judicial resources, as the remanding court would have to become suffi-
ciently familiar with the facts to order a remand on every occasion that it
remanded. A large number of judges would look at the case, but decision
on the merits would be confined to just the district court judge; all the time
spent by the appellate judges would be for naught.
This relates to a close variant in the face of factual change-the
appellate court issuing an incomplete opinion, deciding what it could and
remanding the rest. This proposal will make the most sense in cases where
the facts that allegedly have changed are fairly peripheral and/or where the
appellate court is inclined to apply a legal standard different from the one
applied by the district court; in this latter situation, the incomplete opinion
would avoid a potential drawback of a remand with no opinion-namely,
that on remand the district court focuses on issues that the appellate court
considers irrelevant.
The issuance of an incomplete opinion would not resolve the infinite
loop problem, however: the appellate court would have laid out general
principles but left the crucial issuance of the holding-the application of the
legal rule to the facts as they have developed-to the district court; and if
those facts continued to change, then the next time they arose to the
appellate court they would again be stale and require a new remand.
In addition, the more crucial the facts are that are subject to change,
the less confident the appellate court can be that its articulated rule will
actually cover the factual situation as it is developing. In other words, the
opinion might fire at the wrong target (because, of course, the target has
moved), which likely would translate into a waste of time for the appellate
court and the parties, as the appellate opinion would not in fact give
guidance in the particular case.219  The way for the appellate court to
avoid that problem is for it to familiarize itself with the facts that have
preparing to review the case. If the Court then dismisses the writ as improvidently granted, it has
wasted all the time it spent on the case up to that point. In addition, of course, the time spent in
determining that the facts had changed would likely be nontrivial, and that time also would be wasted.
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 332 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (complaining that "unique
resources-the time spent preparing to decide the case by reading briefs, hearing oral argument, and
conferring-are squandered in every case in which it becomes apparent after the decisional process is
underway that we may not reach the question presented"). Meanwhile, if the Court seeks to avoid this
problem by denying certiorari in the first place to those cases that might present changing facts, it will
inevitably deny some cases where the facts would not have proved to be so unstable. The only way
to avoid such false positives would be for the Court to examine the development of the facts very
carefully before it granted certiorari; but, in that case, it would be engaging in an expenditure of
significant resources in making such determinations, time that would be wasted if the Court ultimately
declined to grant certiorari.
219. The opinion may provide guidance for others, but the degree to which that seems satisfactory
will depend on one's acceptance of the notion that appellate courts should provide guidance, rather than
resolve disputes. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
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allegedly changed, so that it can be sure that the opinion it issues would
cover the situation even if circumstances had changed as alleged. But once
the appellate court has spent that time so familiarizing itself with the
allegations of new facts, the time that would be required for the appellate
court to make its own findings has diminished (since a significant portion
of that endeavor is the familiarization with the allegedly new circum-
stances), weakening the argument for sending any part of the case back to
the district court in the first place.
C. Update the Facts at the Appellate Level
The final option would involve the appellate court updating the facts
on its own, rather than remanding to a lower court or accepting the stale
findings from below. The obvious objection to this proposal is straight-
forward: in contrast to district courts, appellate courts are not in the
business of finding facts. Appellate courts frequently remand cases and of
course issuing opinions is their stock in trade; but they are removed from
the world of fact-finding and have no expertise in it. Fact-finding, it might
plausibly be argued, is and should be left entirely to trial courts.
The most forceful exponent of this view has been the U.S. Supreme
Court, which has emphasized the district court's ability to judge the
credibility of witnesses as well as, more generally, their familiarity with
(and thus expertise in) engaging in fact-finding. '  On this basis, the
Court has rejected opinions by circuit courts that reconsidered factual
determinations made at the trial court level: "Duplication of the trial
judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only
negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion
of judicial resources. " ' In so holding, the Court has relied upon Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that
"[flindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."'
Even in cases where the district court failed to make some of the
factual findings that the circuit court deemed relevant-and thus appellate
fact-finding would not be duplicative and Rule 52(a) would not apply
220. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141 n.16 (1966) (emphasizing
"the trial court's customary opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and thus the credibility of the
witnesses"); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (noting that "[t]he trial
judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes
expertise").
221. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75. The Court's next sentence seemed to convey its exasperation:
"[Tihe parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources
on persuading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to
persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much." Id. at 575.
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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because there would be no relevant findings to set aside-the Supreme
Court has rejected circuit court fact-finding. Thus, in cases like Pullman-
Standard v. Swint' 2 and Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 4 the
Court rebuked' circuit courts that made their own factual findings on
matters not reached by the district court rather than remanding to the
district court for further fact-finding at the trial level.26
Despite these statements, the reality-as revealed by Supreme Court
cases-is a good bit more complex. The Court may castigate other courts
for engaging in appellate fact-finding, but it has been willing to engage in
conduct that seems difficult to describe otherwise. Simply stated, the
Supreme Court has been willing to find facts in certain situations. Thus,
appellate fact-finding is not as radical as it may sound; in fact, a number
of lines of precedent support it.
Commentators have written at length on the Supreme Court's willing-
ness to engage in fact-finding, and I will not duplicate their efforts
here. 7  I will, however, highlight a few notable instances of Supreme
Court fact-finding to show that the practice occurs in a variety of
situations.
1. When Has the Supreme Court Found Facts?-As an initial matter,
it bears emphasis that, Rule 52(a) notwithstanding, the Supreme Court
223. 456 U.S. 273 (1982). The Court stated:
When an appellate court discerns that a district court has failed to make a finding because
of an erroneous view of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand for
further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing findings .... Likewise,
where findings are infirm because of an erroneous view of the law, a remand is the proper
course unless the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.
Id. at 291-92.
224. 475 U.S. 709 (1986). Again, the Court chided:
If the Court of Appeals believed that the District Court had failed to make findings of fact
essential to a proper resolution of the legal question, it should have remanded to the
District Court to make those findings. If it was of the view that the findings of the
District Court were "clearly erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 52(a), it could have
set them aside on that basis. If it believed that the District Court's factual findings were
unassailable, but that the proper rule of law was misapplied to those findings, it could
have reversed the District Court's judgment. But it should not simply have made factual
findings on its own.
Id. at 714.
225. The Court's language has at times been lharsh. See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 293
("Proceeding in this manner seems to us incredible . . . ."). In light of the Court's willingness to
engage in fact-finding on its own, see infra section V(C)(1), it seems that the Court doth protest too
much.
226. See Lee, supra note 168, at 256-61 (discussing Pullman-Standard and Icicle Seafoods as the
main examples of Supreme Court cases that restricted appellate fact-finding).
227. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA
IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1998); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of
Reality by the Supreme Court, 35 FLA. L. REV. 236 (1983).
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sometimes weighs contested facts on its own, without deference to the fact-
finder's ability to look witnesses in the eye. A recent example is Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,'
where the Court articulated its "constitutional duty to conduct an
independent examination of the record as a whole, without deference to the
trial court."1 9 Why did not the Court follow the conventions regarding
deference to a fact-finder? "This obligation rests upon us simply because
the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it
is held to embrace." 30
228. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
229. Id. at 567.
Lest there be any confusion arising from the fact that this case came out of a Massachusetts state
court, the Court stated flatly that "[e]ven where a speech case has originally been tried in a federal
court, subject to the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) that '[flindings of fact... shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,' we are obliged to make a fresh examination of crucial facts."
Id. (ellipsis in original). Thus, in Hurley, the Court conducted its own review of the Boston Saint
Patrick's Day parade and concluded, in direct conflict with the trial court, that it had an expressive
character. Id. at 568-70.
230. Id. at 567.
Hurley is neither novel nor an outlier. In a number of First Amendment cases, the Supreme
Court has made the same point. For instance, after stating that "we cannot avoid our responsibilities
by permitting ourselves to be completely bound by state court determination of any issue essential to
decision of a claim of federal right, else federal law could be frustrated by distorted fact finding," the
Supreme Court in Cox v. Louisiana simply ignored important factual findings made by the courts below
(there, Louisiana state courts) and reached its own findings-which conflicted with the state court
findings-based on its reading of the record. 379 U.S. 536, 545 n.8 (1965) (quoting Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1963) (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 181 (1953))).
Compare State v. Cox, 244 La. 1087, 1097 (1963) ("Unmistakably, ... [the protesters'] activities
resulted in an obstruction of the street"), rev'd, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), with Cox, 379
U.S. at 541 (stating flatly, based on its reading of the record, that "[t]he group did not obstruct the
street"); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508 n.27, 499
(1984) ("First Amendment questions of'constitutional fact' compel [us to conduct a] de novo review.");
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 n.50 (1982); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 189-90 (1964) (Brennan, J.); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (all stating that the Court would make an
independent examination of the record); Steven Alan Childress, ConstitutionalFact and Process:A First
Amendment Model of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1229, 1326 (1996) ("No one seems to
dispute that the independent judgment rule, where it applies, at least requires that the conclusion drawn
from the record be made independently and thus without deference.").
Courts of appeals, similarly, have applied their own independent review of trial court findings
when the facts are central to the legal analysis. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d
Cir. 1996). In Bery, the Second Circuit found such a review necessary:
In the present case, since appellants seek vindication of rights protected under the First
Amendment, we are required to make an independent examination of the record as a
whole without deference to the factual findings of the trial court. Such a "fresh
examination of crucial facts" is necessary even in the face of the "clearly erroneous"
standard of factual review set forth in Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.
Id. at 693 (citations omitted) (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 567); see also Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v.
City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053 n.9 (I Ith Cir. 1987) ("In cases involving first amendment
claims, an appellate court must make an independent examination of the whole record."); L. Steven
Grasz, Critical Facts and Free Speech: The Eighth Circuit Clarifies Its Appellate Standard of Review
for First Amendment Free Speech Cases, 31 CREiGHTON L. REv. 387, 398-401 (1998) (discussing the
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This practice is not limited to the First Amendment; in other contexts
as well, the Supreme Court has conducted an independent review of the
record, giving no deference to the trial court.23! In Kyles v. Whitley, 2
for example, the Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the
facts and weighed them differently from every other court that looked at
the case, including state courts, a federal district court, and a federal court
of appeals. 33  Not only did the Court in Kyles examine the evidence
anew,' but, like a trial court after an evidentiary hearing, it drew its
own conclusions as to what the evidence establisheda-which is also
tendency of appellate courts to apply de novo review when the legal analysis depends heavily on the
facts).
The appellate court in Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1993), took
independent review to its logical extreme, adjudicating a claim that the district court had not ruled on;
given that the court of appeals was engaging in de novo review anyway, it saw little reason to send the
claim back to the district court. See id. at 579 n. 12 ("Although the district court neglected to address
this claim, in the interests of judicial economy, we reach the merits of it under a de novo review, as
we would had the district court reached the question.").
231. As the Supreme Court stated in Norris v. Alabama:
That the question is one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to determine whether in
truth a federal right has been denied. When a federal right has been specially set up and
claimed in a state court, it is our province to inquire not merely whether it was denied in
express terms but also whether it was denied in substance and effect. If this requires an
examination of evidence, that examination must be made. Otherwise, review by this
Court would fail of its purpose in safeguarding constitutional rights.
294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935); see also National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283
(1974) (reviewing the record independently, in a speech case involving labor law and not the First
Amendment, and concluding that "scabs" accurately described the appellees); Haynes, 373 U.S. at
515-16 (requiring an independent determination of whether due process rights were violated); Napue
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959) (positing that "[t]he duty of this Court to make its own
independent examination of the record when federal constitutional deprivations are alleged is clear");
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) (refusing to defer to "issues of fact" found by the trial court
in a case involving an alleged violation of the Due Process Clause).
232. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
233. See id. at 433 (granting a habeas corpus petition because at the original trial the state had
failed to disclose evidence that would have made a different result "reasonably probable"). The Court
invoked neither the clearly erroneous standard of review nor the de novo review that would signal that
it was conducting an independent examination of the record. Its opinion, however, leaves little doubt
that the Court was weighing the evidence anew. The Court presented the question in the case as
whether there was a reasonable probability that evidence not disclosed to the defendant would have
changed the outcome of the trial. See id. at 433-34. At no time did the Court suggest that the issue
was whether the trial court had committed clear error in finding no such reasonable probability.
Instead, the Court directly confronted the substantive issue-whether a reasonable probability existed-
without so much as referring to the clearly erroneous standard anywhere in its opinion.
The lone references to .the clearly erroneous standard appear in the dissent. See id. at 460
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The majority's] findings are in my view clearly erroneous, cf. Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 52(a), and the Court's verdict would be reversed if there were somewhere further to appeal.").
234. It is difficult to communicate pithily the depth of the Court's factual review, precisely because
the review was so lengthy. Perhaps the best illustration, because it is typical, is the two pages of the
majority opinion (and three pages of the dissent) discussing the significance of cans of pet food found
in Kyles's apartment. See id. at 451-52; id. at 472-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 425 (asserting that "Beanie [whom the Court suggested was the likely murderer]
seemed eager to cast suspicion on Kyles"). The Court continued:
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known as fact-finding. In fact, the Court even made judgments as to
witness credibility. 2
6
a. Cases involving a suggestion of mootness.-Hurley and the
other cases discussed immediately above are significant because they
demonstrate the willingness of the Supreme Court to reject the notion that
the process of determining facts is solely the province of a trial court.
Despite all the advantages that a trial court may be thought to possess as
to the gathering of factual material in the record and the determination of
what factual conclusions that material supports, the Supreme Court none-
theless sometimes takes over part of this function-the determination of the
factual conclusions-for itself. This contradicts any suggestion that the
Court considers itself disabled from examining a cold record, without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing or indeed any live witnesses, and making
its own findings based on that record. Still, these cases are distinguishable
from the situation addressed in this Article, as they did not involve an
appellate court gathering facts on its own, but rather merely reviewing the
facts already present in the record. An independent examination of the
record is one thing, it might be argued, but the finding of new facts is a
quite different matter. Fact-finding, though, is exactly what appellate
courts frequently do when there is a suggestion that a case has become
moot. That is, appellate courts-in particular the Supreme Court-have
actually found new facts when there have been changes since the trial court
that may have rendered the case moot.
One prominent example is DeFunis v. Odegaard,27 a case in which
Marco DeFunis had contended that the University of Washington Law
The dissent would rule out any suspicion because Beanie was said to have worn a
"tank-top" shirt during his visits to the apartment; we suppose that a small handgun could
have been carried in a man's trousers, just as a witness for the State claimed the killer had
carried it. Similarly, the record photograph of the homemade holster indicates that the
jury could have found it to be constructed of insubstantial leather or cloth, duct tape, and
string, concealable in a pocket.
Id. at 449 n. 18 (citations omitted).
236. See id. at443 & n.14 (assessing the credibility of a witness named Smallwood); id. at 441-42
(discussing the credibility of a witness named Williams).
This is not to suggest that all of the members of the Court found this detailed review appropriate.
Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, criticized the majority, asserting,
[T]he Court not only grants certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals (and all
the previous courts that agreed with it) was correct as to what the facts showed in a case
where the answer is far from clear, but in the process of such consideration renders new
findings of fact and judgments of credibility appropriate to a trial court of original
jurisdiction.
Id. at 457 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This point did not occupy much of Scalia's dissent, however; the
bulk of his opinion was devoted to a point-by-point response to the facts delineated in the majority
opinion. See id. at 461-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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School's admissions criteria discriminated against him on account of his
race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8  By the time DeFunis's case made it to the Supreme
Court, he was in his third year of law school (having been admitted by
order of the trial court). The Supreme Court became aware that he was in
his final year at the school and asked the parties to brief the question of
mootness; both sides contended that it was not moot (because the school
reserved the right to challenge DeFunis's continuation at the school if he
lost).39 The Court, though, seized on a statement that DeFunis's lawyer
made at oral argument to the effect that DeFunis had enrolled in his final
semester, combined it with the law school's earlier statement that it would
not cancel DeFunis's registration for any given semester, and concluded
that the case was moot because DeFunis was the only plaintiff and "it is
evident that he will be given an opportunity to complete all academic and
other requirements for graduation." 2' In other words, the Court
received new facts, weighed those facts on its own (and in a manner that
conflicted with the views of both parties), and came to its own conclusion
about the implications of those facts for the case before it. Interestingly,
four Justices dissented from the Court's disposition, but they did not
challenge the Court's willingness to receive and weigh new facts or to issue
a ruling based on them. The dissenters argued that the Court had drawn
the wrong conclusion from the facts, not that its enterprise was problem-
atic. In their view, the case was not moot because "[a]ny number of
unexpected events-illness, economic necessity, even academic failure-
might prevent [DeFunis's] graduation at the end of the term."24
DeFunis is by no means unusual. When a party presents an appellate
court with new facts that raise a question of mootness, the court frequently
considers the evidence on its own and makes its own determination about
mootness, rather than remand to a lower court for this determination.242
238. Id. at 314.
239. Id. at 315.
240. Id. at 317.
241. Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also wrote a dissenting opinion, but his
opinion focused on the merits of DeFunis's claim. See id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
242. See, e.g., Board of License Comm'rs v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238, 239 (1985) (per curiam)
(dismissing the case as moot after certiorari had been granted because the Court "learned that the Attic
Lounge has gone out of business"); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72 (1983) (per
curiam) (finding, based on its own interpretation of a letter from a university president, "that there
[was] 'no reasonable likelihood' that the University [would] later change its mind" and thus concluding
that the case was moot); Communications Workers of Am. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F.2d
1310, 1311 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (finding that supervening factual changes that had occurred
since the district court's ruling rendered the case moot and contending that "[any further relief from
this Court would be an advisory opinion"). It should be noted, though, that sometimes appellate courts
do remand for further factual findings when there is a suggestion of mootness based on new facts. See,
e.g., Concerned Citizens v. Sills, 567 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1978) (remanding the case to the district
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In some of these situations, the appellate court has made such determina-
tions based solely on new facts presented by a party in a brief or at oral
argument. DeFunis's registration status at the University of Washington
Law School is one good example. Another example is from Iron Arrow
Honor Society v. Heckler,243 a case in which an all-male "honor" society
had sued the federal government over a federal regulation prohibiting its
use of university property. While the case was pending in the court of
appeals, the president of the university wrote a letter stating that the society
would no longer be permitted to use university property, regardless of the
outcome of the suit.2' The federal government raised the issue of moot-
ness (because relief from federal regulations would not help the society if
the university decided on its own to deny the society use of university
property). In the court of appeals, the society argued that the case was not
moot, and the court agreed.245 The society made the same argument in
the Supreme Court, and the federal government responded by requesting
not that the Court find the case moot, but that it remand the case for an
evidentiary hearing.' 6 The Court, however, weighed the significance of
the letter on its own, without the benefit of any factual findings by a lower
court or special master, and relied on the letter in finding the case moot.
Justice Brennan argued to no avail in dissent that "the issue of mootness
is sufficiently dependent on uncertain factual issues concerning the
University's present intention and future conduct" to merit an evidentiary
hearing.247
In Honig v. Doe,2' the Court went as far as deciding the question
of mootness based on evidence raised for the first time at oral argument.
The issue in the case was the application of the Education of the
Handicapped Act to two emotionally disabled students who had been
indefinitely suspended from state schools, and the United States contended
that both of the respondents were sufficiently old (twenty-four and twenty
years old) that they would not benefit from a ruling in their favor. The
Court agreed with the United States' contention as to the twenty-four-year-
old, who was three years older than the maximum age at which the Act
court that had abstained based on pending state prosecutions, because the appeals court was told at oral
argument that the state prosecutions had been terminated).
243. 464 U.S. 67 (1983).
244. Id. at 69-70. Actually, the letter was written after the Supreme Court had granted, vacated,
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of an earlier Supreme Court decision. That is, the
case was on remand from the Supreme Court to the court of appeals. Id. at 69.
245. Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549, 552 (1983) (finding the case not moot
because the court could still grant relief to the Iron Arrow Society in the form of enjoining the federal
government from imposing further restrictions on the society), vacated by 464 U.S. 67 (1983).
246. Iron Arrow, 464 U.S. at 73 n.2, 74 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
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applied to a student. But, as to the twenty-year-old (Jack Smith), the Court
found that the case was not moot because there was a reasonable likelihood
that he would want to finish high school if given the chance. 4 9 Because
the issue had not been raised before oral argument in the Supreme Court,
neither the court of appeals nor the district court had considered the
question of whether Smith would want to return to high school. The Court
was writing on a clean slate. Notably, in doing so it did not rely on
anything from the record below. The Court cited three reasons for its
conclusion regarding the likelihood of Smith wanting to finish school: first,
his pursuit of the litigation revealed an interest in his education;"
second, "[a]s a disabled young man, he has as at least as great a need of
a high school education and diploma as any of his peers"; 1 and, finally,
at oral argument "his counsel advise[d] us that he is awaiting the outcome
of this case to decide whether to pursue his degree.""
Thus the Court made its own judgment about the factual question of
whether Smith would likely want to return to school. Moreover, its basis
for this factual conclusion is quite striking. The Court relied in significant
part on a broad statement about the value of education and a factual
assertion made by his lawyer at oral argument. Better yet, the lawyer's
assertion was not subject to any sort of examination or verification. Best
of all, the same lawyer in the same discussion at oral argument also said
she "cannot represent whether in fact either of these students will ask for
further education from the Petitioners." 3 The Court was thus left with
a somewhat ambiguous factual situation, but made its conclusions anyway.
Even Justice Scalia, who dissented from the conclusion that Smith's case
was not moot (because Justice Scalia was unpersuaded by the reasons
discussed above), did not suggest a remand; he drew his own factual
conclusion-that Smith had not established a reasonable probability of his
return to school-and advocated a finding that Smith's case was indeed
moot.
254
b. Other fact-finding contexts.-In addition to the mootness
cases, the Supreme Court has found facts and drawn conclusions from them
in other kinds of cases. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands,'
249. Id. at 318-19 n.6.
250. Id. at 319 n.6.
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing transcript of oral argument).
253. Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting transcript of oral argument).
254. Id. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also argued that the Court applied too lenient
a standard ("reasonable expectation" rather than "demonstrated probability") in evaluating the
suggestion that Smith would return to school. Id. at 336-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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for example, the district court had divided the Yakima Indian Reservation
into "closed" and "open" areas, distinguishing the two based in significant
part on the fact that only tribal members were permitted in the closed
area. 6  At oral argument, Mr. Brendale's lawyers "represented that a
decision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in April 1988, after the Court of
Appeals issued its opinion here, has reopened the roads in the closed area
to the public.""7 The Court (and the announcement of its judgment) was
splintered. 8 The important aspect for our purposes is that both of the
opinions that announced the judgment of the Court not only accepted this
development as a new fact but also reached their own conclusions about its
significance: Justice White's opinion found that the changed circumstances
(the opening of the road to nonmembers) fatally undermined the district
court's finding that the reservation had "closed" versus "open" areas; 159
Justice Stevens's opinion, meanwhile, stated flatly that "the fact that
nonmembers may now drive on these roads does not change the basic
character of the closed area . . . ." Interestingly, no member of the
Court suggested that the Court remand the matter to the district court so
that it could consider, in the first instance, exactly what had happened to
the road and the significance of such developments.
But singling out this one case does not do justice to the broader
category, as there are a number of different contexts in which the Supreme
Court has found facts (often without explicitly so stating), and then relied
on them. One example in this regard is quite familiar yet worthy of note:
original jurisdiction cases in the Supreme Court. In its earliest years, the
Court held a number of trials in which it did all the fact-finding (Marbury
v. Madison6' was a trial in the Supreme Court, after all). Such original
jurisdiction cases continue to arise to this day-most as suits between
states, but sometimes in other contexts.26 When such cases come before
256. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 750, 751-53 (E.D. Wash. 1985), aftd,
828 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
257. 492 U.S. at 415 n.2 (White, J.).
258. Justice White, joined by three other Justices, issued an opinion that announced the judgment
of the Court as to the status of the "open" land. Justice Stevens, joined by one other Justice,
announced the judgment of the Court as to the status of the "closed" land. Seven of the nine Justices
did not distinguish between "open" and "closed" land, but Stevens's opinion as to the closed land
reached the same result as the remaining three Justices (in an opinion by Justice Blackmun), and thus
was the majority result as to the closed land; he joined Justice White's opinion as to the open land, so
Justice White announced the Court's judgment on that matter.
259. Id. at 415 n.2 (White, J.).
260. Id. at 439 (Stevens, J.).
261. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
262. A particularly interesting example is United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909). The
background to that case was that the Court agreed to hear the appeal of a capital defendant and ordered
that his execution be stayed. Id. at 403-05. When news of the Supreme Court's order reached
Chattanooga, Tennessee (where the defendant was incarcerated), a mob broke into the jail and lynched
the defendant. Id. at 404-05. Both President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court sent investigators to
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the Court, it acts as a finder of fact, with no findings from a lower court
to which it grants deference. 23 The Court customarily refers these cases
to a special master for fact-finding," but that reinforces, rather than
weakens, my point; the Court has created mechanisms it can utilize to find
facts (and, as will be discussed in the following section, special masters
might be a useful tool in the context of rapidly changing facts, as
well) .265
The Supreme Court construes its authority as giving it the discretion
to refuse to hear most original jurisdiction cases, thereby allowing it to
avoid serving as the trier of fact.' Nonetheless, the Court has granted
a hearing in most cases;26 7 whatever the Justices may consider to be the
deficiencies of initial review in the Supreme Court, those deficiencies have
not led them to try to eliminate all, or even most, original jurisdiction cases
from their docket.268 Admittedly, this fact may be of limited signifi-
cance: it may be that the Justices believe that they cannot deny review to
more cases without suffering some sort of institutional harm. But holding
aside their willingness to hear original jurisdiction cases, these cases still
demonstrate that the Court can find facts, with no apparent ill effects.
They receive facts in the briefs and get a chance to address questions of
fact at oral argument; though such interchanges might seem amusing in a
chamber as lofty as the Supreme Court, they are no different from similar
Tennessee, and the result was contempt charges against the sheriff (Shipp) and leaders of the mob. Id.
at 403-04. See Mary Deibel, United States v. Shipp: Contempt of Court in the Supreme Court, XV(3)
SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y Q. 5, 7 (1994). The contempt charges were brought directly in the Supreme
Court, with the Court making extensive findings of fact about exactly what happened on the night of
the lynching. See Shipp, 214 U.S. at 403-25. The Court consequently found the defendants in
contempt and sentenced them to jail terms. See id. In other words, the Court handled the matter as
any trial court would when faced with contempt charges, and the Court seems to have undertaken its
trial tasks with no ill effects.
263. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 715 (1950) ("The [Supreme] Court in original
actions, passing as it does on controversies between sovereigns which involve issues of high public
importance, has always been liberal in allowing full development of the facts."); Oklahoma v. Texas,
253 U.S. 465, 471 (1920) (directing that testimony be taken); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 657, 733 (1838) (stating that in original jurisdiction cases the Court may ascertain facts with
or without a jury, at its discretion).
264. See A. Leo Levin& Michael E. Kunz, ThinkingAbout Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1627,
1647 (1995).
265. The significance of special masters, and the usefulness of invoking them when evidentiary
hearings are appropriate, is discussed infra notes 346-60 and accompanying text.
266. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,450, 450-51 (1992) (observing that the Court has
"imposed prudential and equitable limitations upon the exercise of [its] original jurisdiction" (quoting
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,739 (1981))); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555, 565-66 & n.36 (1994) (observing that
the Court frequently uses its discretion to avoid cases that come under its original jurisdiction).
267. See Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's Management of
Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 188-89 (1993) (noting that the Court
denies a hearing to slightly less than half of its original jurisdiction cases).
268. See id.
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interchanges between lawyers and judges in trial courts. 9 The Justices
manage to write their opinions and engage in spirited debates, despite
having to involve themselves more directly in the messy world of facts.
Wholly apart from original jurisdiction cases, moreover, the Supreme
Court sometimes engages in fact-finding. That is, even in ordinary cases
involving appellate jurisdiction where it is not obliged to find facts, the
Supreme Court has frequently found and relied on particular facts in its
rulings.
If this proposition seems strange, it is only because the practice has
become so commonplace that we no longer consider it remarkable. For
instance, it is difficult to characterize a judicial determination of the
Framers' understanding of a particular constitutional provision or phrase
as anything other than a question of fact.70 The significance of those
269. My personal favorite was an interchange between the Justices and a lawyer in Louisiana v.
Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22 (1995)-illustrative not only because the Justices managed to conduct a factual
inquiry (despite the laughter from an audience amused by the nature of the examination), but also
because at least one of the Justices had done his own research in the matter, and, like a good trial
judge, had specific questions at hand designed to probe the factual assertions that the lawyer was
presenting to the Court. The following is a sample of the oral argument (including a question from a
Justice that reflects research into the issue of the existence of poplar trees on what Louisiana had
claimed to be submerged land):
QUESTION: So you disagree as a matter of fact with your opponent's statement that for
several months each year it was 40 feet below high water.
MR. McCARTNEY: Yes.
QUESTION: Well, where were you all when you were in the boat?
MR. McCARTNEY: Well-
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Didn't you row among-
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: Didn't you row among the treetops with Mr. Keyser?
MR. McCARTNEY: We rowed among treetops, but there was also water-dry land above
the water.
QUESTION: I mean, where was-that what was mixing me up. As I read these and I had
my law clerk check into it, I did think there was an awful lot of evidence this is one
place, and there are big poplar trees 80 feet around or something, or they're very, very
broad, big trees. I don't know how you could plant these trees if it's underwater all the
time.
But he just said you went out on a boat, and there you were, sailing over the island 40
feet below you under the water. What happened on that boat?
MR. McCARTNEY: Well, what happened was that a part of the time-we motored, we
didn't actually row.
(Laughter.)
MR. McCARTNEY: We motored among the trees over that portion of the island that was
inundated at that particular time of the year, and the master was there, and viewed the
island, and heard the evidence, and read the cases, and reached the conclusion, correctly,
that this is a land mass that has the degree of permanence that qualifies as an island, and
that qualifies as a feature that determines boundary.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Louisiana (No. 121), available in 1995 WL 606000, at *31-32 (Oct. 3,
1995).
270. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247-54 (1999) (determining what various members
of the founding generation understood states' immunity from suit to encompass); cf. RONALD
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determinations (that is, what weight should be accorded to the Framers'
understanding) is a question of law; but the actual determination of the
Framers' subjective understanding is as much a question of fact as is the
question of what the drafter of a contract understood a given provision to
mean.27' The obvious difference between the inquiries involved in deter-
mining the Framers' beliefs versus those of a contract's drafter is that, in
the former case, there is little that a trial court could do that an appellate
court could not; evidence of the Framers' understanding or belief can be
presented in briefs, with no need for the sort of credibility determinations
that best justify the role of a trial court in examining witnesses. Whether
or not this is actually true,2' it is beside the point that I am making here
that appellate courts do engage in fact-finding. The possibilities that some
forms of fact-finding-in particular, those that would not require credibility
determinations-are better suited to appellate courts than are other forms,
and that appellate courts are more likely to engage in fact-finding that does
not necessarily require credibility determinations, do not affect the fact that
appellate courts are willing to do some fact-finding in the first place.'
Furthermore, any putative prohibition on appellate courts engaging in
the sort of fact-finding that does ordinarily involve witness testimony-
albeit a battle of expert witnesses over the viability of a particular
description of the world-is one riddled with exceptions. Appellate-
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 14 (1986) ("The participant's point of view envelops the historian's when
some claim of law depends on a matter of historical fact: when the question whether segregation is
illegal, for example, turns on the motives either of the statesmen who wrote the Constitution or of those
who segregated the schools.").
271. See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 554 (1960); 4 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 616 (3d ed. 1961) (both stating that
construction of a contract and of the drafter's intent is a question of fact); cf. Antilles S.S. Co. v.
Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 733 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with Corbin and Williston regarding whether contract construction is a question of fact,
but agreeing that it is a question of fact when extrinsic evidence, of intent or otherwise, is relied on).
272. It is not at all clear that, in plumbing the Framers' understanding and beliefs, there is no
room for a trial court. The Supreme Court frequently quotes materials from the Framers' era that, in
modern trials, must be authenticated-letters, notes, diaries, etc.-in determining the Framers'
understanding. Some historians might, if given a chance in an evidentiary hearing, question the degree
to which a particular writing reliably reveals a particular person's beliefs or understanding. Just as a
modern letter written by a contract's drafter might be self-serving or otherwise assailable as to its
probative value, the same might be true of some materials from the Framers' era. In fact (to pick one
example among many), some historians mistrust much of what James Madison wrote after the
Constitution's ratification as attempts to recast certain constitutional provisions. And yet, to my
knowledge, no appellate court has ever suggested that it would recommend, much less give deference
to, an evidentiary hearing in which a trial court could make findings on the degree to which various
historical materials accurately reflected the beliefs of the Framers. The sort of inquiry that is routine-
and in fact considered to be essential-in reviewing materials regarding other sets of drafters is deemed
to be unnecessary (perhaps bordering on the ridiculous) when it comes to the Constitution's drafters.
273. These possibilities do, though, give us guidance about what sort of appellate fact updating
makes the most sense. See infra section V(C)(2).
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indeed Supreme Court-fact-finding in this context has a long history. The
Court has, for example, put forward broad, but testable, empirical asser-
tions without deigning to cite any support (and with no obvious source of
support), in cases stretching from the early eighteenth century 2'4 to
today.275
In other situations the Court does rely on authorities (and its assertions
are usually less sweeping), but those authorities are not factual findings
from a trial court but rather material simply presented to the Supreme
Court (generally in briefs to the Court). Some of the Court's most famous
opinions made such findings: In Muller v. Oregon,276 the Court, follow-
ing the lead of the famous "Brandeis brief,"2' upheld a maximum-hour
274. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824) (justifying its construction
of the word "Commerce" in the Constitution by stating baldly that "[a] ll America understands, and has
uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation"). One hundred years later,
in Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, the Court announced,
There is no evidence in support of the thought that purchasers have been or are likely to
be induced to take a 9 and a half or a 10 ounce loaf for a pound (16 ounce) loaf, or an
18 and a half or a 19 ounce loaf for a pound and a half (24 ounce) loaf; and it is contrary
to common experience and unreasonable to assume that there could be any danger of such
deception.
264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924). This blithe assertion, not surprisingly, has been subject to much criticism.
See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLuM. L. REv. 945, 956 (1955) ("The Court found
its 'common experience' neither in the record nor in specific extra-record sources; the 'common
experience' came from vague impressions and a priori judgment.").
275. For example, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), the Court
held that construction of a patent, though it may seem like a question of fact appropriate for a jury, is
actually within the exclusive province of judges. Id. at 372. In reaching that conclusion, it seems
fitting that the Court baldly stated that "[t]he construction of written instruments is one of those things
that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis." Id.
at 388. And in response to the suggestion that patent construction cases frequently entail credibility
determinations, the Court simply announced that "our own experience with document construction
leaves us doubtful that trial courts will run into many cases like that." Id. at 389. No support was
cited for either assertion.
A somewhat ironic example dealing with juries arose in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878). The Court, in advising a reviewing court on how to approach the issue of juror impartiality,
asserted (with no support) "the fact we have so often observed in our experience, that jurors not
unfrequently seek to excuse themselves on the ground of having formed an opinion, when, on
examination, it turns out that no real disqualification exists." Id. at 156; see also, e.g., Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999) (announcing, without citation, that astrology is a
discipline that "lacks reliability"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677 (1977) (asserting that
"because paddlings are usually inflicted in response to conduct directly observed by teachers in their
presence, the risk that a child will be paddled without cause is typically insignificant"); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976) ("[Ihe hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated
disability recipient may be significant. Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that
of a welfare recipient.").
276. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
277. Louis Brandeis, then a practitioner, filed a brief in defense of the maximum-hour law for
women that contained two pages of legal argument and 110 pages of sociological and economic data.
See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419. The brief is widely considered to be the first in the history of the
Supreme Court that brought in extra-record sources like social science evidence. It relied heavily on
such studies and the views of numerous doctors; and, as it turned out, the Court was persuaded and
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law that applied to women "without questioning in any respect the decision
in Lochner v. New York;" 278 the crucial difference, according to the
Court, arose from the litany of "facts" it found demonstrating that women
were weaker than men and thus could not handle the long hours that men
could. 2 9  Then there was footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of
Education,' in which the Court supported its conclusion that segregation
"generates a feeling of inferiority" " among African-Americans by
stating that "this finding is amply supported by modem authority" and
citing seven publications.' And in Roe v. Wade,' the Court relied
not on studies but on its own research in making a slew of findings on its
own.2
These more famous cases may tend to overshadow, and thus obscure,
the Court's routine reliance on facts that it finds on its own. An example
of the latter, picked simply because it is recent, is Bragdon v. Abbott,'
adopted the result that Brandeis advocated. See ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 227, at 13-14;
PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 121 (1984); MONAHAN & WALKER,
supra note 206, at 4-11.
278. Muller, 208 U.S. at 423.
279. Id. at 421-22.
280. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
281. Id. at 494.
282. Id. at 494 & n. 11.
283. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
284. For instance, the Court announces that "[A]bortion in early pregnancy ... is now relatively
safe." Id. at 149. Does the Court rely on trial court findings for this proposition? Of course not;
"[a]ppellants and various amici refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that
is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe." Id.
According to the Court, Stoics believed, and most Jews believe, that life does not begin until live birth.
Id. at 160. How does the Court know that? From scholarly sources, of course. Physicians, by
contrast, focus on conception, live birth, or viability; it must be so, because the medical dictionaries
and textbooks say so. Id. at 160 & n.59. Those sources also tell us when viability occurs. Id. The
Catholic Church believes that life begins at conception; "[s]ubstantial problems for precise definition
of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception
is a 'process' over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual
extraction, the 'morning-after' pill, implantation of embryos .... and even artificial wombs." Id. at
161. What is the source for that wisdom? Scholarship, not findings below. Id. at 161 n.62.
Many commentators have criticized the Court for relying on medical authorities in Roe v. Wade.
Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, complained that the Court grounded its decision "on a
quicksand of someone else's expertise," rather than on more enduring constitutional values (such as
putting women and men on an equal footing). See Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining
the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 169 (1984).
Others have expressed support for the Court's use of extra-record facts but have criticized its
failure to give the parties a chance to challenge them. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative,
and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1986); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and
Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 21, 37 (1978) (saying of the fact-finding in Roe that "[i]f an
administrative agency, even in a rulemaking proceeding, had used similar materials without having
given the parties a fair opportunity to criticize or controvert them at the hearing stage, reversal would
have come swiftly and inexorably").
285. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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a case with voluminous findings of medical fact. In addition to six
extensive paragraphs of factual findings based entirely on medical literature
on the nature of HIV and AIDS,' the Court relied largely on medical
publications (and rejected the significance of evidence actually in the record
below') in stating, with admirable honesty, that "[o]ur evaluation of the
medical evidence leads us to conclude that respondent's infection substan-
tially limited her ability to reproduce.""
Not only does the Court inform us about medical and social science
issues such as the nature of HIV and what makes for effective
psychotherapy, 9 but it also makes findings about matters of technology.
286. Id. at 633-37.
287. Id. at 641 (rejecting the significance of evidence in the record suggesting that antiretroviral
therapy can lower the risk of perinatal transmission to about 8%).
Of particular interest was the Court's charge to the lower court in Bragdon. The Supreme Court
noted that it declined to grant certiorari on the question whether the doctor who refused to treat the
HIV-positive patient raised a genuine issue of fact for trial. "As a result, the briefs and arguments
presented to us did not concentrate on the question of sufficiency in light all of the submissions in the
summary judgment proceeding. . . . [F]ull briefing directed at the issue would help place a complex
factual record in proper perspective." Id. at 654. Thus, the Court stated: "We conclude the proper
course is to give the Court of Appeals the opportunity to determine whether our analysis of some of
the studies cited by the parties would change its conclusion that petitioner presented neither objective
evidence nor a triable issue of fact on the question of risk." Id. at 655.
The irony of this result is quite rich, particularly for those who believe that appellate courts
should not find facts: The Supreme Court has weighed the facts on its own and made its own findings
("our analysis of some of the studies. . ."), but it has refrained from drawing legal conclusions based
on those facts; such application of the law will be left to other courts.
288. Id. at 639 (emphasis added). The Court justified this conclusion as follows:
First, a woman infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on the man a
significant risk of becoming infected. The cumulative results of 13 studies collected in
a 1994 textbook on AIDS indicates that 20% of male partners of women with HIV became
HIV-positive themselves, with a majority of the studies finding a statistically significant
risk of infection ....
Second, an infected woman risks infecting her child during gestation and childbirth,
i.e., perinatal transmission. Petitioner concedes that women infected with HIV face about
a 25% risk of transmitting the virus to their children. Published reports available in 1994
confirm the accuracy of this statistic.
Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
289. SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 & n.9 (1996) ("Effective psychotherapy.. . depends
upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. . . . [TJhe mere possibility of disclosure
may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.") (citing
.studies and authorities cited in the Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae
14-17, and the Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 12-17"); see also
Edward Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of the Supreme Court's
Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 49 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 974 (1998)
(identifying the Court's assertions about the importance of nondisclosure for effective psychotherapy
as the "linchpin" of Jaffee's reasoning, and asserting that the studies cited by the Court "do not support
the majority's generalization that patients will not make the necessary revelations to psychotherapists
without the protection of an evidentiary privilege").
A recent example of a case involving scientific evidence is United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
303 (1998), in which the Court did not rely on a factual finding by the court below that polygraphs
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In the 1996 cable indecency case Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,2' for instance, the
plurality opinion's many assertions about cable television-such as that
cable television broadcasting "is as 'accessible to children' as over-the-air
broadcasting" 29 -relied solely on relevant publications (mainly dealing
with the cable industry).2' Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC,'9 the plurality opinion relied almost entirely on sources
were unreliable, and instead looked at the studies on its own and came to its own conclusion that there
was no consensus. See id. at 307, 309.
290. 51.8 U.S. 727 (1996).
291. Id. at 744 (plurality opinion). Likewise, the Justices proclaimed:
We have no empirical reason to believe, for example, that sex-dedicated channels are all
(or mostly) leased channels, or that "patently offensive" programming on
non-sex-dedicated channels is found only (or mostly) on leased channels. To the contrary,
the parties' briefs (and major city television guides) provide examples of what seems
likely to be such programming broadcast over both kinds of channels.
Id. at 761-62. The opinion relied on publications and materials submitted to the FCC by private parties
(much like briefs submitted to a court) to support their assertion that:
Municipalities generally provide in their cable franchising agreements for an access
channel manager, who is most commonly a nonprofit organization, but may also be the
municipality, or, in some instances, the cable system owner. Access channel activity and
management are partly financed with public funds-through franchise fees or other
payments pursuant to the franchise agreement, or from general municipal funds.
292. DenverArea was a challenge to an FCC rulemaking. Such challenges are presented directly
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and that court defers to findings made by the
FCC. Thus, the appropriate findings to which the Supreme Court would defer would be the findings
of the FCC. But in Denver Area, the Court proved just as willing to make its own findings as in cases
where the facts have been shaped by a district court.
In fact, some kinds of appellate fact-finding may be more common in appeals from agencies.
Agencies are not Article III courts and are not limited by Article III, so matters that arise under Article
III may be considered fully for the first time on appeal. The obvious example is standing. An appeal
from an agency to a court of appeals marks the first occasion when constitutional standing will be a
dispositive issue. The court of appeals, in other words, will make the initial determination on standing.
And, though the existence of standing is a question of law, the tests for standing rely heavily on factual
determinations (such as whether there is an injury in fact to the plaintiff). This puts the court of
appeals in a structural position akin to a trial court. Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts of appeals in this
position sometimes find themselves making findings of fact. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v.
National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding standing to
challenge lifting of fuel efficiency requirements because those requirements would cause manufacturers
to alter the fuel efficiency of their vehicles); id. at 1345 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contesting this
assertion); see also James E. Brown, Note, Civil Procedure-Standing and Direct Review in Appellate
Court-Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 793 F.2d 1322
(D.C. Cir. 1986), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1045, 1062 (1987). Brown observes:
[T]he court of appeals in Centerfor Auto Safety resolved the factual disputes on the issue
of standing without the aid of findings of fact on this issue either from a district court or
from the agency .... Indeed, in Center for Auto Safety, the resolution of the standing
question turned on a factual finding made by the court of appeals.
Id. On the application of this Article's analysis to cases where the fact-finder was an administrative
agency, rather than a federal district court, see infra note 320.
293. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (addressing the constitutionality of a federal statute mandating that cable
operators carry local broadcast stations).
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outside the record as support for its factual assertions about cable
television. 94  In other places- including the crucial2 95  (and
contested a%) assertion that most viewers' use of their systems made cable
into a bottleneck-the plurality cited no support whatsoever.z9  Even
though the bottleneck assertion relies on the role that cable television
actually plays in viewers' lives (at least their viewing lives) and thus seems
to be an issue of fact, the Court saw no need either to cite findings below
or to remand for findings if appropriate ones did not exist.29 The Court
clearly saw itself as fully capable of reaching its own conclusions about
cable's role vis-A-vis its subscribers.
294. See id. at 628 (citing a 1993 article for the Court's assertion that "[n]ewer systems can carry
hundreds of channels, and many older systems are being upgraded with fiber optic rebuilds and digital
compression technology to increase channel capacity"); id. at 655 ("[T]here appears little risk that cable
viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages
endorsed by the cable operator. Indeed .... it is a common practice for broadcasters to disclaim any
identity of viewpoint between the management and the speakers who use the broadcast facility."
(citations omitted)); id. at 628 (citing Television and Cable Factbook (1994) for the plurality's assertion
that "[m]ore than half of the cable systems in operation today have a capacity to carry between 30 and
53 channels").
Some of these sources were published after the district court issued its opinion; others were
available to the district court, but the Supreme Court relied directly on them rather than on findings
by the district court. The district court, in turn, had relied heavily on congressional findings and some
assertions of its own. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 46 (1993) (citing
congressional findings on dangers posed to local broadcasting by the cable industry); id. (asserting,
without citation, that "cable holds the future of local broadcasting at its mercy").
On courts' reliance on legislative findings in First Amendment cases, see Note, Deference to
Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2312 (1998); William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1261 (1998).
295. The plurality squarely stated that "[tihe must-carry provisions ... are justified by special
characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators and
the dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast television." Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S.
at 661; see also id. at 669-70 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The must-carry provisions are amply 'justified
by special characteristics of the cable medium,' namely, 'the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by
cable operators and the dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast television.'") (quoting
the plurality opinion).
296. Some of the briefs before the Court in Turner squarely contended that cable was not, in
reality, a "bottleneck" because, for example, viewers could easily acquire a switch that allows them
to change from broadcast to cable with the push of a button. See Reply Brief for Appellants Discovery
Communications, Inc. and the Learning Channel, Inc. at 10, Turner Broad. Sys., (No. 93-44); see also
Lee, supra note 294, at 1311 n.361 (listing five independent reasons why Justice Kennedy's bottleneck
argument is faulty).
297. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 656.
298. The district court did not find as a fact that cable was a bottleneck, but it did refer to
Congress's assertion that cable was a bottleneck. See Turner Broad. Sys., 819 F. Supp. at 40. The
fact that Congress so contended would undercut the claim that a court had found this fact on its own
if the court was deferring to Congress's finding. Although that did happen in the district court (which
pointed out on numerous occasions that it was deferring to Congress's findings), the Supreme Court
did not intimate that its finding of a cable bottleneck reflected a congressional finding. The Court
presented the conclusions as its own, without any suggestion that it was adopting those of another body.
In fact, nowhere in the section of the opinion finding bottleneck status did the opinion even mention
Congress. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 623-24, 661.
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Thus, rather than remand, the Court has found all sorts of facts by
relying on sources outside the record below, including bare assertions by
parties in briefs, research by authorities outside of the adjudication, and
their own personal sense about the state of the world. This is not to
suggest that its actions were improper. It may be that these findings would
not have benefited from evidentiary hearings, or that the benefit of such an
evidentiary hearing would be outweighed by the resources expended
(whether via remand or via a hearing in the Supreme Court). It might be
that if the Court could not draw such conclusions, it would remand so
many cases that it might take ten years for it to issue a final opinion on the
merits. The point simply is that, despite what the ordinary rules of
procedure might suggest, the Supreme Court has seen fit to draw its own
factual conclusions.
c. Is this just judicial notice?-Some might object that I am
being too fastidious, because what was really going on in these cases is that
the Supreme Court was simply taking judicial notice of these facts, without
actually saying so. The problem with such a notion is that it begs the
question of what "judicial notice" means in this context. Ordinarily,
judicial notice is appropriate with respect to facts that are not subject to
reasonable dispute.2' The assertions discussed above do not seem to fall
into that category, however; almost all of them seem eminently contestable.
I am sure that some would argue that the factual assertions in Muller and
Turner are obviously correct, but I am equally sure that many reasonable
people would contest them. Moreover, the facts asserted by the Supreme
Court could, by and large, be subject to studies that in turn could be the
subject of fact-finding. A trial court could, for example, receive evidence
on the question of the effect of segregation on African-American
children,3" or the preconditions necessary for effective psychotherapy.
299. See FED. R. EVID. (201)(b) (specifying that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned"). "Judicial notice"-at least as that term is used in Rule 201 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence-does not apply to legislative facts, arguably leaving courts with more
flexibility in determining how to take notice of legislative facts. See FED. R. EViD. (201)(a) ("This
rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts."). Whether or not courts are in some sense
authorized (by this omission in the Federal Rules of Evidence or otherwise) to take judicial notice of
disputable legislative facts, it does not change the substance of the court's action; and that substance,
as is discussed in the text, appears to entail the finding of facts that are subject to reasonable dispute
and appropriate for a formal evidentiary process.
300. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Educ.,
220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933
(1964), in which the district court revisited Brown's factual assertions about the deleterious effects of
segregation and found that the evidence actually pointed in the opposite direction. See id. at 678; see
also supra note 190. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit, in reversing, did not contend that the findings in
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Under these circumstances, we may consider the Supreme Court's
assertions to be judicially noticeable, but in so doing we have construed the
term to encompass factual assertions that are subject to reasonable dispute
and more exhaustive fact-finding. We would be defining "judicial notice,"
in other words, to include much of the fact-finding that is discussed in this
Article. We could call such a process "judicial notice" or "fact-finding"
or "spelunking," but the substance of it would be the same: the Court
would be drawing its own conclusions on contestable issues of fact that
could instead be the subject of fact-finding below. Thus the larger
significance of these cases is that the Court was willing to find facts despite
their contestability and provability.30'
Brown were unassailable, but rather suggested that the Supreme Court announced a broad rule that did
not depend on any particular set of facts. See Stell, 333 F.2d at 61. The Fifth Circuit was probably
correct insofar as it was deciphering the real reasons underlying Brown; but, as commentators have
noted, the actual language of the Brown opinion (as distinguished from what we may assume to have
been its underlying reasoning and purpose) does, by its terms, indicate some reliance on a set of factual
assertions about the effects of segregation. See Brewer, supra note 20, at 1554-63.
301. One potential response is that the Court thought these facts were indisputable and thus took
judicial notice, even though other persons might not have so concluded. One problem with this
suggestion is that the Court knows how to say "judicial notice." See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 159 (1990) ("We can take judicial notice of the fact that writs of habeas corpus are granted
in only some cases, and that guilty verdicts are returned after only some trials."); Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1984) ("We can take judicial notice that the unauthorized use of narcotics is a
problem that plagues virtually every penal and detention center in the country."); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 344 U.S. 1, 3 (1952) (per curiam) ("This Court takes judicial notice of a fourth case, which is
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Boiling et al. v.
Sharpe et al ... ."). Similarly, the Court knows how to disclaim the propriety of judicial notice. See,
e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (stating that the Court could not determine,
"based solely on judicial notice" that "the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined
that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public [are in fact] instrumental in the teaching of
religion"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968) ("We simply cannot conclude, either
on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially
increases the risk of conviction."). Why, then, didn't the Court say so in the cases discussed above?
A standard rule of statutory construction is that, where a legislative draftsperson sometimes uses a term
(demonstrating her familiarity with it), her failure to use it in other comparable situations is significant.
See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citing the well-known canon of
construction that "where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion"). The missing references to "judicial notice" are
analogous, casting doubt on the suggestion that the Court intended to take judicial notice in these cases.
A more fundamental problem with this focus on what the Supreme Court Justices thought,
however, is that it proves little. If they thought that judicial notice was appropriate but recognized that
the facts so noticed might reasonably be disputed, then, as I just noted, they have engaged in fact-
finding and have simply used a different term to describe it. If the Justices believed not only that
judicial notice was proper but also that the facts they announced could not be disputed by reasonable
people, then the category of such indisputable facts must be very broad indeed; their operational
definition of noticeable facts would thus seem to encompass a broad swath of facts that have an
objective element but could be disputed by some, and thus judicial notice would effectively encompass
many of the facts that heretofore had been thought subject to evidentiary fact-finding only.
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It is also interesting to reflect on why we might want to refer to the
Court's assertions as judicial notice (despite the Court's failure to so
identify its actions). Presumably, it is because we assume that admitting
that the Court is not taking judicial notice is admitting illegitimate judicial
acts; fact-finding, as we are taught from our earliest days in law school, is
reserved for trial courts. But that perspective may not give the Court
enough credit. Perhaps the Court is making a reasoned determination that
appellate fact-finding is appropriate where the alternative is a remand that
will require a considerable amount of time and resources for a benefit that
seems slight; and that, of course, is what this Article suggests as well.
2. The Benefits of Trial Court Fact Gathering.-The obvious rejoinder
to the previous parts of this section is that they may establish that the
Supreme Court is willing to find facts and does find facts, but they do not
demonstrate that appellate courts should find facts."° There are signifi-
cant arguments against appellate updating (and in favor of trial court factual
determinations); and, it might be argued, such arguments are dispositive
even in situations where facts have changed since the original findings by
the district court and may be subject to continual change in the future.
One argument against appellate updating of facts is that fact-finding
by trial courts is valuable because it also serves as a screening and focusing
device, weeding out the weak cases and clarifying the issues for appeal.
The appellate court can exercise its energies focusing on the few cases that
seem to merit review by that exclusive body, secure in the knowledge that
all the other cases have already been heard and that the issues it hears have
been refined by trial courts that have waded through the unfocused and/or
bloated filings the parties originally submitted. 3 The winnowing and
focusing function sug, sted here is probably overstated however. Parties
are entitled to an appeal as of right to a federal circuit court, so there is
obviously no winnowing function there. And on appeal parties can (and
do) put forward every possible mistake that the trial court may have made.
Even if the trial court did try to focus the proceedings, it cannot control
302. After all, the fact that the Court has looked at facts in the past does not necessarily justify
it in doing so. Many of the cases discussed above have been controversial. The debates over the
legitimacy of the findings in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), and footnote 11 of Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for example, continue to this day. See Dean M. Hashimoto,
Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 111, 139 (1993); Thomas Koenig &
Michael Rustad, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs,
72 N.C. L. REv. 91, 106 (1997). And some examples cited above, such as Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419 (1995), triggered angry dissents from justices who believed that the Court was inappropriately
arrogating unto itself the authority to find facts (although, in the Kyles case, the dissent spent more time
putting forward its own version of the facts, see supra note 236).
303. If the filings were focused and concise at the trial court level, then no trial court focusing
function would be necessary or even useful.
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what the parties submit on appeal, and quite possibly the attempted
focusing itself may be challenged by parties who believe that they should
have been able to present other issues. °4
The more weighty arguments against appellate updating are also the
strongest arguments in favor of remanding: that trial courts have more
expertise in fact-finding than do appellate courts; and, relatedly, that
district courts have an enhanced ability to find facts because they can hold
oral hearings and thereby judge credibility. 5
The expertise argument assumes that appellate courts are unaccus-
tomed to fact-finding; but, as the previous section shows, they find facts
all the time. To be fair, though, those facts are generally found based on
briefs and record material-i.e., based on a cold record, absent the oral
evidentiary process. Thus we might amend the expertise argument to say
that district courts have greater expertise in finding facts pursuant to oral
hearings. This dovetails nicely with the second advantage-that district
courts have the ability to hold such hearings.
Even as reconfigured, the arguments based on expertise in holding
hearings and the ability to hold hearings remain serious considerations-
ones that, in ordinary cases (i.e., where there is no concern on remand
about an infinite loop) would present a powerful argument against appellate
updating of facts. There are countervailing considerations, however, that
loom large in the situations on which this Article focuses.
At the outset, it should be noted that, if hearing witnesses really is
crucial, appellate courts could do so. There is no law of nature that
prevents the appellate court itself from empaneling and hearing from
witnesses. As matters currently stand, appellate courts do not hear
witnesses, but that is of course a reversible choice. (After all, Justices are
judges as well.) But the stronger argument is that an oral evidentiary
process often will not be necessary, or even particularly advantageous, in
the first place.
For some kinds of facts it is not clear that live witnesses will add
much to the paper record; the ability of a court to see witnesses live, rather
than rely solely on papers, may not confer a significant benefit.
304. A larger problem lies in the posture of the case. When facts have changed as the case is on
appeal, the appellate court already has the case before it. If the appellate court is limited to the facts
presented at trial, it may not be deciding the actual dispute between the parties; the appellate court may
issue an opinion, but that opinion will (if the facts have changed) be outdated on the day it is issued.
If the case then winds back to the trial court, the district court will not only be the first court to
consider the new facts as they apply to the parties, it may be the only court to do so (because of the
danger that they will change again after the second fact-finding). So deferring to the winnowing and
refining functions of a district court may result in the appellate court sitting on the sidelines. If the
appellate court wants to let another court find the facts, it may never get a chance to adjudicate the case
as it then exists; thus, the appellate court either acts without winnowing or only when it is too late.
305. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
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Importantly, it seems likely that many of the facts that are subject to rapid
and continual change will fall into this category. The reason for this lies
in the nature of the kinds of facts that are likely to undergo rapid and
continual change. For many purely historical facts (e.g., who did what to
whom), hearing witnesses may be helpful, in particular because the finder
of fact can make credibility determinations. The facts that might be subject
to continual change, however, are likely to be different. Such facts
generally will not be specific to a finite interaction between a given set of
parties but instead will pertain to the world as it exists in operation.
Moreover, such facts will often be what I have called technological facts-
the understanding of which presupposes a fairly nuanced familiarity with
the technology at issue; examples, as I suggested above, might be how the
World Wide Web is configured,3"6 how effective Internet filters might
be,3"7 or whether a browser is separate from an operating system. 0 8
The significance of these points is that, as a number of commentators have
suggested, the oral adversarial process might generate more heat than
light.3" Those who testify on technological and scientific matters will
have submitted their findings-and the crucial data and methodology
backing up those findings-in writing."' The most effective
questioners-both as to methodology and credibility-are likely to be others
familiar with the science or technology, not generalist judges and
lawyers;.. and those other scientists will usually respond (and respond
306. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 90.
308. See supra notes 114-20, 130-33 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1, 47 (1993) (stating that, in cases relying on expert witnesses,
.cross-examination becomes a ritual that does little to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of a
witness'[s] testimony"); John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TExAS L. REV. 277, 311 (1989)
("While the adversary system touts the effectiveness of cross-examination for revealing the truth, there
is little empirical support for this conclusion.").
310. The suitability of some forms of testimony to written presentation was crucial in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in which the Court ruled that a pretermination evidentiary hearing
for a recipient of disability benefits was not necessary, as a constitutional matter, because of the
adequacy of the pretermination written procedures. Id. at 344-46. The Court emphasized that a
written, rather than oral, medical determination of impairment was sufficient in light of the nature of
the inquiry (Le., because it relied on reports, tests, and X-rays). Id. at 345 ('The conclusions of
physicians are often supported by X-rays and the results of clinical or laboratory tests, information
typically more amenable to written than to oral presentation."); see also id. at 344 n.28 ("The value
of an evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation, to an accurate presentation of [certain
worker characteristics] to the decisionmaker does not appear substantial.").
311. Interestingly, the Supreme Court's case law on standards for the admissibility of expert
testimony lends some support to this proposition. In a line of cases on the admissibility of such
testimony beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and
extending to last term's Kumho - Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999), the Court has stressed
the relevance of "general accepta..ze" within the "relevant scientific community," as well as "whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585,
584, 593, 592-94; see also Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (quoting from Daubert). The Court
could have opened the door wide to all forms of self-proclaimed "expert" testimony, leaving the judge
[Vol. 78:269354
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more effectively) with their own written submissions.3" Lawyers and
judges might be able to find questions that will trip up the witnesses, but
that may shed no light on the validity of the underlying scientific assertions
at issue. 313  In fact, examination and cross-examination in this context
may do more harm than good, as it might give the lawyers and judge an
illusion of understanding. 314
If this last point is correct, this may be a reason to prefer appellate
fact-finding, because appellate judges (assuming that they do not utilize
procedures to hear witnesses) will not have been misled by the showman-
ship of examination and cross-examination. Even if examination does not
do any harm, if it also confers no benefit then there would be reason to
prefer appellate fact-finding. 35 After all, there would be three or nine
judges reviewing the submissions and reaching conclusions about what they
actually indicate, rather than just one.31 6 The consequences of either of
or jury to figure out what testimony was most reliable; or the Court could have given the judge a
stronger gatekeeping function while leaving the determination of reliability solely to the judge's own
sense of what is reliable testimony. The Court rejected both of these options, however, in apparent
recognition of the benefits of an initial gatekeeping function served by scientific peers, rather than lay
juries and generalist judges. The Court suggested that judges not only look to an expert's fellow
scientists, but also that judges look for a paper record of publication and peer review, in determining
reliability.
312. As David Faigman noted:
Good scientific research simply does not depend on the credibility of individual witnesses.
If the question is whether the declarant made a statement under a belief of impending
death, the nurse's credibility might be critical, and this presumably can best be assessed
in person. In contrast, whether a series of six epidemiological studies support the
conclusion that the relative risk associated with silicone implants exceeds 2.0 for
connective tissue disorders does not entail the same sort of credibility assessment. The
science must be evaluated on the merits and as reported, in most cases, in the literature.
David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 969,.978-79 (1997).
313. See, e.g., Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert
Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 496-97 (1993) ("[M]oden expert testimony has
strayed so far from traditional testimony that it is no longer recognizable as such, but is rather a form
of professional advocacy. As such, the assertion of partisan experts might be better evaluated in written
form.").
314. See Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 267 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (focusing on
experts' demeanor, tone, motives, biases, and interests), aff'd in part, modified in part, 788 F.2d 741
(11th Cir. 1986); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case? The Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1779, 1799-1800 (1995) (citing Wells as
an example of an overwhelmed judge who improperly focused on nonsubstantive criteria in assessing
testimony).
315. See Faigman, supra note 312, at 979 ("Contrary to the arguments against appellate courts'
competency, arguably appellate judges are better positioned than trial judges (and trial judges better
than juries) to decide scientific disputes that transcend particular cases."); Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Standard ofAppellate Review for Scientific Evidence: Beyond Joiner and Scheffer, 32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 289, 317-18 (1999) (arguing that "[tihe trial court does not have a privileged position over the
appellate court in [admitting scientific evidence] because appellate judges can have direct access to the
scientific material").
316. Judge Friendly noted several potential advantages of appellate panels, chief among them that
"the give and take of discussion may produce a result better than any single mind could reach. [And]
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these conclusions are considerable; they would suggest that there is no real
reason for appellate courts to remand to trial courts for fact-finding, even
if the facts are not subject to further change. One need not accept this
broad proposition, however, to accept the narrower proposition advanced
in this Article that whatever are the benefits of trial court fact-finding, they
may be outweighed by the costs involved in a remand. Put another way,
even if it is wrong to suggest that there are no benefits to trial court fact-
finding, the benefit does not appear to be very great (and, perhaps
ironically, the empirical evidence on the advantages conferred by oral
examination is inconclusive 17). Thus the presence of significant counter-
vailing considerations (here, that facts are in a state of flux) may be
sufficient to command a different presumption about who should be the
fact-finder.
This is not to suggest that appellate courts always (or even usually)
draw appropriate conclusions from the paper record that is presented to
them. Commentators have accused appellate courts of misconstruing the
material presented to them in a number of cases, and their accusations may
well be apt.31 The point, instead, is that it is not clear that district
courts will do a better job of wading through material bearing on facts
about the world. To return to a previous example, why should an appellate
court defer to a trial court's interpretation of briefs and memoranda on,
say, whether Internet filters successfully filter out sexual material, or
whether cable is a bottleneck? What does the trial court know that the
appellate court does not? The answer may be "a bit," because the trial
court had whatever advantage might be conferred by an adversarial fact-
finding hearing (if it held one);319 but that advantage may be outweighed
when the facts are subject to rapid and continual change, for the reasons
outlined in this Article.3 2" That is, the disadvantages of the appellate
collegial review tends to eliminate or curtail decisions based on impermissible factors." Henry J.
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMoRY L.J. 747, 757 (1982).
317. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources
of Appellate Review, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 650 (1988) (noting that "[t]here is room still to
wonder whether the opportunity to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses at trial actually enhances the
fact-finding process").
318. See Robert H. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination
ofWilliams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 621,623-31 (1998)
(arguing that, in cases involving the minimum size of juries, the Supreme Court has misinterpreted and
misapplied relevant studies); Michael J. Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec.
1974, at 18, 18 (asserting that, in Williams v. Florida, "the law's confrontation with some relatively
simple empirical questions was simply an embarrassment").
319. On the possibility of a trial court not holding such a hearing and not having greater familiarity
with the facts than an appellate court would, see supra notes 209-10.
320. This discussion, and indeed the Article as a whole, refers to the original fact-finder as a
district court or trial court. As was noted above, though, on some occasions the fact-finder is not an
Article I court but instead an administrative agency; the agency makes the determination, and the
parties appeal from there to a federal court (normally a court of appeals). Although the Supreme Court
has never confronted the issue discussed in this Article, it has suggested, in a somewhat analogous
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court avoiding the factual updating (i.e., the infinite loop or the issuance
of an outdated opinion) seem greater than the advantages of deferring to a
trial court.32'
This sort of distinction among facts-here, focusing on the ones that
would require evidentiary hearings or otherwise consume lots of appellate
resources-is in many ways analogous to the Supreme Court's own prac-
tices. In Lockhart v. McCree,3" the Court suggested, in dictum, a
willingness to treat some facts differently on appellate review.3' The
respondent in Lockhart had argued that the Supreme Court should defer to
the lower court findings that "death qualification" of jurors produces
conviction-prone juries. 24 The Court stated that "[b]ecause we do not
ultimately base our decision today on the invalidity of the lower courts'
'factual' findings, we need not decide the 'standard of review' issue. We
are far from persuaded, however, that the 'clearly erroneous' standard of
Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of 'legislative' facts at issue here. "32
Unfortunately, the Court has not returned to this issue in any other case,
so its suggestion of nonpersuasion for a certain class of facts has never
been adopted.32
context, that agency actions should be remanded if there are allegations that the facts changed during
the agency's processes. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 514 (1944).
While a full discussion of the courts' role in taking account of new facts in administrative cases would
require another article, a few preliminary points can be made. On the one hand, there are similarities
between appellate review of agencies and district courts. Agency fact-finding can be a very time-
consuming process, and the delays that occur after the agency has completed its work (i.e., when the
case is awaiting decision by the reviewing court) can be quite substantial. Moreover, the jurisprudential
concerns involved in an Article III appellate court issuing a forward-looking opinion that relied on
outdated facts would exist whether the original finder of fact was an Article I court or not. On the
other hand, there are significant differences. An agency typically operates under a grant of
policymaking authority, pursuant to which it wields primary responsibility for implementing a
regulatory program. This circumstance gives special force to the argument that the agency should, in
general, be allowed to speak first on factual matters. Relatedly, the difference in expertise between
appellate courts and agencies is likely to be much greater than the difference between appellate courts
and district courts. See Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 575 (1952). Additionally, the
position of appellate courts is complicated by the concept that agency rulemakings are analogous to
legislation by a legislative body, as opposed to agency adjudications that are treated as analogous to
judicial decisionmaking. See RLC Industries Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 F.3d 413,
417-18 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the distinction between agency rulemaking and agency adjudication).
321. In this way, the analysis is similar to the test for determining how much process is required
before a constitutionally protected benefit can be terminated. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976) (outlining the three factors to consider in a due process inquiry). The Mathews inquiry asks
whether, in light of the claimant's interests, the increased accuracy to be gained from additional
procedures is outweighed by the costs of such procedures. See id. There was no dispute that additional
procedures (in Mathews, a pretermination evidentiary hearing) would confer some benefit, but the Court
doubted that such benefit would be sufficient to justify the additional cost involved. See id. at 344-46.
322. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
323. See id. at 168 n.3.
324. Id. at 173.
325. Id. at 168 n.3.
326. This language from Lockhart raises a question: Would a Supreme Court holding that appellate
courts should not defer to trial courts on legislative facts, but should instead find such facts on their
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In addition, Lockhart's suggestion is at odds with cases in which the
Court has taken an uncompromising position on appellate fact-finding,
denominated as such.327 Some circuit courts had held that they could
exercise de novo review of district court findings that were not based on
credibility determinations. 3' The Supreme Court squarely repudiated
but no cigar. Such a rule would be both broader and narrower than the appellate fact updating
considered in this Article. It would be broader because I am not arguing that the Court routinely find
legislative facts on its own, but rather that it do so only when the facts are subject to continual change.
The burden of persuasion on an article writer would be higher if one were to extend that rule to
ordinary cases, because the justification of the potentially high costs of remand would be absent.
Perhaps more important, though, routine appellate finding of legislative facts might not
encompass some of the facts that are subject to change and that, in my view, might merit appellate
updating. Consider the question whether Microsoft's operating system and its browser are separate
products. My reading of the categories suggests that this fits comfortably into neither category, but
that it is probably better understood as an adjudicative fact. See text accompanying note 42. If so,
such a fact would not be included in the Lockhart dictum as available for appellate updating, and the
problems identified in this Article would remain. In the alternative, one could consider this to be a
legislative fact, but, in so doing, one would then be treating that category so broadly that it would likely
encompass, for instance, most (if not all) the facts in the Microsoft case about the nature of its and its
competitors' products; and because those facts are the essence of the case for injunctive relief, it would
mean that appellate courts would essentially be holding a new trial all over again (and that, of course,
would dramatically raise the cost of appellate courts finding legislative facts and thus make the entire
procedure much less attractive).
Part of the difficulty in determining the effect of a rule of nondeference to legislative facts is that
the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts is fairly murky. As Charles Alan Wright and
Kenneth Graham have noted, once one moves beyond paradigmatic examples there is wide
disagreement-even between Kenneth Davis, who originated the distinction, and the Reporter for the
Federal Rules of Evidence, who adopted the distinction for Rule 201. The categories simply are not
very clear. See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNErH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5103 (2d ed. 1987).
327. One could try to harmonize Lockhart's dictum with the cases in which the Supreme Court
rejected a distinction among facts by noting that the Lockhart dictum had referred to the "'factual'
findings"-the quotation marks around the word "factual" perhaps suggesting that, in the Court's view,
these were not really questions of fact at all. One problem with this reading is that in the same foomote
the Court subsequently referred, twice, to this sort of "'legislative' fact," putting the word "legislative"
in quotation marks but not the word "fact." See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168 n.3. Presumably, if it
meant to suggest that these were not really facts, it would have put quotation marks around the word
"fact."
If, though, the Court was attempting to suggest that these were not really facts, it lends support
to the argument that the Court is willing to engage in a practice that seems indistinguishable from fact-
finding, even if the Court is calling it by a different name. If the Court wants to characterize these
sorts of determinations as mixed questions of law and fact-or even as questions of law-and then
consider them de novo, they are effectively "finding" the answers to those questions. We could then
achieve appellate fact-finding simply by recharacterizing legislative facts as mixed questions of law and
fact. I think that such an approach is dishonest, because I think that such legislative facts are deemed
to be facts with good reason. But perhaps Lockhart reveals a suggestion (thus far not implemented)
to consider legislative facts de novo via a semantic distinction. (Unfortunately, if that is what we
interpret the Court as doing, then we are back to interpreting Lockhart in a way that is in tension with
cases like Bessemer City and Pullman-Standard.)
328. See Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1950); Lydle v. United States, 635 F.2d
763, 765 n.I (6th Cir. 1981); Swanson v. Baker Indus., Inc., 615 F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 1980). As
the Supreme Court remarked inAnderson v. Bessemer City, "[tihis theory has an impressive genealogy,
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that practice in Anderson v. Bessemer City,329 concluding that there was
no basis for distinguishing among facts.
At the same time, however, the Court has acknowledged that the line
between questions of law and questions of fact is sufficiently nebulous that
it is often up to the courts to choose their characterization. 330  And, in
Miller v. Fenton,33' the Court noted that "the fact/law distinction at times
has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration
of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the
issue in question." 332  The Court then embarked on an extensive discus-
sion applying this principle, noting, for example, that allocation as fact was
appropriate where "the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and
therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, 333 whereas
[If] the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through
its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has
been reluctant to give the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive
force and, in so doing, strip a federal appellate court of its primary
function as an expositor of law.
The "vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and
questions of law" 335 has also led the Court to dump some questions into
having first been articulated in an opinion written by Judge Frank and subscribed to by Judge Augustus
Hand, see Orvis v. Higgins .. . ." 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). But, as the Court also noted in
Anderson, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apparently rejected the notion that
findings not based on credibility could be subject to de novo appellate review; by its terms, it applies
to all findings of fact. See id. at 474; see also Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision
Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1000 (1986).
This is not to suggest that Rule 52(a) applies to the proposal put forward in this Article; the rule
covers appellate review of existing findings of fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact...
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."). Rule 52(a) thus does not apply to the updating
of facts, but the rule, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, obviously provides no support for the
distinction mentioned here, either.
329. 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Similarly, the Court in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273
(1982), concluded:
Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings
from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court's findings unless clearly
erroneous. It does not divide facts into categories ....
Id. at 287.
330. It is perhaps ironic that in one of the cases in which the Court harshly rebuked a circuit court
for applying de novo review to what the Court deemed to be a question of fact, the Court in the next
breath noted "the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law."
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.
331. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
332. Id. at 114.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.
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the category of mixed questions of law and fact-a wonderfully mushy
classification. And the review applied to such mixed questions is (perhaps
fittingly) indeterminate: unlike the standard of review for questions of law
and questions of fact, the standard of review applied to mixed questions
varies; "deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted
when it appears that the district court is 'better positioned' than the
appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate
scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine."336
The logic of the Court's reasoning-which frankly focuses. on the
relative positions of trial and appellate courts-would seem to allow for
appellate updating. The considerations in this Article are not purely based
on expertise; as I have suggested, also relevant is the concern that the
appellate court be able to issue an opinion (i.e., avoid an infinite loop), and
that it issue an opinion that actually applies to the world as it exists (i.e.,
avoid an opinion based on outdated facts). But the considerations
enunciated by the Court-for example, the focus on an appellate court's
"primary function as an expositor of law" 337-seem to encompass this
kind of concern.
We could try to characterize as questions of law or as mixed questions
the sort of rapidly changing situations discussed in this Article. It seems
more honest, however, to acknowledge that even in the blurry world of
such categories the sort of situations on which we are focusing probably
constitute "facts," but to argue that such categorization is not dispositive
as to the illegitimacy of their finding by an appellate court in these
circumstances. After all, although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that all facts are found by trial courts and subject to clearly erroneous
review,338 it has nonetheless been willing to find facts on its own.339
The point of these arguments is not that either credibility determina-
tions or the winnowing and focusing function is valueless; on the contrary,
in many situations they may be of great value. The arguments for an
enhanced role for district court fact-finding (either by relying on the facts
as found and leaving any updating for a further action in the district court,
or by remanding) simply have less force in the context addressed in thisArticle."4
336. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
337. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 114.
338. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
339. See discussion supra section V(C)(1).
340. This context can be seen as one example of the larger category of situations where there is
reason to doubt the findings below. For instance, an appellate court may have concerns about the good
faith of the trial court. This should be rare, but in fact frequently came up in the desegregation
decisions. For example, when James Meredith challenged the refusal of the University of Mississippi
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But, a skeptical reader might ask, wouldn't the appellate updating just
described constitute a big waste of resources? The answer is no, although
its contours change depending on whose resources are at issue.
If we focus on saving appellate courts' resources, 34  the argument
against appellate updating would be at its strongest: updating would require
that the appellate court devote extra time to a case (sifting through a paper
record takes some time), and that case might well be overtaken by new
facts in a matter of years or perhaps months. An appellate court concerned
about its resources thus might be tempted to focus instead on cases that do
not take extra time and will have a longer shelf life.
The matter, though, is not quite so simple. With respect to remand-
ing, as was noted above, if the factual updating would not be terribly time
consuming, then it might save the appellate court's time simply to engage
in that updating and then issue its final opinion, rather than hearing it a
second time on its way back up from the district court. There is, of
course, the possibility of a new case being filed once the facts change
again, but that should be compared to the certain existence of the remanded
case in the district court."4 And if the facts keep changing, remanding
to admit him, the district court made relatively few findings of fact in rejecting his claim, other than
the rather remarkable ones that "there is no custom or policy now, nor was there any at the time
Plaintiff's application was rejected, which excluded qualified Negroes from entering the University,"
and that "the University is not a racially segregated institution." Meredith v. Fair, 202 F. Supp. 224,
227 (S.D. Miss. 1962), rev'd, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected these findings and, rather than remand for new findings (as would ordinarily
occur), simply concluded that "[r]eading the 1350 pages in the record as a whole, we find that James
Meredith's application for transfer to the University of Mississippi was turned down solely because he
was a Negro." Id. at 361. The appeals court thus seemed to treat the district court's findings as the
clock that strikes thirteen-that is, an event that not only seems patently incorrect but also makes one
question all that has come before. And, of course, remand for further fact-finding would be pointless,
because the district judge might simply make the same (or perhaps additional) untrustworthy findings.
The reason that neither deference nor remand seems appropriate in the Meredith situation is that
there was good reason to doubt the accuracy of the facts found. The same rationale applies in the
situation discussed in this Article: if a party makes a credible argument that the facts have changed
since the trial court found them, then, by definition, the party has cast a shadow over those findings.
Unlike the situation above, remand is not out of the question (because we are assuming that the district
judge's findings were correct at the time they were found); but, as we have already discussed, remand
does not diminish the problem of inaccurate findings unless one assumes that the next X months will
see less change than the previous X months-an assumption that seems problematic with respect to any
of the rapidly changing industries discussed in this Article. Thus, for different reasons, an appellate
court would be faced with problematic facts found by the district court and a significant likelihood of
equally inaccurate facts if the case were remanded or decided on old facts, with future district court
action to come. Such circumstances seem sufficiently similar to that of the bad-faith judge that a
similar result seems warranted-namely, appellate fact-finding (or, more precisely, fact updating).
341. Perhaps we value appellate courts' resources more highly because there are fewer appellate
judges, perhaps because appellate panels have multiple judges, and/or perhaps because we think that
appellate judges are smarter. We might also be tempted to say that we value them more highly because
we see them as having a specialized law-finding function, but that is circular; the question is why we
give them this specialized function.
342. The calculus is complicated by both the chance of a new case being filed and of the remanded
case not being appealed. See supra note 214.
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means that every time the case comes up on appeal, the remanding court
would have to familiarize itself with the facts in order to determine whether
a remand was appropriate; judges would spend time on the case but pro-
duce nothing. With a bit more energy expended, they could produce a
useful opinion. With respect to deciding the case based on old facts,
meanwhile, the chances of the case not returning to the appellate court are
probably greater:343 in the case of remand, the district court would update
the facts as long as one of the parties did not surrender or settle; in the
case of deciding based on old facts, the case would enter district court only
if the losing party decided to revive its lawsuit and the district court found
that preclusion was inapplicable,3" and we might imagine that the odds
of a successful new filing are lower than the odds of a continuation of the
case on remand. At the same time, however, the investment of resources
by the appellate court would also be greater: rather than remanding, the
appellate court would have issued an opinion in the case, which requires
lots of resources. As with remand, deciding the case based on old facts
might be shortsighted for the appellate court (ignoring the concerns of
other courts and the parties), because, with a bit more effort, the court
could decide the case as it exists and then have a breather until the facts
change again and a new case is filed. If we focus exclusively on appellate
resources, then, the argument against appellate updating is less than
overwhelming.
But an exclusive focus on appellate resources seems overly narrow,
anyway. Even if we put a higher value on appellate courts' time, we
should put some weight on district courts' time. And, once we do so, the
calculus changes: Remand loses much of its appeal (pardon the pun). In
addition to the considerations listed above, remand entails the additional
cost of forcing another court (the district court) to familiarize (or
refamiliarize) itself with the case so that it can update the facts instead of
the appellate court doing so. As between appellate fact-finding and issuing
the opinion without new fact-finding, it would be a closer question; but,
343. Of course, the Supreme Court (but not the courts of appeals) can reduce the chance of seeing
the case again to zero by simply refusing to grant certiorari when it comes back. But by the same
token the Court could deny certiorari or dismiss its writ of certiorari as improvidently granted with
respect to the original case and thus avoid seeing it the first time. These possibilities would probably
save the Court's time, but at the cost of losing its role at the top of the appellate system. See supra
note 218. Still, I must concede that, if the Supreme Court's time is our only focus, the Court might
be well advised to deny any and all cases with facts that might have changed or will likely change in
the future. And given the difficulty of figuring out which cases would have such facts (absent a fairly
close examination of the case that would require the devotion of resources), such a Supreme Court
should probably just deny certiorari in all cases involving prospective relief, thereby avoiding any
possibility of relevant facts changing.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
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given the strong possibility that the parties would immediately go to the
district court if an outdated ruling was issued by the appellate court, it
would seem that the better course would be to update the facts and thus end
the litigation (for months or years, anyway).
If, though, we take an even broader view and consider not only judi-
cial resources but also private (in particular, the parties') resources, then
the argument for updating is stronger. After all, it is certainly a waste for
the parties to bounce around from one court to another (whether as part of
a remand or in response to an outdated opinion). Presumably, they would
prefer to make fewer stops at courthouses rather than more; and, given the
role assigned to appellate courts at the top of the heap, it would make sense
to have an appellate court play the traditional role as the court that issues
the final opinion.
There is still one problem: the discussion above has focused on situa-
tions' where the appellate court might reasonably engage in fact-updating
without having to hold an evidentiary hearing or otherwise spend a huge
amount of time on it. What about situations in which the fact-finding
would be extremely resource intensive and/or would really require an oral
evidentiary process in order for the fact updating to be properly done? In
those circumstances, wouldn't appellate updating be quite unattractive?
At the outset, it bears noting that, if we do not value appellate courts'
time more highly than district courts' time, then the concern about
resource-intensive fact-finding melts away.' 4 But, assuming that we do
value appellate courts' time more highly, there is another option for
appellate updating of the facts: the appellate court could send the matter to
a special master. Appellate courts already utilize special masters in a
variety of situations (for example, the Supreme Court routinely refers
original jurisdiction cases to them46), and, as a practical matter, gives
them deference that is substantially similar to the deference they give to
district courts.347 Notably, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
345. If we value appellate courts' and district courts' time equally, then nothing would be saved
by a remand no matter how time consuming the fact-updating process might be; just as many resources
will be expended by the district court in updating the facts as would be spent by the appellate court.
The way to conserve judicial resources, of course, would be for no court to engage in such a time-
intensive factual updating, and instead simply to leave the case in limbo. But such a failure to
adjudicate seems indefensible, particularly where the duration and course of future changes (and thus
the length of time that the case might be in limbo) is not clear. See supra subpart IV(B).
346. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
347. Because a special master is not an Article III judge, the Constitution prevents the master from
being vested with final decisionmaking authority. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
a special master's findings of fact shall be accepted unless clearly erroneous, see FED. R. Civ. P.
53(e)(2), but the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not so provide, see FED. R. APP. P. 48, and
the Rules of the Supreme Court do not even provide for special masters at all (much less the level of
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provide for special masters' but the Rules of the Supreme Court do
not; 9 the Court sends original jurisdiction cases to special masters in
apparent reliance on its general authority to use appropriate procedures in
deciding cases, and the same authority would probably apply here.350
Recall that two crucial arguments against appellate courts' updating of
the facts were that district courts have greater expertise in finding facts and
have the ability to hold hearings. Both of those advantages apply to special
masters as well. Special masters can be, and frequently are, federal trial
judges, and they can and do hold oral hearings." Thus the arguments
do not distinguish remanding from an appellate court requesting that a
special master update the facts.
Despite the neutralization of these two advantages, in ordinary cases
sending a case to a special master still would not seem preferable to a
remand: if the original district judge was available (and desirable352) for
deference they would receive). Federal appellate courts are not obliged, then, to give any particular
level of deference to a special master's findings, and instead have some discretion in the matter.
Although they sometimes mention that they are free to disregard a special master's findings, appellate
courts generally defer to special masters' findings in much the same way that they defer to a district
court's findings, sometimes invoking Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but usually
without invoking any particular authority. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 765 (1981)
(noting "the appellate-type review which this Court necessarily gives to [a special master's) findings
and recommendations"); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 n.11 (1980) (noting the
regularity with which the Court accepts the special master's findings); Demjanjukv. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d
338, 340 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that Rule 53 required that it defer to the special master's findings
unless clearly erroneous); WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 176, § 4054 ("[I]t seems both inevitable and
appropriate that the Court should approach the [special master's] findings with a tacit presumption that
they should be accepted absent a strong contrary showing in the record.").
348. See FED. R. APP. P. 48.
349. Although the Court routinely sends original jurisdiction cases to special masters, the Rules
contain only one reference to special masters, and that is in a housekeeping rule on briefs (it mentions
the filing of exceptions to the "Report of Special Master"). SUP. CT. R. 33(1)(g)(v), (vi), (viii) & (ix).
No substantive Rule even mentions special masters, much less delineates the role of the special master
or explicitly authorizes the use of a special master.
350. The matter is not free from doubt. See Dorf, supra note 45, at 57 n.296 ("It is unclear
whether the Court has the authority to appoint special masters in cases outside its original
jurisdiction."). Assuming that the rules currently do not provide for special masters (either in cases
of fact updating only or in all cases, including original jurisdiction matters), the obvious response is
that those Rules can be changed (and are changed frequently). There is nothing talismanic or sacred
about them.
351. See, e.g., Illinois v. Kentucky, 480 U.S. 903 (1987); California v. Arizona, 441 U.S. 959
(1979); Colorado v. New Mexico, 441 U.S. 902 (1979) (all appointing a United States district judge
as the special master); NLRB v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We...
refer this matter to the chief judge of the Northern District Court of California with directions to
appoint a district judge to serve as special master."); United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d
1073, 1076 (2d Cir. 1983) (summarizing the actions of the district court judge appointed to preside as
special master). In fact, in some cases the court of appeals has appointed the district judge from the
case below as the special master. See, e.g., Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 883 F.2d 333, 335 (5th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Daly, 720 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1983).
352. See supra note 217 (on Connor v. Coleman) and note 340 (on Meredith v. Fair).
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a remand, and if the district judge had become quite familiar with the
facts,353 then sending the case back to her would avoid the time and
energy required for a new fact-finder (here, the special master) to become
similarly familiar with the facts.354 "
Where rapidly changing facts are involved, however, timing (and
timeliness) concerns loom large and thus two aspects of special masters that
would not be of great benefit in ordinary cases take on particular signifi-
cance. First, appellate courts can control special masters more easily than
they can district courts. 5  Special masters are appointed as adjuncts to
the appellate court, and they are under the supervision of that court.
District judges, by contrast, are not under the supervision of an appellate
court; they are not under clear control at all, except by the chief judge of
the district. Insofar as district judges are "supervised," then, it is by a
colleague (the chief judge); special masters, on the other hand, are super-
vised by the court that chose them, in a clear relationship of inferiority.
As a result, we might reasonably expect that special masters would be
more responsive to the wishes of the appellate court.356  Second,
appointing a special master allows the appellate court to proceed with the
case alongside the special master's fact-finding, saving valuable time. The
appellate court can not only retain jurisdiction on the case but continue to
work on aspects of the case that are not affected by the rapidly changing
facts, even as the special master is updating the facts that have changed.
In light of these advantages-and, of course, the related dangers of an
infinite loop on remand or issuing an outdated opinion based on old facts-
sending the case to a special master seems somewhat more attractive. The
appellate court would have the benefit of the main advantages of remanding
(sending the case to an experienced fact-finder who could hold evidentiary
hearings) while minimizing the danger that the fact-updating process would
take so long that the facts would be stale again when the case returned to
the appellate court.3 7
353. Cf. supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
354. There might seem to be another reason to remand: the appellate court can give greater
deference to the findings of a district court, and thus has to expend less time and energy in reviewing
such findings. As was noted above, however, in practice the Supreme Court generally gives similar
deference to district judges and special masters, so the putative advantage does not really exist. See
supra note 347. In fact, the flexibility inherent in the Supreme Court choosing how much, as a
practical matter, to defer to special masters is arguably an advantage for the special master regime.
355. See supra note 217.
356. Admittedly, the evidence for this proposition is largely anecdotal; I am not aware of any
statistically valid evidence on this point. I think, though, that it does not require a leap of faith to posit
that actors who are under more direct control are likely to be responsive to the wishes of those above
them in the hierarchy.
357. The temptation for an appellate court to send all cases involving rapidly changing facts to a
special master would be obvious: the court could let another entity take the first crack at fact updating
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3. How Might the Updating Be Done?-A salient question remains:
Assuming that it might be viable in theory for an appellate court to update
facts when they have changed, how might it be accomplished in practice?
We can easily imagine how an appellate court might implement the pro-
posals to remand or to issue the opinion immediately, as that happens all
the time. (And, of course, we can also imagine the procedures a district
court would use to find the facts on remand, since that, too, happens all the
time.) But procedures for appellate updating are not so obvious; and, if
they are unduly cumbersome, then appellate updating will not be an
attractive option. So how might an appellate court actually undertake the
updating of facts when there is a credible assertion that facts have changed?
There are, of course, many different procedural routes that an
appellate court might take; the following seems a straightforward and
workable solution. The process could begin with either a party or the
appellate court itself suggesting that one or more relevant facts have
changed in the months since the fact-finding by the district court. If the
court made the suggestion of factual changes, it could ask each party to
address the question of their existence. If a party made the suggestion (as
would usually be the case, presumably), it would do so in a filing that
detailed its basis for alleging that facts had changed; if the opposing party
disagreed that the facts had changed, or thought that they had changed but
that the moving party's characterization of those changes was inaccurate,
the opposing party would file a response (or a motion of its own)."58 The
and then consider those findings. As the analysis in this Article indicates, such a tactic would be
unfortunate: in many cases, it will make more sense for the appellate court simply to update the facts
on its own.
It also bears mentioning that where the facts and the legal determination bleed into one another,
it may be problematic for the court to make the legal determinations on its own while looking to
another entity for the factual determinations. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 45, at 57 ("[The [Supreme]
Court cannot simply delegate the task of factfinding to special masters or other adjunct entities, because
the resolution of factual questions in the sense that usually concerns us cannot be neatly separated from
the articulation of norms."). Scott Brewer makes a somewhat similar argument, namely that the same
person(s) should both find facts and apply them-or, in Brewer's words, that "the same legal
decisionmaker wear two hats, the hat of epistemic competence and the hat of practical legitimacy."
Brewer, supra note 20, at 1681.
These arguments would counsel against an appellate court sending the factual determinations
to a special master, because considering another's findings (even without any formal deference) is
different from making those findings on one's own. But for that very reason these arguments would
also counsel against remanding and in favor of appellate updating of facts. Deference to factual
determinations but not legal determinations by a trial court would seem even more troubling (because
of the formal deference); so, unless we subvert the judicial hierarchy by placing trial courts at the top,
it would seem that appellate courts should make their own factual determinations, in at least some
cases, rather than leave those determinations for another decisionmaker.
358. In so alleging, the parties would presumably inform the appellate court of the evidence on
which they relied in making their assertion of factual change. This would help the appellate court in
determining whether to send the case to a special master (if the evidence required credibility
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appellate court would make the legal determination whether there was a
credible allegation of factual change that merited further consideration
(which inquiry would include, of course, a determination of whether the
allegedly changed facts were important to the outcome of the case).
At this point, the reader may begin to wonder whether the procedure
described is so cumbersome and detailed that it would be unworkable. But
the procedure described so far is the one that appellate courts routinely use
when there is a suggestion of mootness (once again, either from the court
itself or from a party). This is not surprising, as mootness based on
factual change is obviously a subset of the larger category of changes in
fact that can affect the outcome of pending cases. If a party suggests that
a case is moot based on some new fact, the appellate court does not
reflexively decide the issue, but first determines whether the suggestion is
both credible and relevant enough to warrant further action. That is
exactly what I am proposing here with respect to other changes in fact.
There is, however, an additional wrinkle: the movant should also
inform the appellate court whether these facts or other relevant facts in the
case are likely to change in the near future. As this Article has suggested,
this consideration is important in the choice between remand and appellate
updating: if the change is a one-time event, then remand does not present
the danger of an infinite loop.
The next stage also would be a bit different from the ordinary practice
in mootness cases. In mootness cases the appellate court usually either
weighs the new facts itself (especially if the facts can be presented on
paper) or sends the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. This
Article has already argued that remand may be undesirable, because of the
problem of the infinite loop. Thus, a different procedure suggests itself:
if the appellate court determines that the allegedly new facts can be
determined based on written presentations, then it should simply order
supplemental briefs in which each side will present its evidence; if the
appellate court determines that a hearing would be of some benefit, then
the court can either conduct a hearing or, more likely, send the matter to
a special master.
Appellate courts deal with written submissions on a daily basis, of
course, so the process of receiving and reviewing written presentations of
facts should not overly tax them. It is true that appellate courts do not
formally make factual findings (except in original jurisdiction cases); but,
as was noted above, there are many instances of an appellate court making
determinations or oral hearings were otherwise desirable) or to update the facts on its own (if updating
the facts based on a paper record seemed appropriate).
359. See supra note 197.
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findings without so proclaiming."6 The main difference here is that they
would be doing so both more honestly and with the benefit of briefing on
the issue from both parties-rather than one or none, as is usually the case.
For those disputed factual matters that can be better handled through
a process that allows for evidentiary hearings, a choice presents itself: the
appellate court could conduct the hearing itself, or it could send the matter
to a special master and then review the findings of the special master.
Either procedure would be workable; but one conclusion bears empha-
sizing: in any procedure (including one based solely on the briefs), the
appellate process would become much more fluid, the master's findings
might necessitate a new set of briefs, and it is even possible that the finding
of new facts would occur after oral argument (for example, in situations
where a judge or Justice was particularly slow in writing her opinion, and
facts changed as she was working on it).
This system may seem to raise a new concern: gamesmanship on the
part of litigants who may want to allege that there are new facts. That
danger, however, already exists. Under my proposal as well as the tradi-
tional system, there may be an incentive for a party that thinks it will lose
in the appellate court to allege that relevant facts have changed. In fact,
the incentive may be greater when the appellate court will remand, as that
opens the possibility that, by the time the case returns to the appellate
court, the identity of some of the judges may have changed, either because
of changes in the composition of the court or because-in the case of some
courts of appeals-it may be possible to get a new panel.
The important point here is that appellate courts already face this
danger and nonetheless seem to muddle through somehow. This is not to
suggest that the matter is easily resolved. Changes in facts place the
reviewing court in a problematic position, as the court may have difficulty
determining the scope of the alleged changes. But the point simply is that
they already attend to this issue, and there is no reason to think they will
be any worse at it in the future. Similarly, they already find facts; this
proposal regularizes that process and provides the parties with notice and
an opportunity to be heard.
That said, it bears emphasis that this procedure would depart from the
orthodox appellate process, in which the parties simply submit briefs that
summarize the record below and make legal arguments confined to that
record. Not only would that process be altered in the case of rapidly
changing facts, but so, too, would our notion of a case being finally and
unalterably submitted to the appellate court. As this Article has argued,
however, that version of the appellate process is currently jettisoned on
360. See supra section V(C)(1).
[Vol. 78:269
Stepping into the Same River Twice
some occasions, most notably when there is a suggestion of mootness and
when the court engages in fact-finding (based on briefs or its own
research). Insofar as the process proposed here would further erode those
procedures and lead to a more flexible appellate process, that is merely a
reflection of the difficulty that rapidly changing facts create: appellate
courts either respond to those changes or risk issuing opinions that are (and
should be) historical artifacts.
VI. Implications
We are left, then, with no ideal approach for appellate courts con-
fronted with facts that have changed since the trial court made its findings.
The factors, on balance, seem to favor appellate updating of facts, but this
approach has drawbacks, like the others. The fact that none of the avail-
able solutions-remand, decide the case based on old facts, or update the
facts-is terribly attractive might suggest that we should look a bit further
afield for other choices. How else might we solve this problem?
One obvious solution would be a streamlining of the judicial (and
particularly the appellate) process. After all, the only reason this problem
arises is because of the long delays between the initial fact-finding and the
final appellate ruling. And, of course, the main timing difference between
remanding and appellate updating flow from, first, the time it takes to get
the case before a district court and, second, the time it then takes to put the
case back on the appellate docket and go through all the appellate
procedures; if those time-consuming procedures did not exist, remand
could be as quick as the appellate court updating the facts on its own.
Perhaps such streamlining is on its way, aided in significant part by
technology. The placement of all trial materials on universally compatible
memory systems (e.g., compact discs) might help to speed up the appellate
process. More radically, as Paul Carrington has recently noted, pervasive
use of video technology could not only allow for virtual trials contained
entirely on videotape, but also for appellate review of trial rulings to which
the parties objected before the tape was ever submitted to a judge or jury
for their consideration. 6 That is, technology might allow us to retain
appellate review but cut out a layer of bureaucratic proceedings. After all,
it is by no means clear that we need a separately ensconced post-
adjudication appellate review, once we allow witnesses to be cross-
examined (and videotaped) separately from the "trial" (that is, the viewing
of the tape).
Unless and until we dramatically reduce the time consumed in the
appellate process (and unless we take a more radical step, such as
361. See Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial City, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1524-34 (1998).
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abandoning appellate review altogether), the central problem will remain:
the tension between a rule of law norm under which forward-looking
opinions lay down not merely advice but the current status of the law as
applied to the parties, and the reality that facts are subject to rapid change.
To pick one example: those opposed to Internet indecency have managed
to enact legislation that seeks to get around the strictures of Reno v.
ACLU. 62 They and their opponents probably assume that the core holding
of Reno will remain unless the Justices change their minds. But if relevant
facts underlying the Internet have changed (as Justice Scalia noted with
concern at oral argument, and Justice O'Connor suggested in her
dissent 63), then Reno may no longer present a valid constitutional
analysis irrespective of any new laws that might be challenged.
Some may object that this sounds close to an abandonment of stare
decisis, because I am advocating that courts not only can but must be
willing to reconsider precedents when facts change, and that parties should
not see appellate opinions as fixed stars by which they can set their course
for the indefinite future. To this accusation I plead guilty; but this is a
necessary corollary to tests that rely on facts, and it appropriately
encourages appellate courts to be clear about what they are really relying
on. Appellate courts can avoid this problem only by issuing opinions that
do not depend on the facts on the ground, a notion of platonic judging that
seems at odds with the requirements of Article lI. 64
So it may be that the result of rapidly changing facts is that precedents
do not control future behavior for very long. In its extreme form, this
development could effectively transform the United States into a jurisdic-
tion where precedents have little value. But there is little reason to foresee
so radical a development, as dramatic factual changes are still relatively
rare, and courts sometimes lay down principles that are sufficiently broad
to transcend minor factual developments. For those, however, who would
contend that I am not giving sufficient weight to stare decisis, and that a
decision should continue to have force even if some of its factual under-
pinnings have been undermined, the proposal for appellate fact updating is
all the more compelling., After all, if an appellate court is making a
decision that might affect Americans in other cases in the future, it should
make sure that it actually gets to make a decision (i.e., avoid the infinite
loop problem of another remand), and that it decides based on facts that are
362. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The new Internet legislation is the Child Online Protection Act, 47
U.S.C. § 231 (1998). A district court has already granted a preliminary injunction against its
enforcement, relying in part on Reno v. ACLU. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 98-104.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64.
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up to date (i.e., update the facts, and do not simply rule based on old
facts).
This discussion also might counsel in favor of the approach put
forward by Justice Souter in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,36 that "we should be shy about saying the
final word today about what will be accepted as reasonable tomorrow.""
One seeming problem with this restraint is that consequently litigants and
ordinary citizens can never really rely on the Court's pronouncements; the
Court, in taking small steps that it promises a willingness to later
reconsider, deprives parties of any assurance about what the future legal
regime will be. Perhaps, though, this is the great advantage of the Souter
approach when facts are changing: people won't rely, and thus will have
no basis to complain when future changes come down the pike. That is,
the problem with more definitive opinions is that citizens may assume that,
like opinions of old, they will remain for a while; and so later changes
based on new facts may frustrate those expectations.
The bottom line is that in light of the centrality of facts to adjudica-
tion, rapidly changing facts require that courts be willing to reconsider
earlier opinions the factual basis of which has shifted. And, if that
happens, the role of stare decisis is diminished. Litigants, judges, and
ordinary citizens will not be able to rely on precedents, because the
changes at work undermine the cases on which they would seek to rely.
Even if an appellate court does update the facts, in light of the possibility
of continual change it may only be postponing the inevitable staleness of
its opinion. This Article suggests that such updating is nonetheless
appropriate, as an updated opinion still will have a longer shelf life than
will one that is not updated-and, more importantly, will actually apply to
the controversy as it currently exists. No matter what, though, judicial
opinions can only be as permanent as the facts on which they rest. No
appellate court will ever catch up with changing facts. So the court must
find the facts as of some point and issue its ruling, knowing all the while
that the resulting opinion may be irrelevant in a matter of a few years (or
perhaps months).
VII. Conclusion
Bruce Ackerman introduced a useful metaphor for judging: judges as
passengers in the caboose of a train, looking backward at the view behind
them.367 One can imagine policymakers looking boldly ahead, setting the
365. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
366. Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring).
367. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 98-99 (1991).
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train (the American Republic) on a particular path. But the role of judges
is to try to make sense of the landscape that the policymakers have carved
out and the path they have chosen.
This Article highlights an elaboration of the metaphor: appellate judges
are not in the caboose looking at the landscape (at least insofar as the
landscape represents the development of facts, as opposed to law). Trial
judges are in the back of the caboose, absorbing the view and writing
descriptions of it; appellate judges are somewhere inside, blinds closed,
relying exclusively (in theory, anyway) on the descriptions that the trial
judges give them. The problem on which this Article focuses is that
sometimes the landscape changes between the time the descriptions are
written and the appellate judges get to review them. What should happen
in those cases?
The question lacks easy answers. The structure of the appellate
system seems to presuppose that facts will remain sufficiently stable to
allow the appellate court to focus on questions of law, secure in the
knowledge that the findings from the district court have not been overtaken
by new developments. This view also presumes that, in those rare cases
when facts found below have changed, such change is a one-time develop-
ment, so that a simple remand can solve the problem-the case will then
come back up the appellate chain with a stable set of findings.
What, then, should an appellate court do when confronted by a
credible assertion that facts have changed in the time since the district court
made its findings, and may change again in the near future? A tempting
answer would be for the appellate court to send the case away without
weighing the significance of any alleged factual changes-either by
remanding to the district court for more fact-finding or by deciding the
case based on the facts as originally found. In light of the delays involved
in remand, and the strange posture of a grant or denial of forward-looking
relief that may be inapposite on the day it is granted or denied, both of
these possibilities are unattractive. This Article suggests another option:
the appellate court updating the facts on its own. To return to the
metaphor of the train, the appellate judges would open the blinds to get a
view for themselves. That proposal may consume more appellate
resources, but it has the virtue of providing for appellate review of the
controversy as it actually exists.
The larger issue, though, is that neither the appellate process nor our
vision of precedent is terribly well equipped for rapidly changing facts.
These situations confound not only our understanding of the role of
appellate courts but also the seeming permanence of appellate decisions.
This Article argues that fact updating will often be the most attractive
response to changed and changing facts. But even if the updating of facts
is necessary to ensure that appellate courts issue opinions that pertain to the
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world when those rulings are handed down, it is of course not sufficient to
insulate appellate opinions from future factual changes. Where such trans-
formations occur, formerly "current" appellate rulings will be out of date.
Ultimately, whether we like it or not, judicial opinions are written in sand.

